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This thesis argues that the relationship between the Gulf Arab states and Egypt constitutes                           
a region in the third food regime, as defined by a circuit of commodities and capital. The                                 
flow of capital from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states into Egyptian food and                         
agriculture since 1988 has played a central role in the construction of a corporate food                             
system. This thesis will outline this process in three stages of the supply chain: horticulture                             
on reclaimed land, agro­industrial production and supermarkets and retail. This space is                       
also defined by the export of horticultural products such as table crops and livestock feed                             
from Egypt to the Gulf states. 
 
The development of this region has been predicated on the formation of close links                           
between Gulf investors and the Egyptian state. This state­capital nexus allowed Gulf                       
capital to territorialise through the mediation of access to state resources by the Egyptian                           
government. This nexus is a synthesis of relations that includes the Egyptian military and                           
Egyptian capitalists who also have close ties to the state. This thesis will posit financial                             
markets and institutions as main vehicles for the internationalisation of Gulf capital into                         
Egypt as they created joint­shareholdings and partnerships that form the state­capital                     
nexus. 
 
The Gulf­Egypt region has led to the formation of new spaces of production at the national                               
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 scale in Egypt. Companies with GCC shareholders have invested in land reclamation                       
schemes and agro­industrial projects that have allowed a heightened level of control over                         
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Agriculture is a mainstay of life in Egypt. Around 30% of the national workforce is                             
employed in the sector and it contributes approximately 11% of total GDP (World Bank,                           
2016). Only a small percentage of the country is suitable for horticulture but the agrarian                             
areas are highly productive, and the combination of climate and water resources allows for                           
intense cultivation. Agriculture is intrinsic to the country’s history and social fabric, and this                           
is represented in the legacy of indigenous animal breeds and practices that have been                           
developed over generations.  
 
Despite this wealth, food insecurity is approaching crisis levels in Egypt. The problem has                           
worsened over the last decade, and in 2011 the percentage of the population suffering                           
from food insecurity reached 17%, or almost 14 million people (WFP, 2013). In rural areas,                             
30% of children under the age of five suffer from stunting due to malnutrition (ibid). The                               
average household in Egypt spends around 40% of its income on food, and as a result of                                 
its high cost it buys less nutritious commodities (ibid). In order to address this problem the                               
government has maintained food subsidies on commodities such as bread, sugar, rice,                       
and cooking oil, and around 70% of Egyptian households consume these products.                       
However as a result of the nutritional nature of this basket of commodities, Egypt suffers                             




Policy debates on this problem tends to consider the market as a solution to food                             
insecurity. This recommendation has been promoted by US development agencies such                     
as USAID, and increasingly they manifest themselves in the strategies of NGOs and                         
private development corporations operating in Egypt. These agencies constitute a small                     
industry in Egypt, and they employ numerous foreign experts who wield influence over                         
government policy. They invest considerable energy in attempting to incorporate small                     
farmers into the market and encourage them to access the value­chain and export their                           
products; they attempt to install a culture of “entrepreneurship” among smallholders.   1
 
This thesis does not offer technocratic solutions to the problem of food insecurity. Rather,                           
it considers that problems such as hunger and malnutrition should be considered as a                           
creation of the structure of Egypt’s food system. With this considered, this dissertation will                           
examine Egypt’s corporate food system, a sector that has expanded rapidly over the last                           
two decades. Large corporations now control substantial market shares of horticulture,                     
food processing, poultry, dairy, supermarkets, and fast food restaurants. The control of                       
corporations over food production has expanded as a result of the state’s backing, and                           
considerable resources and support have been allocated to food and agribusiness                     
companies. The issue of food insecurity should be seen in the context of the dominance of                               
this system. 
 
The role of institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the                               
1 For an insight into one of these projects see (ILO, 2013). 
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 creation of the corporate system, and the access given to multinational corporations, has                         
been well­documented in literature on Egyptian agriculture (Bush 1995; 2007; Bush and                       
Ayeb 2012, Bush and Bromley 1994; Dixon 2013a; 2013b; 2015; Mitchell 2002). But one                           
characteristic of Egypt’s corporate food system that has not been closely examined by this                           
academic field is the part played by Gulf capital, which has become the largest foreign                             
investor in the sector. 
 
This thesis illustrates the investment of Gulf capital in different stages of the agribusiness                           
supply chain in Egypt. The primary argument throughout this thesis is that as a result of                               
the internationalisation of Gulf capital into Egypt’s food and agriculture sector, the                       
relationship between the Egypt and the GCC states constitutes a region in the global                           
corporate ​food system. As a result, accumulation of Gulf agribusiness conglomerates takes                       
place at the regional scale and the supply chains of their operations have been embedded                             
into Egypt. In Egypt, one of the consequences of these regional processes has been Gulf                             
investment’s capitalisation of agribusiness, leading to intense levels of vertical integration,                     
and the creation of monopoly market shares. This thesis will argue that Gulf capital has                             
established its investment in this sector through a relationship with the Egyptian state that                           
is deeper than other foreign capitals. As a result of this linkage, Gulf investors have                             
benefited from access to land, water, and other state resources that have allowed                         
productive capacity. 
 
This thesis' framing of a food system region that spans Arab states is motivated by another                               
lacuna in the academic literature. There have been several studies on food policies across                           
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 the Arab region (Woertz, 2013; Elhadj; 2005; Bailey and Willoughby 2013; Harrigan 2014).                         
While they are all insightful contributions to the field, these works tend to consider Arab                             
states as sharing commonalities in terms of food insecurity, partly due to the mutual                           
reliance on food imports from Northern producers. However the relationship between Arab                       
states and the inequalities embodied within these relations have largely been overlooked.                       
This is pertinent given that trade is the normative policy response to food insecurity; a                             
strategy that assumes exports based on comparative advantage can earn foreign currency                       
to import food. However this policy is based on the assumption that the international                           
market can create an equilibrium in the access to food, yet there is little evidence of such a                                   
balance in inter­Arab trade. In fact there is evidence to suggest that this policy has led to                                 
growing inequality in terms of access to food. Over the last two decades Egypt’s food                             
exports have increased substantially and this has done little to lower levels of malnutrition,                           
indeed they have increased since 2003.   2
 
Theoretically, this thesis employs food regime theory, a Marxist approach towards food                       
systems. Predominantly an historical notion, food regime theory identifies three historical                     
food systems under capitalism: the settler colonial food regime between approximately                     
1870 until 1947, the second food regime following the Second World War, and the                           
corporate food regime from the 1980s onwards. While the first two regimes consisted of                           
linear flows of commodities and capital between North and South (albeit in different                         
directions) the corporate food regime is geographically multipolar. However the                   
2 Between 1990 and 2013 the levels of export fruit crops in Egypt increased by 655%, the number of oil                                       
export crops increased by 1221% and the number of vegetable export crops increased by 258% (Hanieh,                               
2013: 87). 
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 development of this multipolar system has received inadequate attention in food regime                       
literature, despite the inherently complex nature of space in the corporate food system.                         
With this in mind this thesis will augment food regime theory with a geographic and spatial                               
dimension, and in doing so respond to a lacuna and make an original contribution to                             
knowledge.   
 
This thesis also intends to make a contribution to the literature on political economy in the                               
Middle East. Research on the Gulf states has been dominated by rentier state theory, a                             
concept that tends to a reification of the nation state and overlooks the manner in which                               
accumulation is increasingly articulated at the regional scale. This thesis intends to provide                         
an empirical illustration of this internationalisation, and as such argue that contrary to                         





In order to research Gulf investment in Egyptian food and agriculture, and its role in the                               
formation of the corporate food system, this thesis examines Egypt’s agriculture sector                       
between 1988 and the present day. This period has been chosen as Egypt’s debt crisis in                               
1988 granted the IMF leverage to impose structural adjustment policies, which led to the                           
transformation that allowed the growth of a corporate food regime.  
 
In terms of a frame of analysis, the thesis focuses on several institutional entities: Gulf                             
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 food conglomerates and their investments in Egypt, Egyptian companies and financial                     
institutions that have received Gulf investment, and financial institutions in the Gulf that                         
have invested in Egypt. It also examines government institutions, non­governmental                   
organisations (NGOs) and international NGOs. It uses this frame of analysis to empirically                         
illustrate the extent of Gulf investment in Egypt’s food and agriculture sector, with specific                           
focus on three stages of the supply chain: horticulture, agro­industry and food retail. From                           























In order to address these questions this thesis employs a qualitative research                       
methodology. Data extraction was primarily undertaken through semi­structured interviews                 
conducted in Egypt and the Gulf, most of which were arranged through a snowball                           
sampling method. Primary sources also included English and Arabic media reports,                     
business information websites, company reports, and press releases. This method has                     
been undertaken for two main reasons. Firstly, there is a dearth of reliable data in Egypt of                                 
the scale that would facilitate a quantitative study. Secondly there are few data sets that                             
would be appropriate for a quantitative approach to my research aims. 
 
For the most part, interviews were undertaken with informants who could be described as                           
members of the elite. Company managers formed the largest group of respondents,                       
followed by NGO workers, and then government officials. I approached company                     
managers on the basis that the study of the corporate food system required an insight into                               
the firms that control this regime. Dealing with such a group of informants required                           
vigilance against statements motivated by commercial self­interest and promotion. Indeed                   
in some cases managers of corporations did use interviews to extol the social benefits of                             
their activities, or to inflate their size and market share. However this was rare and in most                                 
cases managers of companies were surprisingly candid, and revealed unflattering details                     
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 about their companies and sectors. Perhaps more than in any other area, elite interviews                           
were instructive on the nature of state­business relations that are discussed in this thesis,                           
a topic that is opaque, and knowledge of which tends to be exclusive to a small class of                                   
capitalists who have direct experience of this relation. 
 
I offered anonymity to all of my interviewees and their company or organisation. Anonymity                           
created a sense of security that prompted interviewees to reveal details of their operations                           
but more importantly it offered protection, both from their employers and government                       
agencies. Although many of the issues discussed were seemingly innocuous,                   
conversations that covered corruption, or the nature of the relationship with the state, and                           





Chapter One will focus on food regime theory and it will examine how this has been                               
applied to the Middle East as well as the relevant literature on food and agriculture in the                                 
region. It will then examine how geography has been included in food regime literature and                             
illustrate the lacuna that this thesis will address. This chapter will provide the theoretical                           
foundation for the argument that the Gulf and Egypt constitutes a region within the                           




 Chapter Two will apply the historical framework of food regime theory to Egypt, the                           
manifestations of which are clearly identifiable. I will draw on the rich field of literature on                               
Egypt's development, agrarian economy, and history in order to outline the three periods of                           
the food regime concept. The first food regime covers the period of British colonial rule,                             
and the second regime covers the post­Second World War period, defined by the export of                             
US and European grain to Egypt. This chapter will also examine the transition into the                             
corporate food regime that took place in Egypt from the late 1980s onwards.  
 
Chapters Three to Six will be based on research drawn from my fieldwork as well as                               
secondary sources. Chapter Three illustrates the role of financial markets in the                       
internationalisation of Gulf capital into the Egyptian food and agribusiness sector. Although                       
not all Gulf investments have taken place through financial markets, a significant number                         
have. Financial institutions such as private equity firms have acted as vehicles for Gulf                           
capital’s accumulation in the sector, albeit one that appears to be Egyptian in terms of its                               
management and image. Egyptian stock markets have also performed a similar role. This                         
chapter will also illustrate how Egypt constitutes an important source of revenues for food                           
conglomerates that are listed on the Gulf stock markets. 
 
Chapters Four to Six will trace the presence, role, and consequences of Gulf capital in the                               
supply chain from farm to consumer. Chapter Four will illustrate the role of Gulf investors                             
in establishing large farms on reclaimed land, known in Egypt as the New Lands. These                             
farms serve two purposes. Either they are used to grow livestock feed or high­value table                             
crops for export markets in the Gulf, or they are vertically integrated into the supply chains                               
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 of food conglomerates. The chapter will focus on Toshka and Sharq El Oweinat, two land                             
reclamation projects in which Gulf capital played a central role. In addition to the material                             
benefits of these projects, this thesis will also focus on the political nature of these                             
schemes, and the form of state­capital relations that they represent. Theoretically, the                       
chapter will place this process within the concept of a frontier of cheap nature that has                               
been opened in response to the ecological exhaustion of the Old Lands.  
 
Chapter Five will examine the agro­industrial sector and three sub­sectors: processing,                     
poultry, and dairy. It will illustrate how Gulf capital owns companies (in the form of minority                               
or majority shareholdings) that control monopoly market shares and have the largest                       
operations, both in terms of capacity and technological sophistication. This chapter will                       
argue that the consequences of the flow of Gulf capital into the sector has been an                               
intensification of vertical integration, and a spatial relocation of these industries away from                         
the traditional areas of agricultural production. The section will illustrate how Gulf                       
investment in this sector has been predicated on a relationship with the Egyptian state, an                             
interaction that constitutes the “state­capital nexus”, a recurring theme that is analysed                       
throughout this thesis.   
 
Chapter Six focuses on the supermarket and fast food sector and it will show how Gulf                               
companies have introduced franchises of Western brands to Egypt. As is the case with                           
many Gulf investments in the agribusiness supply chain, accumulation in food retail is                         
dependent on the relationship with the Egyptian state, and this forms another dimension of                           
the state­capital nexus. This chapter will also chart some of the limitations to the corporate                             
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 food sector and the potential for these barriers to be surpassed. These limitations include                           
the family system of food production, rural space, and the state controlled system. Lastly                           
this chapter will examine the influence that Gulf investors have had over consumption in                           





This dissertation argues that the relation between the Gulf states and Egypt constitutes a                           
region in the corporate food regime. This refers to the agribusiness tier of food and                             
agriculture, and the notion should not be understood as reference to all of Egypt's                           
agriculture sector, the majority of which is non­corporate. Moreover the exchange of                       
commodities within the non­corporate system is unlikely to involve a large distance.  
 
This thesis outlines the role of Gulf capital in restructuring Egypt’s agribusiness sector and                           
it examines the supply chain from land reclamation to industrial farming to supermarkets                         
and retail. These sub­sectors are substantial industries that have had extensive ecological                       
and social corollaries, the poultry sector being one example. This thesis concentrates on                         
how Gulf investment provided the capital for the growth of corporate agribusiness                       
companies in these sectors. It does not claim to be a full study on the various industries                                 
that are discussed as their extensive size and the array of issues that are relevant to them                                 




In the same vein, at every stage of the supply chain, the agribusiness tier that Gulf capital                                 
has invested in interfaces with the state food system, and subsistence and smallholder                         
production. These are areas that are also extensive. The state system manifests itself in                           
the form of food subsidies that perform a vital function in ensuring the availability of certain                               
products. This is enabled through state­owned industries that account for a considerable                       
amount of commodities in the Egyptian food market. The subsistence and smallholder                       
sector approximately refers to production by Egyptians who are engaged with some form                         
of agriculture, either on a full time or part time basis. While some produce is consumed                               
within the family unit, the surplus (in varying degrees of scale) may be sold on the market,                                 
a system that accounts for a considerable amount of activity in the agriculture and food                             
sector. This thesis only mentions these systems in terms of their interaction with the                           
corporate agribusiness sector and it does not pertain to be a comprehensive account of                           
their current status. I believe this is justified as the frame of analysis of this thesis aims                                 
primarily at exploring the role of Gulf capital in reshaping the corporate system.  
 
It is with some discomfort that I have defined modes of production in this manner, although                               
such terms are necessary for this purpose of this study. Terminology such as “sector”,                           
“economy”, and the “market” are problematic, as they cloud the political mechanisms that                         
lie behind the construction of such entities. Moreover, it is often assumed that such                           
Northern and Western definitions have a global commonality, when in the case of Egypt                           




“The ideas of the economy and the market seem so matter of fact that they would                               
appear as central categories in almost any discussion of the changes transforming                       
the rural Third World. Yet when they are taken for granted they conceal more than                             
they reveal. A study of contemporary rural Egypt that assumes the economy to be a                             
universal and unproblematic object would overlook the political process of its                     
creation, as well as the local history of this process in Egyptian politics,” (2002:                           
246­7). 
 
I have a similar sense of unease when it comes to other terms utilised in this thesis. For                                   
example the term “investment” is a misnomer, given that in some cases it is part of a                                 
process of dispossession. Smallholder and subsistence production are simplified terms for                     
a complex, diverse, and understudied area of activity, and smallholder farmer is used,                         
despite my awareness that this refers to millions of people who are subject to an array of                                 
relations of production. The same applies to Global North and South, a locution whose                           
simplistic dichotomy has an obvious analytical weakness, but nonetheless has utility.  
 
Another caveat that will be reiterated through the course of this thesis is that while Gulf                               
investment has played a central role in capitalising Egypt’s corporate food system, this                         
point should not be interpreted as reductive. Egyptian and European capitals have also                         
played a role in this process, the Egyptian state has mediated and helped construct this                             
food system and international institutions have overseen corporate restructuring. Moreover                   
I should be clear that this thesis does not intend to portray the Gulf and its capital as an all                                       
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 powerful entity that is unconnected to US hegemony and its policy in the Middle East.                             
Nonetheless, the highly significant role of the Gulf in Egyptian agribusiness has been                         





The interpretivist nature of qualitative research can lead to accusations of reflexive bias,                         
and in response it is important to declare one's subjective weaknesses. There is a                           
historical relation between knowledge and power, and this is an important cognizance for a                           
British citizen studying Egypt in a British university. Historically, the British academy has                         
produced knowledge that has acted as an ideological justification, and practical facilitation                       
of British colonialism (Dimier, 2006; Steinmetz, 2013). A example of this relation can be                           
seen in Arthur Balfour’s speech in the House of Commons in 1910 in which he justified the                                 
continued occupation of Egypt on the basis of knowledge: “We know the civilisation of                           
Egypt better than we know the civilisation of any other country. We know it further back;                               
we know it more intimately; we know more about it,” (Said, 1995: 32). The ability to                               
conduct fieldwork in Egypt is itself a privilege, especially considering the substantial                       
hurdles that Egyptian academics face in their attempts to obtain a visa to the UK. This                               
inequality is a legacy of colonial power and regardless of one’s best intentions and                           
education, access is a privilege that is a product of history.  
   
Keeping this in mind, I have experience living and working in the Middle East, which has                               
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 carried into this research in ways that are both explicit and implicit. Between 2001­2006 I                             
was a journalist in Lebanon and Qatar, and this experience provided a lesson in                           
conducting research in the Arab region. In 2006 I reported on the war between Israel and                               
Hizbullah, and this powerful experience made me realise that I was no longer interested in                             
journalism. I then worked as a business researcher conducting market research across the                         
Middle East, with a strong focus on the Arab Gulf states. This gave me a strong knowledge                                 
of the networks of business and politics that dominate the region's economies. I have also                             
had the opportunity to undertake extensive travel around the region, and over the years I                             
have journeyed to Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Palestine and other                       
countries. However while these professional experiences have been extremely insightful,                   
they also left the legacy of a writing style that was journalistic and prosaic, one that I have                                   
tried to unlearn during the course of writing this thesis. 
 
Although it has given me strong familiarity with the region, my background as a business                             
researcher also meant that I adopted my methodology with a certain bias. In the years                             
prior to starting my PhD I had undertaken several market research reports that involved                           
interviews with members of the “elite”, such as businesspeople, government officials, NGO                       
employees, and foreign diplomats. This experience meant that I had some familiarity with                         
the language and culture of the business elite in Egypt, and the Middle East. The                             
opportunity to explore the critical political economy literature in some depth as a PhD                           




 My Arabic language skills were also an asset during my fieldwork in Egypt. Although my                             
Egyptian dialect is weaker than my Levantine dialect I was able to conduct a minority of                               
my interviews in Arabic, although the majority were done in English. Arabic also served as                             
a useful skill in terms of navigating around Cairo in order to locate offices where I arranged                                 





It was with some trepidation that I departed for Cairo in late August 2013 in order to begin                                   
my PhD fieldwork. That summer, the coup that overthrew President Mohammed Morsi had                         
caused me to rethink my plans to conduct research in Egypt. In light of the violent                               
crackdown on street protests and the instability caused by the takeover, I was concerned                           
that the country was too insecure to conduct research. I was also worried that my                             
questions on agriculture would be considered as unimportant and irrelevant given the                       
turmoil. Once I arrived such fears abated; although there was a palpable air of tension,                             
and a night­time curfew was enforced by the military, life in Cairo continued as normal. 
 
The political atmosphere may have worked in my favour. Many interviewees seemed                       
pleased to be asked questions about agriculture and the economy, and I felt that some                             
viewed my presence as a sign that the situation was “returning to normal”. Some                           
informants, especially those who were particularly well­placed, were in a buoyant mood as                         
a result of the removal of Morsi, and appeared to be happy at the prospect of the                                 
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 restoration of privileges. One consequence to the political climate was my perception that                         
the security services were occupied with the pursuit of members of the Muslim                         
Brotherhood and were unlikely to be concerned with the activities of a researcher. I also                             
felt that there was an environment in which the magnitude of the summer’s event meant                             
that a subject such as the political economy of agriculture was viewed as innocuous. 
 
Between September and November I enjoyed a fruitful period of research during which I                           
conducted 33 interviews with individuals employed in the private sector, non­governmental                     
organisations, and in the government. These were long days. My day would begin with                           
Arabic lessons in Mohandeseen followed by interviews in the afternoon, and on a few days                             
during this period I conducted three interviews in a day. The frequent taxi journeys                           
provided a chance to improve my Egyptian dialect with the reliably chatty cab drivers. They                             
also gave me an insight into the expanse of Cairo, the juxtaposition between its slums and                               
middle class neighbourhoods, and the manner in which the city was continually                       
encroaching onto the agricultural land at its fringe.  
 
As a result of the nature of my interviews and my research aims, my trips outside of Cairo                                   
were limited. This was partly due to the security and political situation, and aside from the                               
numerous reports of clashes and violence in rural towns of the Delta and Middle and                             
Upper Egypt, travel outside of Cairo was complicated by the fact that rail services were                             
cancelled for most of September and October.  
 
On one occasion I arranged to meet a vet who worked in the poultry industry in the Delta                                   
26 
 town of Zagazig. During the journey from Cairo the taxi driver got lost, and the trip happily                                 
turned into an extended tour of the Delta, which passed through several towns and the                             
agricultural areas around them. The experience was insightful, and it drew my attention to                           
the problems that exist within the traditional agrarian areas. There were signs of the                           
bucolic charm that is stereotypically depicted in tourism brochures and guide books, but                         
many of the areas through which we drove were blighted by pollution, unmanaged                         
urbanisation, and inadequate infrastructure. Despite these problems I was also struck by                       
the fecundity of the land and the industrious buzz among the communities of the Delta. In                               
future research I would appreciate the opportunity to gain a better understanding of these                           
rural areas in Egypt.   
 
As the months passed I began to notice that among some, the political mood became                             
more suspicious and conspiratorial. One morning in November my Arabic teacher started                       
my class with a series of noticeably pointed questions regarding my research and my                           
reasons for being in Egypt. Elsewhere I also began to notice a sense of anger and betrayal                                 
based on a perception that Western governments were not more supportive of Egypt’s                         
“fight against terrorism”. Some even went further and considered that the West was                         
participating in a conspiracy against Egypt as a result of perceived support for Morsi and                             
the Muslim Brotherhood. In one interview in November I was given a particularly hostile                           
reception and my questions about agriculture and food were met with a tirade about how                             
the West could no longer be trusted.  
 
As a result of the increasingly bitter mood among some sections of society I wonder if my                                 
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 informants would be as accessible as they were in late 2013. In April 2014 I returned to                                 
Egypt for a month in order to conduct further interviews. Aside from the fact that my list of                                   
potential informants was close to exhaustion, I also noticed that calls were not being                           
returned. Since then I have tried to arrange second interviews by email or over the phone                               
but my requests have gone unanswered.  
 
After I had conducted research in Egypt my plan was to conduct several months of                             
research in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In 2014 I applied for a research                               
visa to Saudi Arabia that would be sponsored by the King Faisal Centre for Research and                               
Islamic Studies, but the Saudi state declined the application for reasons that are unclear.                           
In February 2014 I spent one week in the UAE and one week in Qatar in order to assess                                     
the potential for further research in these countries. In contrast to Egypt, my experience                           
was less directly fruitful in terms of formal interview material. Employees of agribusiness                         
companies were elusive and unapproachable, and employees of NGOs and international                     
agencies had little knowledge of Egypt. My visit to the UAE coincided with an increase in                               
tensions with Qatar as a result of its support for the Muslim Brotherhood government in                             
Egypt. As a result my questions on Egyptian agriculture were used by many informants as                             
a chance to brief me on the interference of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE. In Qatar I                                   
encountered a more open atmosphere but my interviews did not provide much helpful                         
information. 
 
On balance I feel that my fieldwork was effective. I was able to access a mix of informants                                   
with different insights into food and agriculture in Egypt, and the politics of foreign                           
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 investment. NGO workers provided me with criticisms of the private sector and insight into                           
developmental problems. Government officials gave me accounts of the difficulties they                     
face and the constraints they have in trying to influence policy. The most interesting                           
discussions took place with informants in the private sector. Of the 33 interviews I was                             
able to speak to around five company managers who gave me an overview of their                             













The following chapter will provide the theoretical foundation for this thesis. It will start by                             
charting food regime theory, its origins, its criticisms, and its reformulations. Of particular                         
importance to this thesis is the theory’s definition of the third food regime and the                             
corporate food system. Given that food regime theory is expansive, this section will focus                           
on the specific characteristics of the corporate food system that are of relevance to the                             
chapters in this thesis. These are conceptualisations on the role of financial markets, land                           
grabs, agro­industrial development, and supermarkets and retail. The chapter on                   
supermarkets and retail will stray outside of food regime theory. It will then examine how                             
food regime theory has been applied in the Middle East, and also review other literature on                               
food in the region. The chapter will then examine how the question of geography and                             
space has been applied to food regime theory, and illustrate the lacuna that this thesis will                               





Food embodies a set of social relations that have been constructed through time and                           
space. It inheres a wide range of themes that are relevant to political economy, sociology,                             
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 and history. Given this expansive nature, what theoretical approach to the study of food                           
can synthesise these disparate threads? How can food be studied in a manner that avoids                             
its reification? With this in mind, this thesis will eschew a frame that views agriculture and                               
food as purely a technical and scientific matter. Rather, this thesis considers food and                           3
agriculture as a subject that should incorporate social sciences such as politics and                         
economics (Lawrence and McMichael: 2012: 138).  
 
Mainstream social science approaches to agriculture tend to see a problem such as food                           
security as one that can be addressed through a technocratic framework that addresses                         
policy and practices. This approach might consider that the coincidence of foreign                       
investment and food insecurity in Egypt is primarily a result of the inability of small farmers                               
to access agribusiness supply chains. However, as will be illustrated in this thesis, such an                             
approach tends to overlook the differential in power that exists between smallholders and                         
owners of agribusiness companies. The problem of this approach was remarked upon by                         
Bush: “Egypt's agricultural crisis has for too long been seen to be a technical problem at                               
the level of inputs and prices rather than a social and political problem of conflicting                             
relations of production, (Bush, 1995: 515).  
 
The political economy of foreign investment in Egypt is a rich field and some of these                               
works are referenced in a section later in this chapter. This field is relevant to the alliances                                 
between Gulf investors, Egyptian capitalists and the Egyptian state that will be discussed                         
3 Modernisation theory and its manifestations in social science often led to agriculture becoming a technical                               
question of productivity. According to one account: “This period of productivist enhancement was further                           
reinforced by the role of the agriculture economist shaping scientific spheres and mainly analysing rural                             
areas and agrarian change through a modernisation lense,” (Ortiz­Miranda et al., 2013: 11). 
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 and this thesis will engage with aspects of this literature. However despite its utility this                             
corpus does not address the social, environmental and historical issues that are unique to                           
agriculture in Egypt, which are covered by another body of work into which this thesis                             
makes an intervention.   
 
One theoretical approach that encompasses both politics and the issues that are specific                         
to food and agriculture is food regime theory. Epistemologically this notion takes the world                           
scale as the unit of analysis, and it breaks from a linear understanding of development that                               
is inherent to modernisation theory. It posits political relations at the centre of food, both in                               
terms of systems that govern commodities but also the significance of food to power. Food                             
regime theory considers that food is a lens through which the political development of                           
capitalism can be observed. Using a set of indicators, the concept identified three distinct                           
historical periods: the first food regime of European colonial power (1880s­1940s), the                       
second regime of US power (1940s­1980s), and the present third food regime of corporate                           
power.  
 
The food regime concept was first proposed in a 1989 article written by Friedmann and                             
McMichael entitled “Agriculture and the State System. The rise and decline of national                         
agricultures, 1870 to the present”. This paper introduced the notion of a food regime as a                               
link between “international relations of food production and consumption to forms of                       
accumulation broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist accumulation since 1870”                 
(Friedmann and McMichael, 1989: 95). The article was motivated by what the authors                         
considered as the problematic assumptions that lay behind attempts to establish national                       
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 agricultures in the Global South. When considered from a “world­historical perspective”                     
they argue these assumptions have been contradicted by the fluidity and global scale of                           
historical relations between agriculture and industry (ibid: 93).  
 
The theory has been enriched by contributions that have adopted new approaches and                         
methodologies but the criteria behind the original definition continues to anchor the                       
concept. The field was defined by McMichael as follows:  
 
“Food regime analysis emerged to explain the strategic role of agriculture and food                         
in the construction of the world capitalist economy. It identifies stable periods of                         
capital accumulation associated with particular configurations of geopolitical power,                 
conditioned by forms of agricultural production and consumption relations within                   
and across national spaces. Contradictory relations within food regimes produce                   
crisis, transformation, and transition to successor regimes,” (2009: 1). 
 
For Friedmann, one of the main foundations of a regime is the establishment of a set of                                 
rules, compromises and tensions between actors such as corporations, governments, and                     
social movements. According to her, food regimes are made and unmade through these                         
relations: “beneath the natural appearance of a working regime lie unstated assumptions                       
that are in effect implicit rules guiding relationships, practices, and outcomes,” (Friedmann,                       
2005: 232).  
 
Both Friedmann and McMichael have been prolific in their contributions to the field and the                             
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 theoretical area has received numerous additions and reformulations that will be covered                       
in this chapter. Given that the concept emerged as a historical analysis, it is worthwhile                             
devoting some attention to the first two historical regimes that have been defined by the                             
notion. Evident in these periods is the methodology of identifying the global relations of                           
consumption and production, their political configurations, and the crisis and tensions that                       
accompany these phases.   
 
The first food regime was defined by the flow of food from colonies in the Global South,                                 
and the settler colonies in the so­called New Worlds, to Europe. Colonial powers and                           
specifically Britain used its colonies as a cheap source of food and raw materials for                             
domestic industries (Friedmann, 1992; 1993; McMichael, 1992; 2009). Most of the produce                       
from colonial plantations was exported back to European states, and the regime was                         
dependent on new forms of transport such as railways and steam shipping. As a result,                             
this period marked the start of an international division of labour of food in which world                               
regions specialised in agricultural products based on comparative advantage (Friedmann,                   
1982). Tropical regions saw the cultivation of monocultures of commodities such as sugar                         
or cotton, while settler colonial states in the Americas became producers of grain. Analysis                           
of this regime also posited the development of agricultural export zones as a source of                             
cheap food (McMichael, 2009). This concept of value relations has remained a theme                         
within food regime literature and has been expanded by other scholars such as Araghi                           
(2003) and Moore (2010). Manifest in the first food regime was the role of finance capital,                               




The first food regime laid the foundations for the centrality of agriculture to development.                           
According to McMichael: “the establishment of national agricultural sectors within the                     
emerging settler states (notably USA, Canada, and Australia), modeled twentieth­century                   
‘development’ as an articulated dynamic between national agricultural and industrial                   
sectors,” (McMichael, 2009a: 141). McMichael suggests that the first food regime went into                         
decline as a result of the First World War, the Great Depression, the collapse of the gold                                 
standard, and the ecological exhaustion of the US Dust Bowl (McMichael, 2013b: 31­32).   
 
The second food regime was determined by a reversal in the flow of food. In this regime                                 
commodities flowed from American and European producers to the Global South. The                       
most prominent characteristic of this system is the subsidised export of surplus grain from                           
the US (Friedman, 1992; 1993; McMichael, 1992; 2009a). These surpluses were a                       4
creation of US government policy and they resulted in huge food exports in the post                             
Second World War era.   5
 
In terms of political power, US power was the hegemon that enabled the second regime                             
(Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). The US dollar dominated the system, and this period                         
4 These surpluses were a result of the New Deal programme of the 1930s, a programme that was intended to                                       
assist family farms by setting the minimum price for farm commodities. After the Second World War, these                                 
subsidies were excluded from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and thus ensured the US                               
agriculture was not exposed to competition from foreign imports (Friedmann 1993). 
 
5 These exports were channelled to the Global South as a result of the introduction of Public Law 480 in                                       
1954. This law allowed the export of food in a programmed dubbed “Food for Peace” that was part of a US                                         
strategy to counter Soviet influence. By 1965, more than 80 percent of US wheat exports were financed by                                   
food aid (Friedmann, 1992). 
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 also saw the emergence of what is termed as agro­capital as a result of the growth of large                                   
grain trading and agribusiness multinationals (Pritchard, 2000). In this regime, the state is                         
considered to be a central actor; mercantilist decisions led to US and European grain                           
surpluses, and states in the Global South sought to take advantage of them in order to                               




The exports of US food surpluses reshaped the global food system. In Europe, the                           6
Marshall Plan resulted in the restructuring of the European farming sector and the growth                           
of industrial agribusiness. The import of cheap livestock feeds from the US encouraged                         7
the farming of livestock, and the increased consumption of meats (Palat, 2004: 34). As a                             
result, one of the key aspects of the second food regime was the integration of the US and                                   
American agriculture sectors into what is described as the Atlantic agro­food sector                       
(Counihan, 2013: 330). However this relationship was contradictory, as both Europe and                       
the US produced food surpluses and over time they began to compete with each other,                             
thus creating a highly competitive world market. The Atlantic system became the “hinge for                           
the reconfiguration of the food relations of Asian, Latin American and African economies.                         








 In the Global South, the second food regime was associated with what Hobsbawm                         
described as “the most spectacular, rapid, far­reaching, profound, and worldwide social                     
change in global history” (1992: 56). Farmers were unable to compete with the Atlantic                           
agro­food system, and the regime “caught the third world in a scissors” (Friedmann, 1993:                           
38). As subsidised surpluses were dumped onto the markets of the South, smallholder                         
farmers could not compete and many were forced to abandon farming and seek wage                           
labour in the cities, thus building the reserve army of labour for nascent industrialisation                           
programmes. The smallholder existence was further undermined by the fact that industrial                       8
food production in the North was able to substitute the products that had been introduced                             
to tropical regions during the first food regime. This period resulted in what was described                             
by Araghi as “depeasantization”, in which peasants became a minority on the world scale                           
(1995).  
 
The second food regime was predicated on Fordist economic management, a system that                         
sought to create new markets for surpluses (Otero, 2011). This creation of new markets                           
led to contradictions. Subsidised US­European exports fostered the growth of specialisms                     
in certain Southern countries that increased competition in the world market. These are                         
termed as New Agricultural Countries (NACs), and their emergence indicates a departure                       
from Northern dominance and Southern subordination (McMichael, 2009; Bernstein,                 
2001). As a result of this expansion, the power of corporations over the trade of                             
commodities grew. In a sign that the power of the US state over the food system was                                 







Generally there is agreement that during the 1980s there was a transition towards a third                             
food regime (Friedmann, 1992; 1993; McMichael, 1992; 2005; 2009a; Burch and                     
Lawrence, 2009; Pritchard, 1998; Pechlaner and Otero, 2010; Le Heron and Roche, 1995;                         
Bernstein, 2015). This regime is considered to be dominated by corporate power and it                           10
has been defined by the general withdrawal of the state’s management of food and                           
agriculture, other than in ways that were essential to the mediation of the market.                           
According to McMichael the third regime represents:  
 
“a new moment in the political history of capital’, reversing the political gains of the                             
welfare and development eras, by ‘facilitating an unprecedented conversion of                   
agriculture across the world to supply a relatively affluent global consumer class.                       
The vehicle of this corporate­driven process is the WTO’s Agreement on                     
9 The incident was dubbed by the press as the Great Russian Grain Robbery and it resulted in a threefold                                       
increase in prices (Roberts, 2008: 120). 





 Agriculture, which . . . institutionalises a distinctive form of economic liberalism                       
geared to deepening market relations via the privatisation of states” (McMichael,                     
2005: 273). 
 
The third regime was partly a product of the neoliberal ethos, which resulted in a                             
reordering of state­market relations, a process that will be discussed in the next section. In                             
the Global South the third regime led to the internationalisation of food and agricultural                           
sectors. Structural adjustment led to inward flows of foreign capital, and the pressure to                           
earn hard currency meant that export agribusiness was given priority over resources.  
 
In terms of an institutional framework, the third food regime is considered to be anchored                             
by the agreements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World                             
Trade Organisation (McMichael, 1992; 2009; Friedmann, 1993). The GATT regime marked                     
the start of the subordination of national sovereignty to a corporate system that privileges                           
free trade and investment (McMichael, 1992). The agreement exacerbated Southern                   
dependency on grain imports by protecting Northern subsidies while removing them in the                         
South. The GATT agreement was then replaced by the WTO in 1995, which further                           
undermined the state’s organisation of food regulation at the national scale, and increased                         
the influence of corporations over the agrarian economy (Araghi, 2009; Friedmann, 1992;                       
1993; McMichael, 1992; 2005; 2009).   
 
One aspect of the third food regime is the emergence of the idea of green capitalism, in                                 
which there is an increasing awareness of the source and standard of food. However there                             
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 is a difference between analysis of the third regime in Northern/Western countries and in                           
the South. Analysis of this regime in Northern countries tends to posit consumer demand                           
for “green and fresh” as being a primary contour (Burch and Lawrence 2009; Le Heron and                               
Roche, 1995). Friedmann argues the environmental movement manifests itself in the                     11
third food regime through the emergence of regulations concerning safety, organic food,                       
animal welfare, and fair trade. One definition of the current regime considers that one of its                               
contradictions stems from the tension between the food sovereignty and green movements                       
and corporations (Friedmann, 2005).  
 
In contrast, in the Global South agro­industry has homogenised and denatured food (Le                         
Heron and Roche, 1995). There is also a tension between demands for green and fresh                             
food in the North, and movements for food sovereignty in the South (Friedmann, 2005).                           12
As Southern states exported to meet this fresh demand, they also spent increasing                         
amounts importing basic foods, leaving them exposed to fluctuations in the markets in both                           
production and consumption (McMichael, 1992). This bifurcation between the North and                     
South led Araghi to suggest that the third regime is predicated on the transfer of value                               
11 I understand this as including organic, “healthy” and sustainably sourced food. 
 
12 A example of this is the recent demand for the grain quinoa among consumers in the North. The food was                                         
marketed as a wonder food due to its high levels of nutritious protein. However the demand led to a sudden                                       






 from poor to rich, creating a state of “forced underconsumption” in the South. He argues                             
that this has been the cause of food shortages in the South amid abundance in the North                                 
and other wealthy regions (Araghi, 2009). According to Araghi: “global value relations of                         
neoliberal globalism are relations of upward redistribution of that value that displace, more                         
than produce, value via a bifurcated food system based on “cheap reproduction” and                         
coerced underconsumption on the one hand and privileged consumption (green or                     
otherwise) on the other hand,” (Araghi, 2009: 142).  
 
One of the most provocative notions associated with the third food regime is the                           
dominance of exchange value of food over use value (Moore, 2010; van der Ploeg, 2008).                             
A lucid analysis of this came from van der Ploeg who considered that value has been                               
reworked by the commodification of new stratas of agrarian life, and that access to these                             
domains has itself become a commodity (van der Ploeg, 2008: 88­89). Under a system                           
that privileges use value, the factory or the field is the space in which value is defined,                                 
based on the quality of the product and other characteristics. In the present regime the                             
privileging of exchange value has meant that the place of production has become the                           
commodity, rather than its ability to produce the commodity. According to van der Ploeg                           
“its (food) value is, above all, that it is an (exchangeable) asset in a global enterprise that                                 
aims at large and growing market quotas, which in their turn allow, for example, the                             
possibility of attracting additional flows of capital, high share prices and/or the opportunity                         
of further expansion,” (ibid: 88). 
   
A main driver of accumulation in the third food regime is the development of technology                             
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 such as genetic engineering (Pechlaner and Otero 2008). Accompanying this process is a                         
regime of intellectual copyright protection that is enforced through institutions such as the                         
WTO. For Global South countries the nature of this technology tends to sustain                         
dependence on the North. According to Pechlaner and Otero: “The policy expressions of                         
neoliberal globalism – trade liberalisation, neoregulation and corporate­friendly IPR                 
(intellectual property rights) – have provided the means for important linkages between the                         
neoliberal regulatory thrust and biotechnology,” (ibid: 366). 
 
The food price crisis of 2008 is considered to be a major event in the third food regime as                                     
it signals the system’s inability to provide cheap food (McMichael, 2009, Moore 2010). In                           
contrast to Pechlaner and Otero, Moore argues that the corporate food regime is defined                           
by the absence of a scientific and technological revolution that raised agricultural output                         
and labour productivity. He posits this as an indicator of the difference between the                           13
corporate food regime and the second regime, which was characterised by the Green                         
Revolution. He argues that this is a consequence of the nature of neoliberalism, which                           14
has led finance capital to extract value without productive investment. Moore also                       
suggests that the food price increase was a result of finance capital replacing productive                           
long­term investment with short­term speculation on asset bubbles such as food                     
commodities.  
 
13 In US agriculture, labour productivity fell by a third between 1980 and 2004, relative to the postwar period                                     
(Moore, 2010: 244). 
 
14 The Green Revolution is a term for agricultural technology in the form of pesticides, hybrid strains and                                   
fertilisers. The advancement saw a huge increase in agricultural yields and augmented Northern surpluses,                           
resulting in a fall in the cost of food (Moore, 2010; 236). 
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 McMichael considers the food price crisis of 2007­08 as an event that signals the                           
contradictions that underpin the third regime (McMichael, 2009). He provides context to                       
Malthusian assumptions over food shortages by pointing to the growth in agro­fuel crops,                         
and the manner that this diverts agricultural output from food to industrial use. As a result                               
he argues that this event marks the start of a period of crisis, in which the market’s ability                                   
to govern the distribution of food may be challenged by social movements. According to                           
McMichael: “Food sovereignty movements politicize the current trade regime, revealing the                     
complicity of states in incorporating agriculture into the reproduction of capital, rather than                         
sustaining it as a site of social and ecological reproduction,” (ibid, 2009: 93).   
 
Food regime theory has been subject to several critiques, especially in its formulation of                           
the third food regime. One of the main criticisms is that geography has been neglected and                               
this will be examined in a section later in this chapter. Other than this issue, food regime                                 
theory is often accused of forcing disparate historical events into simplified periods, which                         
overlook the heterogeneity of the development of capitalist agriculture. Perhaps the most                       
noteworthy remark came from Goodman and Watts, who argued that food regime theory’s                         
tendency to erase the division between agriculture and industry is problematic. They argue                         
that the concept relies on too few commodities and too few countries; creating a                           
framework that is simplistic and essentialist. According to Goodman and Watts: “questions                       
of coherence similarly arise with respect to the genesis of new food regimes, notably the                             
tensions between the structural logic of mimetic replication across different social                     
formations, and the role of friction and contingency in the emergence and reproduction of                           
the regime’s structure of governance” (1994: 38). According to this criticism, the food                         
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 regime argument underestimates the role of small farms in particular locations, and there                         
is insufficient evidence to show that they are being subsumed by non­agricultural and                         
finance capital.  
 
A riposte to this criticism came from Araghi, who argued that the critique of Goodman and                               
Watt was “symptomatic of the postmodern turn towards abstract particularism and                     
depoliticised micro­narratives” (2003: 50). Campbell and Dixon also responded to this                     
criticism by accusing it of having “substantially misunderstood the latest potential” of the                         
concept. They argue that contrary to it being a simplifying narrative, it reemerged in the                             
1990s in a response to the linearity of accounts of capitalist development, and the                           
possibility that food regime periods include social agency. According to Campbell and                       
Dixon: “the key structuring relationships at the heart of a food regime can be reset,                             
inverted or emerge in totally new forms,” (2009: 264).  
 
However these responses notwithstanding, Goodman and Watts undeniably have a point                     
when they argue that the food regime concept can slip into oversimplification. According to                           
them the global food system is a “much more nuanced and heterogeneous map of                           
commodity filières within the agro­food system” (1997: 11). As this thesis will illustrate, the                           
third food regime in Egypt adopts a particular modality in which the corporate food system                             
cohabits with a system controlled by the state and a smallholder/subsistence food system.                         




 Another criticism of food regime theory came from Bernstein, who examined the “peasant                         
turn”, a term he uses to describe the insertion of the food sovereignty movement into the                               
notion of the third food regime (2015: 25). He argues that there is inadequate evidence of                               
the role of this movement, and that food regimes risk becoming a binary between                           
smallholder and corporate farming. According to Bernstein: “investigation of complex and                     
contradictory realities is displaced by verification of the definitive vices of agribusiness and                         
virtues of small­scale farmers,” (ibid: 25). Bernstein argues that this creates a bias, and                           
trends or developments that do not conform with food regime concept are ignored.  
 
One relevant remark is Pechlaner and Otero’s conclusion that food regime theory would                         
benefit from the addition of case studies in order to “disaggregate the large abstractions                           
and macro­structural focus of world­systems perspectives within food­regime analysis,”                 
(2010: 204). They suggest that the nation state should become the concept’s main unit of                             
analysis, in order to provide a methodology that can asses the formation of social                           
consequences of capitalist agriculture. 
 
In light of these criticisms, one useful way of understanding the third food regime is to                               
consider it as divided into three different competing and overlapping constellations:                     
capitalist farming, peasant farming and entrepreneurial farming (van der Ploeg, 2008: 3).                       
Van der Ploeg argues that these constellations are interconnected. Firstly through “short                       
and decentralised circuits”, secondly by multinational corporations that operate across the                     
world, which he refers to as “Empire” (ibid). According to him the relations between the                             
constellations, and the circuits that link them, are in a constant state of movement as a                               
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 result of competition and contestation. According to him: “Empire is not only an emergent                           
and internally differentiated phenomenon; it is, above all, the interweaving and mutual                       





The transition to the third food regime stems from the increasing influence of neoliberal                           
ideology over economic policy in the 1970s. Given that the term neoliberalism suffers from                           
a lack of definition, and it is sometimes used amorphously and reductively, a brief                           
definition is valuable. It also allows an illustration of how the third food regime was an                               
outgrowth of neoliberal ideology, rather than a tautological definition of the same                       
manifestations. The neoliberal period has also had consequences on several areas that                       
are relevant to this thesis, particularly the role of the state.   
 
Neoliberalism is an ideology that grew out of the Austrian school of economics and was                             
formulated by economists such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and Karl Popper                       
(Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 2005; 2003; Saad­Filho and Johnston, 2005; Bayliss et al, 2016). It                           
is essentially defined by its opposition to all government intervention in the economy other                           
than in forms that ensure the maintenance of the market, uphold private property, protect                           
capital and the institutions upon which it relies (Harvey, 2003: 157).  
 
Neoliberalism was “an isolated and largely ignored corpus of thought” for several decades                         
46 
 (Harvey, 2003: 157). It was not until the economic crisis of the 1970s that the ideology                               
became influential at the level of government policy. Some of its most influential                         
proponents were former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, and former US                     
president Ronald Reagan, who launched a revolution against the state­centered                   
Keynesian economics that had dominated government policy for decades. The praxis of                       
neoliberalism resulted in policies that cut social spending, privatised state­owned assets,                     
and liberalised economic transactions (Jessop, 2002: 454).    15
 
This ideology became influential in international institutions such as the IMF and World                         
Bank, and its adoption resulted in what has been referred to as the “Washington                           
Consensus”, a manifesto representing the market oriented policies of neoliberalism                   
(Williamson, 2004). These institutions presided over a radical restructuring of Global South                       
states, enabled by the debt crisis of the 1980s (Hanieh, 2011: 48). During the 1970s, many                               
Third World countries had accumulated external debts in US dollars, partly as a result of                             
the cost of fuel imports following the 1973 oil shock. The rapid increase in the level of debt                                   
was also a result of the “Volcker Shock”, a 1979 decision by the US Federal Reserve to                                 
hike interest rates. As a result, repayments soared and states were pushed to the verge                             16
of bankruptcy. The IMF offered these beleaguered governments bail­out loans, and debt                       
rescheduling, on the condition that they implement structural adjustment policies. The                     
15 One of the first laboratories for these policies was Chile, in which the imposition of free market reforms was                                       
preceded by a military coup that removed a democratically elected government, an early indicator of the                               
relationship between neoliberal ideology and authoritarianism. 
   
16 The Volcker Shock was named after the chairman of the board of the US Federal Reserve Paul Volcker.                                     
The decision was a core aspect of the neoliberal turn and strengthened the US dollar by attracting capital to                                     
deposit in US banks. 
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 consequences of these policies and the forms in which neoliberalism has taken across the                           
state system are variegated. They are clearly identifiable in Egypt, and the next chapter                           
will illustrate how these policies marked the start of the corporate food regime in the                             
country.  
 
Of particular relevance to the food and agriculture sector is the manner in which neoliberal                             
policies led to capital’s increased extraction of value from activities of social reproduction                         
(Bayliss et al, 2016; Moore 2010). As a result of privatisations and structural adjustment,                           
the state withdrew from its social management of services such as water and healthcare.                           
In the agriculture sector these policies led to a decrease in state investment in agriculture,                             
and between 1980 and 2006 public expenditure on agriculture in the Global South fell by                             
50% (McMichael, 2013: 55). Land allocations were reorientated from small farmers to                       
agribusiness, credit banks were closed, and state subsidised inputs were stopped. This                       
withdrawal created a vacuum that was filled by private capital. Moore considers this as a                             
response to the exhaustion of frontiers of uncommodified nature, which forced capital to                         
seek new areas of accumulation: “Instead of looting the gold and silver of the Americas, as                               
in the classic era of primitive accumulation, finance capital in the neoliberal era worked to                             
extract maximal wealth from the “real economy,” (Moore, 2010: 230).) One manner in                         
which capital was able to access these areas of social reproduction was through financial                           
instruments such as derivatives and the increase in credit. 
 
This process is closely tied to financialisation, a term used to refer to the growth of the                                 
finance sector and its role in non­financial areas of the economy (Lapavitsas, 2013; Fine,                           
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 2010; Epstein, 2005: Krippner 2005). Definitions of financialisation vary but essentially it is                         
a “pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels,                       
rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner, 2005: 174). The result has                         
been an increase in the extraction of profit through financial speculation on commodities                         
and derivatives, the launch of financial products by non­financial enterprises, and the                       
financialisation of industrial and commercial enterprises (Lapavitsas, 2013). One way of                     
viewing the process of financialisation is that it results in production becoming a                         
money­money (M­M) relation as opposed to a money­commodity­money (M­C­M) relation,                   
which has previously defined capitalist relations (Moore, 2014: 298). More generally,                     
financial markets provide a means for cross­border investments as they pool capital,                       
allowing it to penetrate barriers such as national frontiers.  
 
Another feature of neoliberalism relevant to this thesis is the question of the role of the                               
state. As a result of the ideological tenet of the free market, neoliberal policies are                             
sometimes considered to have resulted in the declining relevance of the state (Hardt and                           
Negri, 2000, Robinson, 2004). However, the prevalent view is that the state’s interventions                         
remain central to accumulation, and a process of reorganisation has led to a withdrawal                           
from its social management, while those functions that ensure mediation of the market                         
have been prioritised (Albo, 2004; Saad­Filho and Johnston, 2005; Bayliss et al, 2016;                         
Wood, 2003; 2006). According to Albo: “State apparatuses are being systematically                     
reorganized around a strategy of ‘competitive austerity’ strengthening the economic                   
apparatuses that sponsor the internationalisation of capital while restructuring labour                   
policies to enforce wage compression, pursuing fiscal austerity for social policies while                       
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 cutting taxes to attract international capital,” (Albo, 2004: 109). Another way of                       
understanding the state in the neoliberal period is to consider that one of its main functions                               
is to act as an interlocutor with the global economy (Cox, 1987: 253).   
 
The state's withdrawal from its social management has been uneven. In the case of the                             
agriculture sector, policies that have resulted in the weakening of the smallholder                       
existence have resulted in an increase in unemployment, and the growth of urban slums.                           
As a result the state often has to make interventions in the form of food subsidies, and                                 
other forms of expenditure, in order to mitigate the risk of social unrest and environmental                             
exhaustion. According to McMichael: “Displacing the social and intrinsic value of such                       
habitat eventually recycles as monetary costs of resettlement, food shortages and                     
ecosystem depletion for governments and development agencies,” (McMichael: 2012,                 
693).   
 
In order to avoid a dichotomous understanding of state­market relations, this thesis will                         
portray these links as a synthesis of relations that is embodied in a “state­capital nexus”.                             
This term essentially refers to “the (internal) relationship between the state and capital in                           
general, and at the level of the world market this brings into view the specific role of the                                   
hegemonic state, and of global quasi­state institutions” (Apeldoorn et al. 2012: 474). The                         
synthesis of relations inherent to the state­capital nexus are protean and diverse, and the                           
activities of public and private actors often transcend their formal role. The term was used                             
in the context of food regime theory as a state­finance capital nexus (McMichael, 2013:                           
58). The role of finance capital is inherent to this construct, as it enabled the mobility that                                 
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 created this alliance between capital and a multitude of actors and institutions. According                         
to Moore: “In the neoliberal era, finance capital could make its hegemony only by entering                             
into a shifting mosaic of alliances with states large and small,” (Moore, 2010: 229). In the                               
case of Egypt, the concept of the state­capital nexus was used by Abdelrahman to                           
describe state institutions and regime cronies who exploit “public assets for personal profit”                         
(Abdelrahman, 2015: 11). Another way of considering this alliance between state power                       
and capital was proposed by Bush, who described it as the “coalition for dispossession”                           
(2011).  
 
In addition to political power, the state­capital nexus also includes shared ideological                       
values regarding government policy and state management. According to Dixon: “The                     
character of this emergent class of finance capitalists in Egypt illustrates not just                         
increasingly intimate state – class relations during the last decade or more, but the                           
workings of finance hegemony as elites are connected globally through institutional                     
centres of knowledge production, prestige and so on,” (Dixon, 2013b: 8). 
 
One important relation within the state­capital nexus in Egypt is the role of the military. As                               
will be illustrated the army mediates access to resources such as land, particularly relevant                           
in the agribusiness sector. The military's relationship with foreign capital has allowed it to                           
fortify its position, when in other states such as China and Turkey, liberalisation has                           
resulted in the military's retreat from the economy. According to Springborg: “Egypt’s                       
foreign suitors, by contrast, have been more supportive of state than market,” (Springborg,                         




The dominance of the state­capital nexus has often been explained through the notion of                           
“networks of privilege” (Heydemann, 2004). As a result of the “partial and selective                         
process of economic reform” these networks were able to retain existing benefits and                         
expand into new opportunities created by the privatisations that started in the 1990s (ibid:                           
79). These networks coalesced around the flow of foreign investment and have often acted                           
as the gatekeepers of the economy. The ability of cronies to portray themselves as                           
capitalists created an image of an economy that was open to external capital flows.                           
However while much attention has been paid to the intrigue that has taken place between                             
domestic elites in the literature on political economy in Egypt, the role of foreign investors                             
in national politics has been given less regard. Networks of cronies are often considered to                             
be domestic and as a result are analysed at the national scale. With this contrast                             
considered, the frame of analysis of these networks should be expanded beyond the                         
national scale to include Gulf capital. 
 
This thesis explains the extent of Gulf capital’s acquisitions by arguing that it has become                             
internalised into Egyptian networks of privilege. However epistemologically it departs from                     
the notion of relations between state and business, which tends to posit cronyistic relations                           
within the nexus as an impediment to an ideal type of market. This approach is based on                                 
“deductively deriving models of institutionalised market exchange and inductively                 
generalising from institutional and distributional particularities” (Albo, 2005: 64). In contrast                     
this article considers networks of cronies as part of the social characteristic of the variant                             
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 of capitalism in Egypt. In this sense the relationship between state and business is not only                               
determined by corruption, cronyism and networks of privilege, but it is a result of the                             
state’s expression of class interests.  
 
With this considered an adjunct to this notion of the state­capital nexus is the effect of                               
flows of Gulf capital on class formation in Egypt. GCC investors have entered into an array                               
of relationships with Egyptian capitalists. This offers a range of benefits such as a partner                             
who understands the local market, has the necessary connections with the state, and also                           
legal and tax status. Given the extent of crony capitalism in Egypt, the domestic partners                             
of Gulf capital almost always have connections to the state and this will be illustrated                             
throughout this thesis. As a result the state­capital nexus incorporates the role of Gulf                           
capital in contemporary class formation in Egypt. As will be shown in Chapter Three,                           
financial markets and institutions have provided structure for the relationship between Gulf                       
investors and their Egyptian counterparts. This was submitted by Hanieh when he argued                         
that “the region’s capitalist classes have become tied in a fibril web of finance to the                               
reproduction of capitalism in the Gulf,” (Hanieh, 2013: 143). 
 
References to the state­capital nexus will be made across this thesis. Each chapter will                           
illustrate the manner in which the accumulation of Gulf capital in the food and agribusiness                             
sector has been predicated on its relationship with different elements in the synthesis of                           
the nexus. In order to avoid accusations that this term constitutes a reification, it should be                               






The previous sections established a definition of food regime theory and the current                         
regime’s relationship with neoliberalism. This section will focus on specific areas of food                         
regime theory that will be utilised in the coming chapters. These chapters will indicate the                             





Chapter Three will illustrate how financial markets and institutions are structures that have                         
allowed Gulf capital to access Egyptian food and agribusiness. As a result, Gulf capital has                             
played a role in increasing the control of financial markets over the agribusiness sector in                             
Egypt and this has been concomitant with processes such as vertical integration and the                           
principle of exchange value.  
 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the manner that financial markets and institutions                           
have allowed Gulf capital to overcome spatial and temporal barriers, and incorporate                       
Egypt into circuits of accumulation. This characteristic has been central to the                       
internationalisation of capital since the 1970s (Palloix, 1977; Panitch and Gindin, 2004).                       
According to Hanieh: “The role of finance as a means of overcoming barriers to the motion                               
of capital has been deeply reinforced by internationalization. In this case, finance                       
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 subsumes barriers to space­time that emerge as capitalism ‘conquers the whole earth,’”                       
(2011: 22). In the food industry, finance was behind the restructuring of industry across the                             
Global South (Raynolds et al., 1993). The increasing mobility of capital allowed capital to                           
flow into agro­industry, a process that led to the “demise of a relatively stable form of                               
capital accumulation anchored in nationally regulated industrial economies,” (ibid: 1105).  
 
Food regime literature has been augmented by several works that remark on the                         
increasing ownership of agribusiness by financial institutions (Clapp, 2012; Ghosh, 2012;                     
Isakson, 2013; Larder et al. 2015). Some of these works link speculation in financial                           
markets with the food price crisis of 2007­08 (Clapp, 2012; Isakson, 2013). The launch of                             17
derivatives allowed investors to speculate on agricultural commodities without the need to                       
hold a physical position of the commodity. In another sign of the growth of financial                             18
products across the economy, agribusiness and food companies launched derivatives, but                     
also other financial products such as mortgages and insurance (Isakson, 2013: 17).  19
17 These derivatives offer a means to mitigate risk. During the second food regime, the state often offered a                                     
means to manage risk by setting prices and subsidising inputs. During the third regime, such protection was                                 
often replaced by future contracts. 
 
18 In the 2000s these derivatives grew rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008 investments in Commodity Index                               
Funds (CIFs), which bundle commodities into an index, of which agricultural products generally represent a                             
third, increased from $15 billion to $200 billion (Clapp, 2012: 8). Between 2005 and 2008, investment in                                 
commodity futures contracts doubled to $400 billion worldwide (ibid). 
 
19 Examples of this include Tesco launching a consumer bank and an insurance company. Cargill, one of the                                   








Clapp considers that a consequence of the growing relation between food production and                         
financial markets is “distancing” (Clapp, 2013). The growth of derivatives separates                     
consumer and producer geographically and socially. According to Clapp, financialisation                   
“abstracts food from its physical form into highly complex agricultural commodity                     
‘derivatives’ that only seasoned financial traders fully understand.” Elongated commodity                   
chains confuse responsibility over the environmental and social conditions under which                     
food is produced, and further displaces the externalities of consumption.  
 
Many of the works on the deepening link between financial markets and food consider this                             
relation as a process of financialisation, but this thesis will generally refrain from using this                             
term. In some cases there is a tendency to assume that an investment in agribusiness or                               
food production by a financial institution constitutes a form of financialisation, without                       
further elaboration into what this entails. This was pointed out by Bayliss et al: “while                             
financialisation is a core aspect of neoliberalism, it remains not only uneven but also                           
confined in its direct grasp over economic and social reproduction – not everything is                           
financialised even where finance or even just the market is present,” (Bayliss et al, 2016:                             
26). Another reason why the term is unsuitable for this chapter is that agricultural                           
derivatives are mostly unavailable in Egypt. Moreover, many of the works on                       
financialisation and food are vague regarding the empirical metrics that can be used to                           
measure this process. 
 
Regardless of this point, this thesis will utilise features of the food and financialisation                           
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 literature. Contrary to being a unifying force, as the ubiquitous usage of the financialisation                           
concept might lead one to believe, the consequences of the acquisition of food and                           
agribusiness by financial markets and institutions is variegated. This is relevant in the case                           
of cross­border investment into funds, stock markets, and private equity institutions, which                       
lead to complex shareholder structures and the obfuscation of foreign acquisition and                       
capital flows. As will be illustrated the internationalisation of Gulf capital into the sector has                             
been undertaken through Egyptian private equity funds. It has also resulted in shareholder                         
structures in which Gulf investors are minority investors alongside private Egyptian                     
investors, and also the Egyptian state. This is a form of the state­capital nexus that was                               
discussed in the previous section, and this synthesis allows Gulf capital to form relations in                             
Egypt within the state but also among domestic capitalists.  
 
The structures and shareholdings created by financial markets is reflected in literature on                         
finance and food. Fairburn’s study on foreign capital’s acquisition of land in Brazil                         
illustrates how the Brazilian state has failed to regulate these purchases as they have                           
been made through financial markets. According to Fairburn: “The capriciousness of global                       
capital makes the foreigner a moving target, difficult to pin down for more than a moment,”                               
(2015: 589). Financial institutions and markets also provide a shield for foreign investors                         
as they mask their identity and outsource the management of their assets to a local                             
company. According to Clapp: “Financial institutions and investors are not typically                     




 Another characteristic of financial markets is the extraction of profit through means other                         
than investment into productive capacity (Isakson 2013; Burch and Laurence 2009). These                       
strategies include asset stripping, and the acquisition and resale of companies after                       
restructuring. This has been legitimised by the “shareholder revolution”, in which the                       
channelling of profits to investors is considered as one the main measures of the                           
performance of an asset (Burch and Lawrence 2009; Moore 2010). Private equity is                         
particularly effective in its extraction of profit, and the model is based on buying and                             
reselling companies; its considerable financial resources have allowed the acquisition of                     
multiple companies and their vertical integration within one portfolio (Rossman, 2010).                     
According to Moore: “Through private equity firms and the principle of shareholder value,                         
there emerged a rapacious “extraction of value” that progressively undermined the                     
opportunities for productive investment,” (Moore, 2012: 243). 
 
Financialisation is considered to have has fuelled the land grab phenomenon (Moore,                       
2010; Daniel, 2012; McMichael, 2013; Sassen, 2013; Isakson, 2013; Hall, 2010). The                       
launch of funds and derivatives enabled the collectivisation of capital for the purchase of                           
land, which was deemed to be a strong asset class. On a deeper level some suggest that                                 
this acquisition of land is an example of the dominance of the exchange value that is                               
associated with financialisation, and it has become an asset class in which its use value                             
has been overlooked (Isakson, 2013, McMichael, 2012). According to McMichael:                   
“Financial speculation renders land and crops increasingly fungible as governed by the                       
price form ­ at the expense of rational farming of the land for social and ecological                               
sustainability” (McMichael, 2012: 684). According to Isakson speculation is the main                     
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 concern while agricultural production is secondary: “Financial interest in land is based                       





Chapter Four will posit Gulf capital as a central actor in several large land reclamation                             
projects in Egypt, schemes which fit under the definition of land grabbing. There is broad                             
agreement that a characteristic of the third food regime is the increase in foreign                           
acquisition of land (McMichael, 2013; 2012; Araghi and Karides, 2012; Zoomers, 2010;                       
Hall, 2013; Cotula, 2012). The term land grab is contentious; some of the research on land                               
grabs has been accused of suffering from a weak methodology, and there is still some                             
question over how much land on the global scale has been subject to foreign acquisition                             
(Oya, 2013, Cotula, 2012).  
 
In Egypt these areas of reclaimed land act as a productive land base for export markets                               
and agro­processors. The control of agribusiness companies over these areas of land                       
creates what is described by Cotula as a “close circuit” system, in which flows of                             
commodities are restricted to agribusiness systems (Cotula, 2012: 673). In a similar vein,                         
McMichael argues that the agro­industrial complex is a driver for land grabbing. According                         
to him, the complex: “deepens agro­industrialization as a force for reordering land and                         
water­use across the world via considerations of power and profit, at the expense of                           




Another feature of these projects that will be discussed in Chapter Four is the food security                               
rhetoric. Gulf investors often vaguely use the term food security in order to justify these                             
investments, despite the fact that the commodities produced on these farms are                       
channelled to agro­industry such as meat and dairy farms. This rhetoric justifies the                         
acquisition of large tracts of land on the basis that agribusiness has a higher productivity.                             
According to McMichael: “The unifying ideology is that lands occupied (farms) or accessed                         
(commons) by smallholders and pastoralists are low­yield and underutilized lands that,                     
with capitalization, can improve rural incomes and address the global food security                       
problem underscored by the current ‘food crisis,’” (McMichael, 2012: 683).  
 
McMichael considers that these land grabs are an example of the contradictory nature of                           
the third food regime, one that is visible in the case of the Gulf states and Egypt (2013).                                   
One one hand, the investments that have been made into Egypt by the Gulf rely on the                                 
principle of liberal trade that is promoted by agreements such as the WTO. On the other                               
hand, land grabs that have been made by state capital, or companies with very close links                               
to the state, undermine the principles of free trade, and suggest that there is declining faith                               
in the ability of the market to ensure food security. According to McMichael: “Instead of                             
market rule under WTO auspices, organized by TNCs around the principle of ‘comparative                         
advantage’ (including Northern subsidies), the food regime geography associated with this                     




Several scholars have pointed out that such large scale foreign land acquisitions represent                         
the “foreignisation of space”, which inheres questions of geography and space (Zoomers,                       
2010). Sassen argues that this process represents the disassembling of national territory                       
and the creation of a “global operational space that is partly embedded in national                           
territories,” (Sassen, 2013: 43). McMichael describes the land grabs as “pivoting on a                         
dialectic” between reterritorialisation by some states through investment in offshore                   
production, and deterritorialisation as the host states lose control over land and water                         
(2013). 
 
Chapter Four will examine the politics behind the allocation of land to Gulf investors. The                             
politics of land grabs are considered to be diverse, and the interaction between investor                           
and host often comprises of certain expectations (Sassen, 2013; Margulis and Porter,                       
2013). For the domestic audience in the host state, such investments are justified through                           
the promise of job creation or other forms of development (Da Via, 2011). The host                             
government is often encouraged to continue opening up state land to such investments in                           
the hope that it will encourage foreign investments, and increase access to hard currency                           
through the export of cash crops (McMichael, 2009). These investments are sweetened by                         
the development of infrastructure adjacent to these projects and often the land is leased or                             
sold at below market rates (ibid). Sassen argues that these land grabs are against the                             
interest of “national capital”, and that such investments are undertaken by the “executive                         
branch of government that is getting aligned with global corporate capital,” (2013: 44).                         
Margulis and Porter argue that the host countries bear agency for the consequences of                           
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 investment in land. According to them: “Southern states are major players, as investors, in                           
protecting or abusing their own populations, and in negotiating strong or weak international                         
rules. This introduces more complex dynamics into the transnational political process:                     
Southern states are not “victims” seeking to rebuff the North,” (2013: 16). 
 
The Gulf states have invested in land reclamation projects on the basis that they can                             
secure their domestic food security. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, this stated aim                             
is disputable as much of the produce from these projects is sold to the market and used in                                   
supply chains for agro­industry. Aside from land reclamation, more generally this thesis                       
argues that capital from the Gulf has constructed a corporate food system that is                           
detrimental to Egypt's food security, and the notion that the market can safeguard food                           
security is problematic.  
Understandings of food security are contested. There is friction between the principle of                         
individual food security and national food security. While a nation may have obtained                         
aggregate food security this does not ensure that an individual has access to food (Gross                             
et al, 2000: 9). Another consideration is the affordability of food, a reflection of societal                             
inequality. As a result food security is considered to be a “manifestation of the social and                               
political construct,” (ESCWA, 2010: 9). Arguably, the issue of affordability is linked to the                           
increasing role of the market in food provisioning, a process that has been encouraged by                             
IFIs. For example, policy recommendations argue that agricultural land should be used to                         
grow export crops, which can earn hard currency that can be used to buy commodities on                               
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 the international market. The World Bank's report on food security in the Arab region in                             
2009 advocated this strategy: “High­value crop production gives landowners more                   
entrepreneurial opportunities, creates more employment for women and landless workers,                   
and raises agricultural wages ... This would increase dependence on imported cereals, but                         
it would also generate more foreign exchange from high­value crop exports that would                         
cover the cost of additional cereal imports,” (World Bank, 2009: 39). 
This thesis will adopt one of the most common definitions of food security, due to its                               
application of the concept of food security as a universal right. In 1996 the Food and                               
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) stated that: “Food security, at the individual, household,                     
national, regional and global levels (is achieved) when all people, at all times, have                           
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary                           
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life,” (FAO n.d.). This thesis also                             
considers that food security is ensured through food sovereignty, a position that was                         
adopted by the FAO in 2012. According to the peasant's union Via Campesina: “Food                           
sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced                         
through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own                         
food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at                           






Chapter Five examines the role of Gulf investment in restructuring Egypt’s agro­industrial                       
sector. The term restructuring is a reference to capital’s internationalisation of production,                       
and general reorganisation that followed the crisis of the 1970s. Restructuring of                       
agro­industry is considered to be a feature of the third food regime (Goss and Burch, 2001;                               
McMichael, 1992; 1997; 2000; Friedmann, 1992). In the Global South the grain surpluses                         
of the second food regime provided cheap feedstock and other inputs that enabled the                           
development of agro­industry (Friedmann, 1993). This created what is termed by food                       
regime literature as New Agricultural Countries (NACs) and examples of this are Thailand                         
and Brazil (Goss and Burch 2001; McMichael 2000). Restructuring is also considered to                         
be a result of structural adjustment that opened Southern countries to increased foreign                         
investment and placed greater emphasis on exports, a process that drove                     
agro­industrialisation (Goss and Burch, 2001; McMichael 1997). Agro­industry has                 
resulted in food production becoming integrated at the global scale and the “peoples of the                             
Third World have been incorporated or marginalized ­ often simultaneously ­ as                       
consumers and workers” (Friedmann, 1992: 379).   
 
The restructuring of agro­industry is founded on increased control over the supply chain,                         
land, and water resources (van der Ploeg, 2008). In the case of the livestock complex, the                               
incorporation of developing world countries in the 1970s, resulted in intensifying pressure                       
on subsistence production as multinationals were able to undercut smallholder farming                     




Agro­industry is associated with two forms of control over the supply chain. Vertical                         
integration is a strategy that seeks to cut costs by acquiring a portfolio of companies that                               
extends across the supply chain. Often this is undertaken through mergers and                       
acquisitions of other companies enhancing profitability, increasing control and allowing                   
consolidation (Ismail, 2009: 180). Disintegration is the process of externalising the supply                       
chain through contract farming, allowing agro­industry to displace risk, finance its activities                       
through delayed invoice payments, and reduce costs through labour casualisation (Watts,                     
1992; Goodman and Watts, 1994; 1997). Although these contracts are often represented                       
as a means in which smaller farms can raise their income, the reality is often                             
immiseration. This form of flexible accumulation relies on debt relations to subordinate                       
producers, and the “self­exploitation” of the family unit in order to increase output.                         
According to Watts: “Contract farming is less a means to underwrite the preservation of                           
small­scale commodity production, than rather a vehicle to … deepen the process of                         
appropriation by which rural production processes are converted into industrial products by                       
agro­industrial capitals,” (Watts, 1992: 91). In the case of Egypt, Dixon argues that the                           
country’s emergence as a NAC was dependent on disintegration, as much as the process                           
of vertical integration. She argues that: “processes of informalization in Egypt have come                         
to reproduce and limit the reproduction of corporate food – and Egypt developed and grew                             
as an NAC through this tension,” (2013a: 56). 
 
Another characteristic of agro­industrialisation is the bifurcation of diet in which richer                       
markets are provided with fresh food, sometimes organic or highly regulated, while poorer                         
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 markets are provided with industrially produced durable foods, often lacking in nutrition or                         
poorly regulated (Le Heron, 1995). The power of agro­industry is also reflected in the fact                             
that industrial inputs are grown in place of table crops, and as a result humans have to                                 
compete with livestock within the food market. According to McMichael, the shift towards                         
capital intensive agro­industry “privileges the exchange value of food over its use­value                       
and enhances bio­industrialization which is pivotal to production and marketing flexibility in                       
agro­food systems,” (1992: 351). Moreover, biotechnology offers agro­industry the                 
opportunity to reconfigure itself. Inputs that were previously field based can be replaced by                           
industrially manufactured products, its outputs can be expanded by biotechnology to                     
include new products (Friedmann, 1992).  
 
A consequence of the intensity of the agro­industrial complex are the spread of viruses,                           
ecological exhaustion, and disruption. An important aspect of the second food regime was                         
the Green Revolution, which increased agricultural yields significantly. A characteristic of                     
the third regime is an ecological and environmental barrier to this technological fix referred                           
to by Jason Moore as the “superweed effect,” (Moore, 2010: 226). Moore quotes Wallis as                             
saying “the more (capital) ‘tames’ natural processes, the more they spin out of control,                           
provoking new and more aggressive taming measures with increasingly disastrous                   
effects,” (Wallis 2000: 505, as cited in Moore, 2010). The cited example of this is the US                                 
superweed phenomenon, in which years of herbicide use has resulted in the evolution of                           




 In the case of the agro­industrial complex in Egypt the superweed effect is represented by                             
the devastating outbreak of H5N1 Avian Flu and other viruses. This has led to the                             
development of what Dixon describes as the biosecurity regime, a strategy to increase                         
market shares by segregating its production from the animal and human population in a                           
time of viral crisis (Dixon, 2015). As a result agribusiness has sought to relocate farms                             
deeper into the desert, thus opening a new spatial frontier. She also frames the process as                               
an ecological one and argues that the biosecurity regime gives insight into “nature­society                         





Chapter Six illustrates the manner in which Gulf capital has invested in Western                         
supermarket and fast food chains. The role of retail and supermarkets is not given much                             
attention within food regime literature, and as a result this thesis utilises other related                           
areas of theory. One relevant area of work examines the expansion of multinational                         
supermarket brands into the Global South, a process described as the “supermarket                       
revolution” (Burch and Lawrence, 2009; McMichael, 2009; Humphrey, 2007; Reardon et al,                       
2003; Wood et al., 2014). This thesis posits Gulf capital as being a central agent in the                                 
internationalisation of Western retail brands into Egypt, and it has therefore been an actor                           
in the supermarket revolution.   
 
As will be illustrated in this thesis, establishing a supermarket requires considerable                       
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 political and logistical organisation. An important task is the foundation of a supply chain                           
sufficient for a large supermarket (Humphrey, 2007). One strategy has been to operate a                           
disintegrated supply chain and to enter into direct agreements with suppliers, allowing                       
them increased control over the cost and standard of their supplies. As a result, the                             
expansion of large supermarket chains has often come at the expense of workers and                           
suppliers, and supermarkets can access capital at virtually zero cost (Burch, and                       
Lawrence, 2009: 277). Such contracts also place a downward pressure on prices and thus                           
makes it difficult for smaller farmers to benefit from their position in the supply chain due to                                 
their inability to “scale up”. Another aspect of this supply chain is its hegemonic role in the                                 
implementation of environmental and safety regulations during a period of deregulation                     
(Marsden, 2000). One way of understanding these strategies is to consider them as a                           
process of embedding into the new space (Coe and Lee, 2006). Embeddedness is                         
achieved through introducing different brands, deepening its supply chains and by offering                       
different products such as financial services.   
 
The internationalisation of retail capital into the South has been the subject of several case                             
studies. Nguyen argues that in Vietnam, the entry of Northern retail capital is likely to put                               
pressure on domestic retailers (Nguyen et al 2013). She illustrates the manner in which                           
foreign companies were able to access the Vietnamese market as a result of de­regulation                           
that was associated with WTO membership. Okeahalam and Wood use a case study of                           
the expansion of a South African supermarket chain into other markets in Africa to                           
illustrate the manner in which retail capital entering new markets must balance the                         




Evident in many of these case studies is the need of international food retailers to deal                               
with the hostility of domestic retailers and feelings of nationalist sentiment amongst                       
consumers. The failure of Carrefour in Japan and Sainsbury’s in Egypt suggest that                         
companies must consider numerous factors in their consumer relations and internal                     
management. Aoyama focusses on the entry of Carrefour and Wal­Mart into Japan, and                         
argues that these companies faced a contradiction between standardisation and                   
localisation, which resulted in their unsuccessful expansion into the country (Aoyama,                     
2007). The local specifics of new markets represents a significant barrier to transferring                         
“oligopoly” into new markets. She argues that: “Geographically, contemporary globalization                   
involves varying scales at different levels of market engagements ... Because retailing                       





The Middle East and Arab World generally has received little more than a passing                           
comment within food regime theory. Given its world­historical nature the dearth of region                         
and country specific studies is not surprising. However regions such as Southeast Asia,                         
South America, and Australasia have been subject to case studies with a food regime                           
perspective. Given that Arab countries are some of the biggest importers of grain in the                             
world, the gap in the literature is conspicuous. However there are some exceptions;                         
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 Dixon’s work on the corporate food system in Egypt is a comprehensive application of food                             
regime theory to a Arab state. (Dixon, 2013a). She illustrates the manner in which                           
corporate food system has been constructed in Egypt through the restructuring of                       
agribusiness (2013). 
 
Other than food regime literature, there is a large field of literature on contemporary                           
Egyptian agriculture (Sadowsky 1991; Bush, 1995: 2007; 2012; Bush and Bromley, 1994;                       
Dixon, 2013a; 2013b; 2015; Mitchell, 2002; Hinnebusch, 1993; Hanieh, 2013). In a series                         
of articles Bush posits free market reforms, such as the lifting of rent controls and the                               
liberalisation of inputs, as the cause of poverty and the crisis of Egypt’s agriculture sector                             
(Bush, 1995; 2007; 2012; Bush and Bromley, 1994). In Rule of Experts, Mitchell submitted                           
a extensive work on Egyptian agriculture and a history of the country’s capitalist                         
development. Starting with the British colonial period, Mitchell traces the exploitation of                       
Egypt’s nature through technological fixes such as irrigation, pesticides, and industry. He                       
provide a postcolonial perspective that challenges the determinism of some accounts of                       
capitalist development: “capitalism … has no singular logic, no essence,” (Mitchell, 2002:                       
303).  
 
In Lineage of Revolt, Hanieh provides an important contribution to the field by examining                           
the Egyptian agriculture sector in the same context as other North African states. He                           
argues that neoliberal reform has led to the growing levels of inequality that were behind                             
the Arab uprisings of 2011. Contrary to the view that the Arab spring took place because of                                 
a lack of free market reform, he argues that they took place because of these policies.                               
70 
 According to Hanieh: “the development of capitalism in the region has produced highly                         
polarized outcomes ­ a tiny layer of the population benefits from its control over key                             
moments of accumulation and is linked closely to international capital, alongside a growing                         
mass of poor, dispossessed populations across rural and urban areas,” (Hanieh, 2013:                       
174). Hanieh gives considerable coverage to the internationalisation of Gulf capital into                       
North African agriculture, and as a result his monograph provides a point of departure for                             
this thesis. 
 
This thesis responds to a lacuna within the literature on the neoliberal transition of Egypt’s                             
agriculture. With the exception of Hanieh, the works on Egypt provide little focus on the                             
role of the Gulf. Rather, there is a marked focus on the role of Western capital and                                 
institutions. Bush argues that the emphasis on market access in the free markets reforms                           
will favour the “interests of US and EU capital,” and that the policy of institutions such as                                 
the World Bank and IMF does not prioritise issues such as “local food security, national                             
development or poverty amelioration,” (Bush, 2007: 1613).  
 
Other works mention the role of Gulf capital, but do not fully illuminate the structural                             
implications of its flow into Egypt. Mitchell discusses the Toshka project and the role of                             
Prince Al­Waleed bin Talal Al­Saud. However the reader is left with the perception that this                             
project was outwith a capitalist logic and that it was primarily determined by the whims of                               
former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. According to Mitchell: “Toshka was the object                       
of a ruler’s desire, as he passed his seventieth birthday, to build something by which his                               
rule would be remembered, a fairy tale to be fulfilled with the help of a billionaire prince                                 
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 and the bankrupt owner of Superior Seedless grapes. These dreamlands are the places of                           
desire that global capitalism cannot contain,” (2002: 303). Such a depiction appears to                         
conclude that Toshka was a failure or a white elephant, yet the project had consequences                             
for the management of natural resources that continue to resonate today.  
 
Other works tend to treat foreign capital as external to the frame of analysis. Dixon’s                             
argument tends to a reification of the national scale. In her PhD thesis she makes                             
repeated references to multinational and transnational companies, and acknowledges that                   
they comprise of European or Gulf capital but she does not elaborate further. She also                             
makes a reference to Egyptian finance capital when describing Egyptian institutions that                       
comprise of Gulf capital, such as Citadel Capital (now known as Qalaa Holdings). She                           
argues that this capital is opening a new frontier in Sudan as a result of its investments in                                   
land reclamation. According to Dixon: “The southward expansion of the ecological frontier                       
for capital’s expanded reproduction since the 2007– 2008 crises reflects in part the growth                           
of Egypt’s corporate agri­food system,” (2013b: 13). Based on this, one might assume that                           
Egyptian capital is at the centre of an emerging Middle Eastern region in the third food                               
regime, rather than Gulf capital. 
 
This thesis also intends to reframe the issue of food security, which has dominated                           
literature on agriculture and food in the Middle East. Over the last decade food security in                               
the Middle East has been the subject of a number of academic studies and policy reports                               
(Woertz, 2013; Bailey and Willoughby, 2013; Harrigan, 2014; Elhadj 2005). These works                       
have brought attention to the food insecurity of the Arab states but they have tended to                               
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 blur the inequality in food security that exists within the Arab region, and the manner in                               
which the inter­regional trade of crops and commodities can exacerbate this difference.                       
For example, Harrigan treats the region as a whole but does not investigate the inequality                             
that exist between Arab states. Other studies focus specifically on the Gulf states, and                           
create an impression that their food insecurity is the most acute in the region. For                             
example, Woertz’s book is entitled “Oil for Food: Global Food Crisis and the Middle East”                             
suggesting that it examines the whole region, but rather the majority of his study focusses                             
on the food insecurity of the Gulf states. Other works such as Elhadj promote the Gulf                               
states’ policy of food imports based on the theory of comparative advantage.   
 
One problem with approaches to the question of food security is the notion that it can be                                 
remedied by export agriculture, which supposedly earns hard currency to buy other types                         
of food on the international market. This technocratic view is unquestioning of its belief in                             
the market’s ability to provide sufficient food. It also assumes a level playing field in which                               
the smallest farmers have the same access to resources and state support as the largest                             
agribusiness corporations. A critique of this was submitted by Hanieh who argued that:                         
“neoliberal logic treats the nation as a single unit, and calculates the cost and loss of                               





The main theme of this thesis is that as a result of the flow of commodities and capital,                                   
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 relations between Egypt and the Gulf constitute a region in the third food regime. This                             
focus on geography is a departure from the dominance of history within the food regime                             
notion, and it is where this thesis seeks to make an original contribution to the field. This                                 
section will firstly examine the inclusion of geography within food regime literature, it will                           
then briefly define the term region, and lastly it will outline how this thesis will approach                               
geography and space theoretically.  
 
One of the main critiques of food regime theory is that geography has generally been                             
eschewed in favour of historicisation. According to Atkins and Bowler (2001: 24): “History                         
has been given priority over geography, while the high level of abstraction is problematic                           
for understanding the historical experience of particular nations and regions” (2001: 24).                       
The biggest detractors of food regime theory have picked up on the lack of geographical                             
application and consider this as confirmation of its over simplification (Goodman and                       
Watts, 1994; 1997). Whatmore and Thorne argue that understandings of globalisation that                       
are implicit in aspects of food regime theory are reductive in their understanding of                           
geography, and they refer to “a peculiarly modernist geographical imagination that casts                       
globalisation as a colonisation of surfaces which, like a spreading ink stain, progressively                         
colours every spot on the map” (1997: 211). Le Heron and Roche made a call for the                                 
inclusion of geography in their study of New Zealand’s position in the third food regime                             
(1995). They argued that “we suspect that insufficient treatment has been given to how the                             




 Arguably, the absence of geography was countenanced by the relatively linear nature of                         
the first and second food regimes and their North­South organisation. However the need to                           
incorporate notions of space within food regime literature has become more acute as the                           
third food regime has splintered into new regions and is multipolar in nature (yet at the                               
same time retained a global unity). This complexity and its implications for geography and                           
space is hinted at within the food regime corpus. Friedmann considers that the                         
transnational restructuring of agro­food complexes has led to the “suppression of                     
particularities of time and place in both agriculture and diets,” (1992: 379). As a result of                               
deepening market relations she considers that the inhabitants of the South are subject to                           
the homogenous consequences of agro­industry on the bifurcation of diet and production                       
relations. According to Friedmann:  
 
“If this reached its logical end, consumers of corporate food products would be                         
differentiated by class, rather than nation or cultural region. Farms would adapt                       
production to demand for raw materials by a small set of transnational corporations                         
(not a fancied 'world market'), and in order to meet quality standards would buy                           
inputs and services from (often the same) transnational corporations,” (1992: 379).   
 
One way to consider the geographical changes of the third food regime is to examine the                               
replacement of the state’s regulations and laws by corporate regulations (Pechlaner and                       
Otero, 2008; 2009). According to Coles this creates a “kind of borderless space where                           
goods and services flow freely, even across national and international boundaries, so long                         
as they meet pre­established standards, as well as having access to particular                       
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 certification,” (Coles, 2013: 208). As a result governance space has a geographical and                         
economic significance as regulation configures the flow of goods as it is imposed at certain                             
points. These regulations and conventions include technology, risk management, laws,                   
sustainability policies, and health and safety regulations (Le Heron and Roche, 1995). The                         
nature in which these policies are implemented can potentially reveal the development of a                           
investment axis between zones of production and consumption.  
 
The concept of the New Agriculture Country (NAC) inheres geography and space. One                         
NAC, Japan, makes for an interesting case study that has parallels to the Gulf and Egypt.                               
(Friedmann, 1993; McMichael, 2000). In the 1980s the high cost of raw materials and                           
labour pushed Japanese agribusiness companies to develop offshore platforms in the beef                       
industry in Australia, and the poultry and agro­food complexes of Thailand. McMichael                       
points out that as the cost of feed increased in Thailand, Thai producers in turn also made                                 
offshore investments in China, Malaysia and Taiwan. McMichael argues that this is a core                           
that has eclipsed the Northern dominance of the second regime and this “presents a new                             
pole around which regional and global, food trade concentrates ­ displacing the centrality                         
of the US ‘global breadbasket.’' In other words, the East Asian food import complex is one                               
central node in a global regime forming around corporate, rather than state­driven,                       
agro­food markets,” (McMichael, 2000: 421). 
 
NACs are new powers that have reconfigured the flow of commodities and capital, and                           
exert their own modes of regional power. Margulis and Porter consider that land grabs                           
made on South­South contours are an example of the multipolarity of the present system,                           
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 which they illustrate as complex and defiant of a “core­periphery” framework (2013). As                         
examples of this they point to Brazil, which has acquired land in Africa with the support of                                 
the Brazilian state, yet itself is also subject to large scale acquisitions of land by foreign                               
investors (ibid: 7). According to Margulis and Porter: “more complex sets of relationships                         
are replacing old power relationships between North and South or between a US­led                         
capitalist West and state­centric regions elsewhere,” (ibid: 8). 
 
In response to the idea of a pole within the corporate food regime, this thesis will refer to                                   
the relationship between the Gulf and Egypt as a region. But what do I mean by this                                 
concept? Relations between the Gulf and Egypt already constitute a region in a variety of                             
ways. Egypt and the GCC states are part of the Arab region, and they share historic,                               
cultural, and religious characteristics. There are extensive economic ties and hundreds of                       
thousands of Egyptians are employed in the Gulf. In terms of agriculture, some works                           
consider that a region can be defined by similarities in agricultural practices or a                           
specialisation in the production of certain commodities (Fitzsimmons, 1997: 115). This                     
thesis uses the term region in reference to the flow of commodities from Egypt into the                               
Gulf, investment flows from Gulf conglomerates into Egypt and the transfer of profits back                           
again. Other aspects of this region include a form of state­capital relations and on a more                               
abstract level the flow of tastes and consumer practices.   
 
In order to avoid a shallow and reifying treatment of this region and its implications, this                               
thesis will theorise space through the concept of scales. Scale refers to the global,                           
regional, national and sub­national levels at which capital is organised and defined by                         
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 social relations, struggle, state power and other characteristics (Brenner et al, 2003). A                         
significant question is the relation between these scales, especially given that since the                         
1970s, globalisation has resulted in the state becoming a more complex, incoherent                       
space, “it seems to be leaking, and thus the inherited model of territorially self­enclosed,                           
state­defined societies, economies, or cultures is becoming highly problematic,” (ibid: 3).                     
One way of responding to this is to consider the relation between scales as interconnected                             
and interdependent. Moreover these scales are responsive to the territorialisation and                     
reterritorialisation of capital and are therefore fluid (Brenner, 1998). Brenner argues that:                       
“Spatial scales constitute a hierarchical scaffolding of territorial organization upon, within,                     
and through which the capital circulation process is successively territorialized,                   
deterritorialized, and reterritorialized,” (ibid: 464). According to Swyngedouw: “the                 
production of space through the perpetual reworking of the geographies of capital                       
circulation and accumulation junks existing spatial configurations and scales of                   
governance, and produces new ones in the process,” (ibid, 2000: 68).  
 
With this in mind, the relation between the Gulf and Egypt constitutes a regional scale of                               
accumulation with the GCC at its core. This was described by Hanieh as follows: “the                             20
Middle East needs to be seen as more than just a simple agglomeration of nation­states,                             
but rather as a set of ‘internally related’ social relations that striate national borders. Class                             
20 The core of this region was illustrated by Hanieh’s notion of Khaleeji Capital (referred to in this thesis as                                       
Gulf capital) (2011). Hanieh shows that Gulf capital has internationalised and three capital circuits                           
(productive, commodity and financial) are in motion through the Gulf region. These are represented by                             
financial institutions and conglomerates that have a pan­GCC ownership but also by a maturing and                             
deepening of capitalism within the region. According to him: “the social relations underpinning Gulf capitalism                             
are increasingly interlocked across the Gulf states, and capital comes to conceive its accumulation from the                               
perspective of the GCC as a whole,” (Hanieh, 2011: 23).  
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 and state formation at the national scale both reflect this interlacing of social relations,                           
while simultaneously help to produce the ‘regional,’” (Hanieh, 2013: 241). This region is                         
dependent and is constituted through the territorialisation of capital at the national scale in                           
Egypt. In agribusiness, Gulf investment has capitalised the sector and spatial                     
reorganisation is manifest through the supply chain. This is a theme that will be illustrated                             
throughout this thesis. This concept of scales can be augmented by the concept of value                             
transfer, and this thesis will argue that these scales are interconnected through this                         
transfer. In this sense, rural areas of Egypt, places of malnutrition and poverty, are linked                             
to cities in the Gulf, places of wealth and opulence, through these spatial scales.   
 
Lastly, a further way of theorising space is to consider its relation with crisis. Harvey’s                             
notion of the spatial fix is relevant to this thesis. Put simply Harvey considered that capital                               
has a “insatiable drive to resolve its inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and                           
geographical restructuring,” (2001: 24). Harvey mainly considered that this crisis would                     
arise as a result of overaccumulation but I will use it in reference to environmental                             
exhaustion. As this thesis will illustrate, a response to this crisis is the relocation of fixed                               
assets into new frontiers of land in the desert. In addition to a spatial resolution of crisis,                                 
Harvey also emphasised a temporal fix, in which surplus capital can be absorbed through                           
investment in long­term projects such as education and fixed capital (Jessop, 2002). At the                           
same time, spatial expansion requires other forms of temporal fixes such as investment in                           
technology and transport. The root of the concept of a spatio­temporal fix was Marx’s                           
observation that: “capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the                         
creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and                           
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This chapter has provided a theoretical foundation for the remainder of this thesis. It has                             
also provided a literature review that has illustrated the lacuna to which this thesis will                             
respond. This lacuna consists of two main dimensions. Firstly, the role of Gulf capital in                             
constructing a neoliberal corporate food regime in Egypt has largely been omitted from                         
much of the literature on contemporary capitalist agriculture in Egypt. Secondly, geography                       
and space has been given insufficient attention by the food regime concept (the existing                           
contributions to the field notwithstanding). By responding to these two gaps this thesis                         
seeks to illustrate that the third food regime has been restructured in the Global South                             
through regions or poles such as the Gulf.  
 
This chapter has also served to provide a theoretical foundation for three main themes that                             
will be traced throughout this thesis. Firstly, Gulf capital has been a main actor in the                               
construction of a corporate food system in Egypt, as illustrated by the characteristics that                           
will be examined within Chapters Three­Six. Secondly, the Gulf­Egypt region has been                       
predicated on the state­capital nexus, a synthesis of relations between Gulf capital, the                         
Egyptian state, and domestic Egyptian capitalists. This relation is central to Gulf capital’s                         
position as the state mediates its accumulation through the allocation of resources, and                         
through other necessary services. This state­capital nexus is diverse in nature and it                         
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Given that food regime theory is a world­historical concept how can this notion be applied                             
to Egypt? The first part of this chapter will apply the historical periodisation of food regime                               
theory to Egypt and trace its manifestations in the history of the country's agrarian                           
development. The three food regimes can be clearly identified in Egypt. The first food                           
regime in Egypt reached its apex under British occupation, which imposed a monoculture                         
of cotton production and other industrial crops. In the second food regime, Egypt became                           
increasingly reliant on wheat exports from the US and Europe, while its internal capacity to                             
produce food crops for the domestic market was weakened. The third food regime resulted                           
in the retreat of the Egyptian state from the management of the agricultural economy and                             
the rise of the corporate system. 
 
The second, shorter, section of this chapter will provide a historical account of the                           
relationship between the Gulf states and Egypt in the post­Second World War era. Egypt                           
was the primary Arab power, but this has been replaced by a system in which the Gulf                                 
states, led by Saudi Arabia, are more dominant. Within Egypt, this shift has been                           
concomitant with increasing political and economic influence on behalf of the GCC states,                         




This chapter is not intended to feature a full account of these historical phases. Academic                             
work on these areas has been substantial, and contemporary Egyptian studies is rich in                           
works on history, agrarian studies, political economy, and international relations. This                     
chapter aims to chart some of these works and provide a historical frame for the main                               
arguments that will come in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. This section will also                             





The historical phases of food regimes are characterised by transnational patterns in the                         
flow of capital and commodities. Uniting these phases is the commodification of nature and                           
the opening of new frontiers, themes that are present in all of the three food regimes in                                 
Egypt (Moore 2010; 2014; Dixon, 2013b). The opening of new frontiers has been                         
facilitated by technological fixes that have required further applications of technology                     
(Mitchell, 2012). This “rule of experts” over Egypt’s ecology has facilitated the cheapening                         
of nature on which Egypt’s capitalist development has relied and the agriculture sector is                           
central to this.  
 
The Nile River, the central ecological resource of northeast Africa, has represented a vast                           
frontier for capitalist farming. Throughout these three regimes, technology would be used                       
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 to manage its water for capitalist farming. The successive stages of dams at Aswan, and                             
the construction of irrigation infrastructure, reshaped Egypt’s environment and raised                   
agriculture yields. Yet these acts had unforeseen ecological consequences that resulted in                       
further technological fixes, opening a cycle of interference and fix. This process has led to                             
the environmental degradation of the Nile valley and the deepening of the metabolic rift. 
 
As these frontiers were opened, and capitalist farming pushed deeper into the country,                         
Egypt has developed as a unified market, and the land and its people were subject to a                                 
process of commodification. The demise of communal land tenureship and the rise of                         
private property was concomitant with waves of accumulation that turned people off the                         
land, and created new classes of wage labourers. Debt relations allowed the concentrated                         
ownership of land, despite the interlude in this trend that took place following the revolution                             
of 1952.  
 
The coming sections chart this process through the three food regimes. Although the                         
political power upon which these regimes have relied is a central feature, the ongoing                           





In Egypt the characteristics of the first food regime are clearly identifiable. The country’s                           
water resources, climate, and location made it ideal for the cultivation of industrial inputs                           
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 such as cotton and sugarcane (Abul­Magd, 2010; Beckert, 2014; Mitchell, 2002; Owen                       
1993). Much of this produce was exported back to Britain in order to be used in the                                 
country’s industry, particularly cotton mills. During the time of the British occupation                       
(1882­1956), the growth and export of cotton became one of the main economic activities                           
in the country. Between 1880 and 1884, cotton contributed 75 % to the total value of                               
exports, and by 1910­13 this proportion had risen to more than 92 per cent (Owen, 1993:                               
219). The shortage in cotton caused by the American Civil War of 1861­1865 created                           
demand that led to its increased production across Egypt, and further exposed the                         
agriculture sector to the global market. By 1912, the total agricultural area that was                           
devoted to cotton production was estimated to be 1,700,000 feddans, by comparison, the                         
area devoted to the production of maize, the most common food crop, was 1,838,000                           
(Vatikiotis, 2013: 52).  
 
Although cotton cultivation was at its most intense under the British occupation, the crop                           
was produced in Egypt throughout the 19th century (Beckert, 2014). However in order for                           
the use of agricultural land to be diverted from food crops towards the cultivation of a cash                                 
crop, a transformation was required in the rural political economy. In order to impose the                             
practice of growing a crop for exchange rather than use, Egypt’s peasants had to be                             
coerced both by physical force and by exposure to market forces. This process was                           
started by Muhammed Ali, who after his rise to power in 1811, abolished the Mamlukian                             
property system, and implemented state ownership of land in order to finance a                         
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 programme of industrialisation and modernisation (Barakat, 1993: 57). In what was                     21
essentially a replication of the slave plantations of the Americas, physical coercion was a                           
main factor in the cultivation of the crop. In Egypt, cotton plantations were managed by the                               
military, who relied on draconian measures to control peasants, such as confining them to                           
their villages by force (Mitchell, 1991: 34).  22
 
In the 1840s this system was modified and villages were put under the control of notables,                               
such as relatives and associates of the ruling family, who enforced the regime in place of                               
the military. This system created a group of landowners who became the class of pashas                             
and sheikhs, who would dominate the rural sphere for the next century (Richards: 1977:                           
38). With the help of these landowners, common land was further enclosed and a system                             
of capitalist property relations intensified.  
 
Another form of coercement was the spread of debt relations. Due to the shortage of                             
cotton caused by the American Civil War in the 1860s, demand soared and farmers                           
borrowed money from European banks, and Greek and Levantine merchants, in order to                         
acquire equipment (Abul­Magd, 2010). For many small farmers this resulted in disaster, as                         
the end of the civil war and an economic depression in 1873, caused cotton prices to fall                                 
21 Ali’s policies represent the enclosure of land and the implementation of private property relations. This had                                 
been ongoing before his rise to power and the first development in this regard was the “iltizam” system                                   
imposed by the Mamlukes, which allowed the right to collect taxes from the land to be bought (Cuno, 1980:                                     
247). Another form of this system was the “timar” in which land was given to individuals in return for other                                       
services to the state (Barakat, 1993: 56). 
 
22 According to Mitchell: “The village was to be run like a barracks, its inhabitants placed under the                                   
surveillance of guards night and day, and under the supervision of inspectors as they cultivated the land ­                                   
and surrendered to the government warehouse its produce, (Mitchell, 1991:34). 
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 and defaults were common. This crisis was exacerbated by other problems, such as the                           
low level of the River Nile of 1877, as well as an increase in diseases such as cholera                                   
caused by the stagnant water created by irrigation projects (Davis, 2002: 103).   
 
A consequence of the debt crisis was the increasing concentration of land ownership as                           
farmers sold property to repay debts that had been secured against their property                         
(Richards, 1977). In order to settle the claims of foreign creditors the colonial authorities                           
established a court system, based on French law using foreign judges and lawyers, which                           
dealt with disputes between Egyptians and foreigners (Gasper, 2008: 25­29). According to                       
Mitchell, this system became a “machine for transferring the land” (Mitchell, 2012: 73). The                           
court’s rulings allowed creditors to seize property, but also other assets such as livestock                           
and houses. In five years these courts resulted in the transfer of 50 thousand acres in a                                 
single province to foreign money lenders from Europe, Greece, and the Levant (ibid).  
 
As a result of these seizures there was an increase in medium and large scale farms. For                                 
example, in 1894, 42.5% of land was held in large properties and this had risen to 44.% in                                   
1913 (Owen, 1999: 217). A growing number of Egyptians held no land at all, leading to an                                 
increase in migration to urban areas, and migration from Upper Egypt to the Delta region.                             
Their displacement led to the growth of the wage working class, which combined with                           
population growth, suppressed the cost of labour during the British occupation (Richards,                       
1976: 281). 
 
In addition to servicing their own debts, Egyptian farmers also had to shoulder the                           
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 sovereign debt of the state. Based on the high price of cotton, Khedive Ismail the grandson                               
of Mohammed Ali, borrowed large amounts of money from European banks, part of which                           
he used for war campaigns in Sudan and Ethiopia (Tignor, 2010: 219). However the fall in                               
the price of cotton led to a default on the loans in 1877. In a moment that would be                                     
repeated in future moments in Egyptian history, the debt crisis resulted in a loss of                             
sovereignty over the nation’s fiscal affairs. A commission run by the UK and France                           
imposed taxes to repay loans owed to European banks, and Egyptian peasants faced                         
another form of violent coercion as these taxes were collected by force.  23
 
Egypt’s debt crisis paved the way for the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 (Tignor, 2010:                               
228­232). Ismail faced nationalist agitation over the state of fiscal affairs and in order to                             
protect their interests, the British sought to prop him up. Moreover, France’s large                         
exposure to Egypt’s debt meant that Britain intervened out of fear that its European rival                             
would act first, giving it a foothold in Africa. In addition to Egypt’s economic importance,                             
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had raised the country’s strategic significance in                             
the British Empire. The route provided vital access between to its colonies in India, Burma,                             
the Far East, and Australasia, and by 1892, 70% of India’s total trade passed through                             
Suez (Rose, 1959: 200). With this considered, Egypt played a central role in the first food                               
regime not only through its role in the production of industrial monocrops, but also due to                               
Suez’s facilitation of the transport crops to Britain from its colonies in India and Asia.  
 
23 According to Davis: “Under extreme European pressure, regiments of tax collectors, with moneylenders                           
following them “like a vulture after a cow,” imposed a reign of terror throughout the Nile Valley. Peasants who                                     
hid cattle or resisted the confiscation of their property were brutally flogged in front of their neighbours,”                                 
(Davis 2002: 103­104). 
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 In order to ensure that Egypt’s debts were repaid, the British authorities used Egyptian                           
funds to invest in the cotton industry and its infrastructure to increase production of this                             
crop, the main source of foreign currency (Tollefson, 1999). During this phase the                         
country’s development was subordinate to the purpose of producing cotton, and education                       
and industrialisation were neglected. For example in 1913, only 3% of the state’s budget                           
was given to the education ministry, while the public works ministry received 16% (Tignor,                           
2010: 234). Another consequence of the growth in production of cash crops was a change                             
in the staple diet and food security. The biggest shift was simply a reduction in the growth                                 
of food crops due to the profitability of cotton farming. According to Richards the general                             
quality of the staple diet was lowered throughout the 19th century, due to a decrease in the                                 
diversity of the country’s food crops (Richards, 1976: 282).   
 
In order to increase the export of cotton and other cash crops, the colonial authorities built                               
transport infrastructure. Under British rule, 2400 km of agricultural roads were constructed,                       
and by 1912­13 three private companies had constructed rail lines with a total length of                             
1200 km, which transported as much as half of the cotton harvest (Owen 1993: 222). This                               
new infrastructure allowed the opening of new frontiers deeper in the country. In one                           
example, a French­British sugar company expanded into Upper Egypt, which created the                       
impetus for the construction of new railway lines, including one from Qina to the Red Sea                               
port of Qusair (Abul­Magd, 2010: 701). As part of its expansion the company purchased                           
agricultural land from a local notable, and 35,000 farmers were displaced from their                         
property. Not only did these farmers lose their land but the company also bought their                             
houses, cattle, and any other asset that they owned. These newly landless peasants                         
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 formed a pool of labour for the new sugar factory, and other related infrastructure projects                             
(ibid: 703).  
 
Another piece of infrastructure that was aimed at raising cotton production was the Nile                           
Dam. The colonial government completed the first Nile dam at Aswan in 1902 resulting in                             
a perennial irrigation system in the Nile Valley, as opposed to one that was previously                             
based on an annual flood (Owen, 1993: 222). This allowed the cultivation of cotton on a                               
year­round basis whereas previously its growth was restricted to the summer, when the                         
Nile river was at its lowest. The damming of the Nile had far­reaching consequences for                             
Egypt that will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. However the Low Dam                               
had an immediate effect on Egypt’s topsoil, as the increase in water availability resulted in                             
the abandonment of the annual fallow period, and the rise in the water table resulted in                               
saturation (Richards, 1976: 281). As a result cotton yields began to decline and just before                             
the First World War, fertiliser was introduced to Egypt for the first time in an attempt to                                 
reverse falling yields.  
 
The intense cultivation of a monocrop had other ecological consequences (Jakes, 2016).                       
The huge increase in cotton plants resulted in a growth in the numbers of the cotton­leaf                               
worm that feed on the crop. This insect had always been present in Egypt but proliferated                               
rapidly due to the new source of food. In 1906 one outbreak was so threatening to the                                 
economy that the government ordered the conscription of all boys between the ages of                           
10­18, to pick cotton plants that had been infested by the insect (Jakes, 2016: 16). These                               
ecological problems coincided with a global economic crisis in 1907, which resulted in a                           
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 fall in demand for Egyptian cotton, (Jakes, 2016). This crisis continued during the First                           
World War, when the policies of the British rulers further exacerbated Egypt’s economic                         
problems. Initially, the authorities restricted the export of cotton, resulting in inflation and                         
the loss of value in workers’ wages (Farah, 2009: 67). They then relaxed controls on the                               
export of cotton and the amount of land planted with cotton increased, resulting in a food                               
shortage.  
 
Following the First World War, British rule was faced with intensifying nationalist                       
sentiment, in part driven by anger over how it had managed the economy (Farah, 2009:                             
66). In 1922 Egypt was granted independence, although the British military presence in the                           
country continued until 1952. One developmental legacy of British rule that remained was                         
its fettered industrialisation. Despite Egypt’s production of cotton, there was little progress                       
in terms of domestic manufacturing and the country was one of the largest importers of                             
British textiles (Farah, 2009: 65). Between the First and Second Worlds Wars Egypt’s                         
cotton industry continued its decline, and the depression of the 1930s further reduced                         
demand for cotton. In the 1930s, average cotton exports were EGP 23.4 million, a fall from                               
the EGP 43.1 million average of 1915­1929 (Clawson, 2014). As well as a fall in price,                               





The main characteristic of the second food regime was the export of subsidised grain from                             
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 the US and Europe to the Global South, and Egypt became one of the biggest recipients in                                 
this flow (Mitchell, 2002; Hopkins and Westergaard, 1998; Waterbury, 1983). In 1955                       
Egypt was self­sufficient in wheat and it produced around 1.5 million tonnes a year, by                             
1980 the country consumed around 7.2 million tonnes a year but its annual production had                             
only increased to around 1.7 million tonnes (Scobie, 1981: 24). This shortfall turned Egypt                           
into the largest wheat importer in the world, and it became a major market for the grain                                 
exporters of the US and Europe. In contrast to the first food regime, in which Egypt’s                               
agriculture was dominated by the export of crops that served as industrial inputs, in the                             
second regime the country’s agriculture and food sectors were shaped by the massive flow                           
of imports. This reversal in the circulation of commodities had far reaching consequences                         
on Egypt’s agriculture, food security, diet, and politics.  
 
The export of wheat to Egypt was a consequence of a US government programme to                             
subsidise domestic wheat production and export surpluses in the form of aid. At its peak in                               
the 1950s and 1960s the policy, known as Public Law 480, constituted a third of the total                                 
value of US agricultural exports (MERIP, 1987). This aid was in various modes, including                           
soft loans and also the facilitation of payments in local currency. 
 
In an era in which African and Middle East states were a theatre for geopolitical                             
competition between the US and USSR, Washington sought to gain influence in Egypt and                           
contain the ambitions of Gamal Abd Al Nasser, who came to power in the revolution of                               
1952 (Burns, 1985). Nasser sought a non­aligned position and implemented a programme                       
of modernist reforms that were unprecedented in the Arab region at that time. He banned                             
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 the employment of children under 12, introduced welfare schemes, and made education                       
compulsory for men and women. Between 1952 and 1957 the number of students who                           
enrolled in technical and vocational schools increased by around 40% every year (Aburish,                         
2005: 141). One of Nasser’s biggest reforms was the redistribution of land, the ownership                           
of which was highly concentrated. In 1947 0.5 percent of the population owned 36 percent                             
of all agricultural land and tenant farmers often faced feudal conditions in which the                           
majority of their income was spent on rent (Margold, 1957: 10). As a result of Nasser's                               
land reform policies, by the late 1960s 15% of the cultivable land had been redistributed,                             
and 80% of it had been granted to 318,000 families (Sakr and Tarcir, 2007).  
 
For the US, food aid served as a means to contain Nasser’s Arab nationalist tendencies                             
during the 1950s and 60s (McNamara, 2004; Weinbaum, 2015). For example, Washington                       
expressed its disapproval of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 by reneging on                             
a wheat deal (Dethier and Funk, 1987). After 1958, the US restarted food aid to Egypt, in                                 
part due to a fear that the Iraqi revolution of that year could strengthen Moscow’s position                               
in the region. In response to Egypt’s intervention in North Yemen in 1962, Washington                           
threatened to stop food aid unless Nasser withdrew his forces from the country (ibid).                           
During the 1960s food aid continued on a sporadic basis amid ongoing tensions between                           
Cairo and Washington and after 1965 it was halted for several years. Although Nasser                           
continued to seek an independent position, this source of food was an effective lure as it                               




 The mastering of the Nile continued during the era of the second food regime. In 1933 the                                 
Low Dam was raised in height, allowing the extension of irrigation channels and canals                           
throughout the Nile Valley (Hughes, 2005). This interference continued to have                     
far­reaching ecological consequences. The expansion in irrigation channels led to an                     
increase in the amount of stagnant water, which led to the spread of malaria (Gallagher,                             
1990). During the Second World War the spread of the disease became an epidemic. The                             
Egyptian authorities tried a variety of tactics against the virus but the use of                           
dichloro­diphenyl­trichloroethane (DDT) proved to be the most successful measure (ibid).                   
However as is now known, DDT is highly toxic and spreads through the food chain killing                               
avian predators, a natural counterbalance to mosquitos and other insects. Its intensive use                         
also resulted in resistance amongst mosquitos, thus creating “super insects” and the levels                         
of DDT had to be doubled and tripled in order to obtain the same results. Another                               24
consequence of the taming of the Nile was the increase in the aquatic snail that carried                               
Bilharzia, which was treated in the post­Second World War with injections with unclean                         
needles. This practice resulted in Egypt having one of the highest rates of Hepatitis C in                               
the world (Mayfield, 2012).   
 
The completion of the High Dam in Aswan in 1970 allowed a transformative level of control                               
over the river, and provided hydroelectricity that provided a source of cheap energy for                           
industrialisation (Ayeb, 2002). According to Hughes the damming of the Nile was a                         
“gigantic step in the ongoing transformation of Egypt from a society dependent on                         
24 The story of DDT in Egypt shows how capitalists create the problem and provide the solution. In 1950 two                                       
of the biggest conglomerates in Egypt the Misr Group and the Abbud Group, both of which had made                                   
substantial interest in sugarcane and cotton farming, went into a joint venture with Monsanto to build a DDT                                   
factory (Mitchell, 2002: 49).  
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 traditional agriculture to an adjunct of the world market economy” (2005: 218). As the dam                             
led to the end of the annual food that replenished soil with sediment, the High Dam                               
resulted in a continued decline in the fertility of topsoil. As a result Egypt became one of                                 
the most intensive users of fertiliser in the world (Dyer, 1997: 106). Other consequences of                             
the transformation in the Nile was the erosion of the coastal plain, and increasing levels of                               
pollution as the river system was no longer cleansed by the yearly deluge (Sowers, 2013). 
 
Following the appointment of Anwar Sadat as president in 1970, the thaw in Egypt’s                           
relations with the US resulted in the resumption of food aid and other forms of assistance                               
on a huge scale (Waterbury, 1983). The US sought to fortify Sadat as a key ally in the                                   
region. His peace deal with Israel, his liberal economic policies and other aspects of his                             
pro­Western outlook were crucial assets for US policy in the Middle East. Between 1975                           
and 1989 the US spent almost US $15 billion on aid and loans to Egypt (USAID, 1989: i).                                   
Food aid was a major part of this programme, and this led to a sharp increase in the                                   
consumption of wheat, which increased from around 3 million tonnes in 1973 to 7.2 million                             
tonnes in 1980 (Scobie, 1981: 24).   
 
This aid created a market for US exports, and during the 1970s US agribusiness                           
technology was introduced to Egypt’s agriculture. Around $6.2 billion of the $15 billion was                           
spent on development projects that were implemented by US companies, and from this                         
figure 40% was allocated to projects in water, sewage, agriculture, and technology                       
(Mitchell, 2002: 238). As a result, American companies won contracts to construct grain                         
silos and storage facilities. At the same time farming equipment made by companies such                           
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 as John Deere, International Harvester, and Caterpillar were exported to Egypt. US                       
universities and institutions also won consultancy and training contracts worth hundreds of                       
millions of dollars (ibid).  
 
Under Sadat, the state began to roll back some of the socialist reforms of Nasser. In 1973                                 
the government launched a policy of free market reforms known as ​infitah (meaning                         
opening in Arabic). This policy was intended to increase the level of private investment                           
through economic and legislative reform (Amin, 2004). The regional politics that                     25
accompanied infitah will be discussed later in this chapter but this phase marked the start                             
of a number of transformations in the agrarian economy, one of which was the increase of                               
foreign capital in the agricultural sector. Between 1971­1976, private sector investment in                       
the sector was around 4%, but as a result of the free market reforms that started during                                 
the infitah period, this figure eventually rose to 78% in the period between 2007­2012                           
(Tanyeri­Abur, Elamin, 2011: 31).  
 
Under Sadat there was a resurgence in the influence of the rural landed classes. During                             
the rule of Nasser, half of the seats in the Majlis Al­Shaab, a section of the Egyptian                                 
parliament, were reserved for peasants and workers (Kienle, 2001: 141). However Sadat                       
sought new constituents in order to widen his power base and strengthen his position                           
(Fahmy, 2002: 202). In return for political support he increased the parliament seats of the                             
landowning classes at the expense of farmers' representation. As a result, by 1984 no                           
25 It should be noted that infitah largely fell short of its intended aims. By 1990 the level of private sector                                         
activity was just 10 percent of the value of the state sector and the public sector continued to grow until the                                         
1980s, which partly led to a growth in sovereign debt (Roccu, 2012: 110:).  
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 peasants held seats in the Majlis al­Shaab (Springborg, 1991: 246). By the same time, the                             
National Democratic Party’s (NDP) Agriculture Committee consisted of members of the                     
Majlis al­Shaab, Majlis al­Shura, government officials, and members of the private sector                       
but no peasants. Even the NDP’s Peasant Union was run by a member of a landowning                               
family (ibid).   
 
Using this renewed influence, landowners began to lobby for the return of their property                           
that had been lost in Nasser’s land reforms. Sadat allowed landowners to reseize some of                             
their land, the start of a creeping reversal of Nasser’s land reforms (Aidi, 2008: 175).                             
Throughout the 1970s landowners were able to increase their holdings through purchase                       
and court actions against the seizures of property under Nasser. In 1981 limits to land                             
ownership were abolished and the state, which rented 500,000 feddans to farmers, began                         
to sell land to tenants (Springborg, 1991: 234). In 1985 the government announced that it                             
was considering modifying a 1966 law that provided some protection to tenants who were                           
threatened with eviction (ibid).   
 
Another dimension of Sadat’s policies was the centralisation of control over agrarian                       
affairs. Between 1976­1977 agricultural cooperatives that had been introduced under                   
Nasser were stripped of any political role, and their management was transferred to village                           
banks that were under the direct control of the government (Tarouty, 2015). Another                         
institution that was reoriented in favour of landlords and capitalists was the Principal Bank                           
for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). The bank was established in order to                         
provide working credit to small farmers, but under Sadat the number of short­term loans                           
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 fell; between 1960­1975 such credit was around 97.4% of its book, but by 1984 this had                               
fallen to 71% (Sadowski 1991: 202). The reform of the bank also meant that long­term                             
loans had to be securitised against land, a policy that favoured big landowners.  
 
During the 1970s the Egyptian diet underwent a transformation (Aulas, 1982). For some in                           
Egypt’s middle classes, infitah created a new spending power that made meat more                         
affordable and this was concomitant with a change in crops in Egypt. Imported wheat                           
provided the basis for bread, and other carbohydrates in the human diet, and domestically                           
produced crops were directed towards animal feedstocks. In 1966 humans consumed 53%                       
of domestically produced maize and grains such as barley and sorghum, but by 1988 this                             
had fallen to 6% (Mitchell, 2012: 215).  
 
While meat consumption among the wealthy increased from the 1970s onwards, for poorer                         
classes in Egypt the cost of food increased. Between 1982­1987 the World Bank reported                           
that the expense of the “minimum cost diet” had risen to 242% in rural areas (Nagarajan,                               
2013: 31). This also resulted in a rapid increase in the state’s expenditure on subsidised                             
food in the 1970s. In 1972 the cost of food subsidies was EGP 11 million and by 1974 the                                     
bill stood at EGP 329 million (Dethier, Funk 1987). This influx of wheat and the technology                               
that was used to store it had unforeseen consequences on public health; the grain was                             
often stored in hot and humid conditions that led to the spread of fungus that caused                               
kidney and liver diseases (Lock and Nguyen, 2011). 
 
Globally, the second regime went into crisis following the huge grain deals with the Soviets                             
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 of the early 1970s, and the subsequent increase in prices. The emergence of a European                             26
agribusiness sector that had been fostered with US support under the Marshall Plan,                         
began to compete with US agriculture (Friedmann, 1993). This competition manifested                     
itself in Egypt, and the US market share of grain imports in Egypt contracted, in 1974­76                               
the US share of Egypt’s agricultural imports was 40% but by 1983 it had declined to 28%                                 
(Dethier, Funk 1987). This led to a trade war over the Egyptian market between the US                               
and Europe, and in 1983 the US government offered a large amount of wheat and flour to                                 
Egypt through its aid programmes in a bid to bolster its share (ibid). The dumping of                               
surplus grains suppressed the cost of grain but it hampered the development of Egyptian                           





In contrast to the first two food regimes in which the state was the dominant actor, the third                                   
food regime is characterised by corporate power. In Egypt, the withdrawal of the state from                             
the management of agriculture had its roots in the structural adjustment measures that                         
were implemented following a debt crisis in 1988 (Bromley and Bush, 1994; Bush, 1995;                           
2007; Hopkins and Westergaard, 1998). Egypt’s debt had accumulated through the 1970s,                       
partly as a result of military spending before the 1973 war with Israel, but also because of                                 
the growing food deficit that created a reliance on imports. As a result of foreign currency                               
26 Starting in 1972, the Soviet Union bought large quantities of wheat from US commodities companies. This                                 
incident (termed in the US media as the “Great Grain Robbery”) caused the global price of wheat to triple.   
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 earnings from oil exports, Suez Canal revenue, and tourism, lenders raised their exposure                         
to Egypt during the 1970s (Owen and Tripp, 1989: 127). This contributed to a                           
transformation in Egypt’s fiscal position. Prior to 1957 Egypt was a net creditor (Amin,                           
1995: 111). By 1987 Egypt’s foreign debt stood at $44 billion (Quandt 1988: 140). As a                               
result of external debt, increasing amounts of foreign currency inflows were consumed by                         
debt servicing. In the 1980s, this was exacerbated by a fall in the oil price and as foreign                                   
currency earnings declined, creditors began to withdraw from further loan commitments                     
(Ikram, 2006: 57).  
 
In response to this debt trap Egypt was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund                               
(IMF) for assistance (Ikram, 2006). In a series of agreements with the IMF starting in 1991,                               
Egypt received commitments to reschedule debt and receive further loans, but these were                         
contingent on economic reforms that would cut social spending, liberalize the economy,                       
and privatise state assets (Abdel­Khalek and Korayem, 2001). One area of social                       
spending that was targeted by these reforms was subsidised food, a form of austerity that                             
would lead to an increased market share for corporate producers. However food subsidies                         
were politically sensitive, and remain so today. In 1977 Sadat had attempted to remove                           
subsidies on several food commodities on the advice of the World Bank and IMF, but the                               
policy resulted in demonstrations that swept the country and nearly toppled his regime. As                           
a result, the implementation of subsidy reform would be gradual. In 1990 the government                           
removed frozen meat from the subsidy programme, and by 1995 fish, tea, rice and certain                             
types of bread were also removed from the subsidy basket (Sachs: 2012, 65). Following                           
1995 only bread, wheat flour, cooking oil and sugar remained (ibid). Other cost­saving                         
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 measures included changes in the size and quality of subsidised products. The state also                           
sought to downsize the number of holders of ration cards. In 1990 87.3% of the population                               
had ration cards, and by 1997 this had been reduced to 69.2% (Abdel­Khalik and                           
Korayem, 2001: 74).  
 
Aside from food subsidies, the government implemented a withdrawal from its                     
management of agriculture in favour of the free market. In 1987 the government removed                           
price controls on crops, essentially enabling farmers to grow what they thought would                         
make them the highest profit. This was done with encouragement by agencies such as                           
USAID, who pushed for a capital­intensive form of agriculture, market liberalisation, tenure                       
reform, and a rise in exports (Bush, 2007: 1604). Initially these policies appeared to have                             
some success as yields rose, but agricultural GDP stagnated or declined in the years                           
following the removal of price settings (Mitchell, 2002: 264). A possible reason for the rise                             
in yields was that under the new system farmers no longer had a disincentive to correctly                               
record their crop yields, which under the state controlled system was a common practice                           
(Bush, 2007: 1604).   27
 
The biggest act of free market reform was the passing of Law 96 in 1992, which abolished                                 
the rights of tenant farmers to remain on their land at a fixed rent (Saad, 2002). Law 96                                   28
27 See Mitchell (2002) and Bush (2003; 2007) for a detailed examination of the claim that free market reforms                                     
resulted in increased agricultural yields.  
 
28 The law was applied in three stages. Firstly a transitional period between 1992­1997 would result in rent                                 
being increased from seven to 22 times the land tax, after which it would be liberalised. Following the                                   
transitional period rental contracts could only be renewed from 12 months as opposed to the perpetual                               
contracts enforced by Nasser’s reforms. At the end of the transitional period, owners of land had the right                                   
to evict tenants (Saad, 2002). 
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 was a death blow against what remained of Nasser’s statist agrarian policies. Following                         
the end of the transitional period in 1997, rents increased by as much as 300­400%, and                               
hundreds of thousands of people were evicted from the land (Bush: 2004). The end of the                               
state’s protection of small farmers further weakened a fragile existence. It was estimated                         
that as many as one million farmers were displaced from their land as a result of the law                                   
and 700,000 people lost their jobs (Mitchell, 2002: 265). The legislation also caused an                           
upsurge in violence and unrest as landlords forced tenants from their land.  
 
Although the IMF’s intervention in Egypt played a role in Law 96, the legislation was also a                                 
result of endogenous class pressure. After their reappearance as a political force under                         
Sadat, the landowning class continued to lobby for the return of their property, and the                             
economic policies of the 1990s provided them with an opportunity. In the media debate                           
prior to the passing of the law, there emerged an image of tenant farmers as unproductive                               
and lazy, while landowners were portrayed as respectable citizens who had been dealt an                           
injustice (Bush, 2002: 107­108). The implementation of the law was also an indicator of                           29
the authoritarianism that accompanied these free market measures. At the time of                       
implementation of the law in 1997, activists who protested the measure were arrested on                           
the grounds that they were using “terrorist means” (Kienle, 2001: 96).   
 
The benefit of these reforms for agribusiness were clear to see. Between 1990 and 2013                             
the levels of export fruit crops in Egypt increased by 655%, and the number of vegetable                               
29 According to Saad: “The stereotyped image of lazy peasants watching videos and abandoning the land to                               
travel abroad to buy more consumer good was heavily deployed as ‘evidence’ for the injustice that had                                 
befallen landowners. In contrast, landowners were portrayed in the image of needy, yet respectable,                           
helpless middle­class citizens, oppressed by merciless tyrants,” (Saad, 2002: 107­108).   
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 export crops increased by 258% (Hanieh, 2013: 209). Market reforms also exacerbated a                         
process of asymmetrical exchange between farmer and buyer. Between 1991­2009 the                     
ratio of export value to “agricultural production at farm gate” increased from 51 to 169                             
(ibid). The free market policies were entirely oriented towards capital and neglected any                         
social welfare. According to Bush: “Contemporary strategy does not have at its core                         
priorities of local food security, national development or poverty amelioration,” (Bush 2007:                       
1613). 
 
The social consequence of these reforms was uneven. Between 1995­96 and 1999­2000,                       
the proportion of Egyptians living below the poverty line declined in Egypt. However this                           
belies the fact that in areas that rely heavily on agriculture, poverty increased during this                             
period. For example in rural parts of Upper Egypt the headcount ratio of the population                             
living under the poverty line was 29.32 in 1995­96, and by 1999­2000 this had increased to                               
34.15 (El­Laithy et al., 2003: 23). Landownership also became more concentrated and by                         
2000, 2821 individuals held 11% of the total area of privately held land, a higher                             
concentration than before 1952  (Roccu, 2012: 120).  
 
The policy resulted in an increase in unemployment. Many farmers were forced to leave                           
rural areas in search of alternative sources of income, and they became inhabitants of                           
deprived urban slums. In 1991 the population of the ​ashwaiyat (slums) in Cairo was                           
estimated to be 6.3 million and in 2000 this estimate increased to 8.3 million (Sabry 2009:                               
17). In the same period the size of these slums in Cairo were estimated to have increased                                 
from 106.9 km2 to 140.1 km2 (ibid), consuming agricultural land. Another consequence                       
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 was a rise in the number of Egyptians who emigrated to other Arab countries or Europe in                                 
search of work. In 1992 the number of Egyptian migrants was 2.2 million and by 2006 this                                 
had risen to 3.9 million (Zohry, 2007: 8).  
 
The intensification of market forces in agriculture and rural life elongated hierarchies in                         
terms of access to resources and influence over government policy. Starting in the 1990s                           
a group of powerful capitalists moved into the agricultural sector in order to take advantage                             
of these opportunities. These capitalists benefited from access to corrupt bureaucrats,                     
which gave them advantages such as favourable treatment in their application for loans                         
from state banks like the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC)                         
(Bush and Ayeb, 2002: 59). As a result, these reforms did not lead to a loss of control for                                     
the regime of Hosni Mubarak, as the entry of capitalists allied to him ensured that the                               
agriculture sector remained under the control of the “ruling bloc” (Roccu, 2012: 136).  
 
The Maghraby and Mansour families are examples of such tycoons. These owners of                         
large conglomerates with interests in real estate, financial services and other goods,                       
expanded into the fruit and vegetable export sector during the 1990s. The involvement of                           
these crony capitalists and their connection to the state meant these reforms led to a                             
concentration of wealth among a select group of businessmen. For example, following the                         
removal of PBDAC’s monopoly over fertiliser, three private companies controlled the                     
market for the commodity, which led to a fourfold increase in the price between 1994 and                               




In addition to Egyptian conglomerates, foreign capital also flowed into Egypt from the                         
1990s onwards. Much of this investment consisted of Western multinationals such as                       
Heinz, Cadbury, Danone and Coca Cola but at the same time Gulf companies also                           





Although the third food regime has been defined by corporate power the state played a                             
mediating role in the expansion of the corporate agribusiness sector in the 1990s and                           
2000s. As will be illustrated in the coming chapters, although its management of the sector                             
was eclipsed by the free market, the state facilitated the corporate food system through its                             
allocation of land and water, and also through its bureaucratic assistance. A characteristic                         
of this alliance that is specific to Egypt has been the inclusion of the military, whose                               
alliance with foreign capital, despite its statist orientation, is an example of the                         
heterogeneity of capital’s alliances in the global mosaic. The military has always played a                           
role in Egypt’s economy, especially following the development of its industries in the                         
1970s, and its factories produced arms but also consumer products (Metz, 1990). This                         
production included food, and in the 1980s it was estimated that the military’s Food                           
Security Division was one of the largest agribusiness companies in the country, and                         
between 1985­6 it produced EGP 488 million worth of products, a figure that amounted to                             
a fifth of the country’s total food production (Crush, 2005). One estimate suggests that                           
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 army’s pasta production accounts for as much as 40% of the Egyptian market (Khalifa,                           
2015: 226).   
 
The army has control over a number of assets that it uses for its own production or which it                                     
can rent or sell to private capital. The military controls a large land bank due to a law that                                     
allows it to seize property for defense purposes, and as a result it controls most of the                                 
country’s coastline, and most of the tourism developments in these areas involve the                         
military. In addition to property, the military also has a sources of cheap labour in the form                                 
of conscripts, which provide a low­cost workforce for its industries, and often these recruits                           
are not paid anything beyond their keep. Workers in army factories, whether civilian or not,                             
are subject to militaristic management practices that restricts union organising on the basis                         
of national security. According to one report in 2010, workers in a army butane cannister                             
factory were charged by a military court for revealing state secrets after they spoke out                             
over a workplace accident that killed one of their colleagues (Abul­Magd, 2011). 
 
Another characteristic of the army’s position in Egypt’s economy is its control over civilian                           
affairs. This is partly due to a network of retired officers who have jobs in state­owned                               
companies and the government bureaucracy. Examples of positions held by former                     
officers include the heads of districts in Cairo, managers in the state oil company, heads of                               
ports, state transport companies, and the head of the Suez Canal Authority (Abul­Magd,                         




 Since the revolution of 2011 the army’s power has strengthened, both politically and                         
economically. (Marshall, 2015; Marshall and Stacher, 2012; Barayez, 2015). In place of                       30
the vacuum that was left by Mubarak’s overthrow, the military has served as a guarantor of                               
the country’s stability, particularly for private capital. Following the revolution, the Supreme                       
Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) formed a military government that resisted demands                         
by the protesters for new labour legislation that would include a minimum wage (Marshall,                           
2015). Amid the instability many foreign­owned companies were able to continue their                       
operations under the military’s aegis (ibid). As a result of this enhancement of power,                           
some researchers have suggested that rather than occupy a rentier economic position                       
based on its privileges, the Egyptian military has now been forced to adopt the                           
responsibilities of fiscal management (Stacher, 2016). One example of this would be the                         
Ministry of Defense US $1 billion donation to the Central Bank in 2011 (ibid). What is clear                                 
from the cases examined in this thesis, is that the military’s influence grants it new                             
opportunities to act, in some cases exclusively, as the gatekeeper for foreign capital                         
(Marshall, 2015; Marshall and Stacher 2012). 
 
Aside from the military, it is important to consider that the Egyptian state has not                             
diminished due to the structural adjustment policies implemented since 1991. In fact, the                         
state is now at its largest since 1952 and is continuing to get bigger. The state employed                                 
5.6 million workers in 2010 and since 2011 this has increased by 900,000 (Stacher, 2016).  
 
30 This thesis refers to the events of 2011 as a revolution, the analysis that in fact it represented a coup led                                           
by the military notwithstanding. It will refer to the events of 2013 as a coup.  
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 Some functions of the state have been transformed in order to act as an interlocutor with                               
foreign capital. Ministries and institutions with an investment and business mandate, such                       
as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Investment, General Authority for Investment and                         
Free Zones (GAFI), and the Ministry of Trade and Industry have arguably been elevated in                             
the state hierarchy. Ministries with more of a social mandate have stagnated and lost                           
power. Egypt’s Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) is one of the largest                           
ministries in Egypt and it is estimated that as many as 500,000 people are employed in the                                 
institution (Rivera and Elkalla, 2007: 256). Yet despite its size, the ministry does not                           
appear to be performing well and has become mired in allegations of corruption and                           
incompetence.  
 
The state has also been subject to a process of decentralisation and centralisation of                           
government institutions, a characteristic of neoliberal reform (Hanieh, 2013: 68). At the top                         
of the state hierarchy there is increasing centralisation of control concerning economic                       
decisions, yet social services have sometimes been decentralised, privatised or turned into                       
fee paying services. The gradual cuts in the food subsidy system are a good example of                               
this, and this ongoing process will be examined in Chapter Six. This process can also be                               
clearly identified in the fate of the agricultural extension service, an institution overseen by                           
the MALR, which has served as an important intermediary between the ministry and                         
farmers. In the early 1990s a policy of decentralising the extension service was initiated                           
through ministerial decrees (Rivera and Elkalla, 2007: 252). According to one study,                       
decentralisation was designed to “bring research and extension services closer to farmers,                       




Rather than improving the extension service, such reforms appear to have resulted in a                           
declining capacity. The number of employees in the agency has fallen as they have retired                             
and not been replaced (McDonougha, et al., 2014: 170). The service is also hampered by                             
low pay, lack of funds for transport, and an unwillingness on behalf of its employees to                               
relocate to remote areas of the country (Shalaby, et al., 2011: 586). In some cases the                               
service had been downsized to the point where extension workers were forced to take on                             
multiple roles, including the enforcement of building regulations, compromising the trust of                       
small farmers. Often, research services of the ministry favoured larger farmers who had                         
the resources to implement the practices they recommended, and the needs of smaller                         
farmers were overlooked (McDonougha, et al., 2014: 168). The fate of the extension                         
service is a good illustration of how the transformation of the state has resulted in a                               
growing disparity between small farmers and agribusiness. Smallholders have lost access                     
to state resources as agribusiness has expanded its control. As will be discussed, some                           





The previous sections have outlined the manifestations of the three food regimes in Egypt.                           
The central theme in these three stages has been the transitions that have taken place in                               
Egypt that have created the corporate food system. This section will examine the transition                           
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 that took place in regional and global politics in the post­Second World war era that                             
facilitated the internationalisation of Gulf capital into Egypt. The central theme in this                         
section is a reconfiguration of the regional balance of power that allowed the Gulf to                             
develop a dominant position in the region and expand its influence in Egypt, a country that                               
now represents a security and economic asset for the GCC states (Springborg, 2013:                         
255).  
 
In the post­colonial era, relations between the Gulf and Egypt were defined by the role that                               
Egypt played as a political and cultural centre for the Arab world. In the 1950’s Nasser’s                               
Arab nationalism was a powerful political force, and Cairo was a centre of reformist ideas,                             
political thought and Arab consciousness (Alsayyad, 2011: 224). Nasser was also                     
emerging as the most popular Arab leader, and his nationalist rhetoric appealed in a time                             
when the region was reeling from the creation of Israel and other traumas of the colonial                               
era.   
  
This powerful influence was a threat to the monarchical Gulf states, who at that time were                               
relatively weak and struggling to create political legitimacy (Niblock, 2006). Arab nationalist                       
and leftist groups were active across the Arabian Peninsula and Nasser’s nationalism was                         
becoming a powerful force in the Gulf countries (Matthiesen, 2013: 94). Migration played a                           
role, and Palestinians and Egyptian who worked in the Gulf, as well as the citizens of Gulf                                 
states who returned home after education or training in Egypt, transmitted Arab nationalist                         
ideology (Chalcraft, 2010). According to one account, Arab teachers encouraged support                     
for Nasser in the UAE and his picture was hung in classrooms in Dubai schools in the late                                   
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 1950s (Davidson, 2008: 42). The nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 set a                           
threatening precedent for states such as Saudi Arabia, who feared any democratic control                         
of its nascent oil industry. Yet despite their concerns over his rhetoric, Gulf states generally                             
sought to maintain a good relationship with Nasser, partly due to the legitimacy that such                             
relations inferred for their image among their own people. In addition to politics, Egypt was                             
experiencing a vibrant era of media, culture, and institutional development, while by                       
comparison much of the Gulf was undeveloped. The country’s cultural output in the form of                             
films and music created a cachet in the Gulf and across the rest of the region. This                                 
continues to have a legacy today for many in the Gulf, especially the older generations.  
 
In the 1960s Nasser’s Egypt became more influential in the region. In 1962 he sent troops                               
to support the republicans in North Yemen, a move that alarmed the Gulf states. However                             
Egypt’s regional leadership began to decline following the defeat of the Six Day War                           
against Israel in 1967. This crushing defeat created leverage for the Gulf to demand that                             
Nasser stop his rhetorical attacks on Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries, in return for                             
financial aid that was badly needed in post­war Egypt. At the Khartoum Conference of                           
1967, Nasser agreed to cease his hostility with Riyadh in return for aid (Mann, 2012: 754).  
 
In 1970 President Anwar Sadat came to power, marking the start of an era in which Egypt                                 
became a close ally of the US and the Gulf states. One key moment in this pivot was the                                     
expulsion of Soviet advisors in 1972, marking the start of Egypt’s pro­Western foreign                         
policy (Waterbury, 1983: 375). A part of this process was the launch of infitah, a policy that                                 




Sadat’s infitah policy coincided with the oil boom of the 1970s, and this period marked the                               
start of the development of a region that was defined by the exchange of labour and                               
capital. The increase in the price of oil following the Arab embargo created surplus capital                             
that was directed to Egypt in the forms of investment and aid packages (Hanieh, 2011).                             32
According to one estimate, between 1967 and 1979, aid from the Gulf amounted to $12                             
billion, and another estimate for a similar period estimated that the amount was as high as                               
$17 billion (Feiler, 2003: 1). Although Gulf aid and loans were substantial, the GCC                           33
states did not have the capacity to encourage specific reform programmes and attach                         
conditionality. As a result Gulf states supported the IMF reforms from 1976 onwards.   34
31 The infitah period was characterised by increased consumerism. According to Amin: “the worst thing about                               
the westernization of the 1970s compared with what went on before was that it constituted mainly the                                 
westernization of consumption, while in the 1950s and 1960s it was to a large extent a westernization of                                   
production.” (Amin, 2004: 51). 
 
32 The increase in the price of oil also created surplus capital that was recycled through western banks and                                     
was lent in sovereign loans to countries in the global South, including Egypt. According to Hanieh between                                 
1973­1977 $107 billion of OPEC reserves flowed into Euromarkets (Hanieh, 2011: 44). This coincided with                             
an increase in the price of oil and food, which forced Global South countries to borrow this money resulting in                                       
growing debt. This flow of money also played a role in the process of financialisation. According to Hanieh:                                   
“Petrodollar flows from the Gulf, particularly from Saudi Arabia, played a critical role in strengthening both the                                 
financialization of the system as a whole and the specific role of the United States as the dominant power                                     
(ibid). 
33 By way of contrast US government grants and loans to Egypt between 1974­1978 was around $2 billion                                   
and the equivalent from the World Bank was just over $1 billion​ (Aulas, 1982).  
 
34 The relationship between the IMF and Saudi Arabia developed following the oil boom and in 1974 Riyadh                                   
began lending money to the fund. These were followed by several more loans and in 1978 Saudi Arabia                                   
appointed an executive director to the board of the fund. In 1981 Riyadh agreed to provide the fund with a                                       
facility of US $8 billion ​(IMF, 2015). ​According to Feiler: “the AOC (Arab Oil Countries) had few tools for                                     
stimulating institutionalized change in Egypt, just as they had not succeeded in activating a political lever                               
through their aid. However the interests of the GCC was tied to the US and other Western countries from the                                       




During this period there were early signs of class formation at the regional scale.                           
Increasing numbers of GCC citizens travelled to Egypt, particularly Saudis, for whom                       
Egypt “represented a gateway to the international world of business” (Mann, 2012: 761).                         
For many inhabitants of the GCC states, Egypt offered facilities that were unavailable in                           
their home countries such as education and healthcare, and Gulf businessmen also                       
sought to invest in Egypt. Commercial relationships between Gulf investors and Egyptians                       
were strengthened by personal friendships and marriage. For example, Saudi                   
businessman Saleh Abdullah Kamal and members of the Sharbatly and Shobshoki (two                       
Saudi business families with interests in the food sector) married Egyptian women. This                         
had the added benefit of allowing these businessmen to circumvent laws limiting foreign                         
ownership of Egyptian companies, and often shares of companies were registered in the                         
name of Egyptian spouses. These relationships even extended to the presidential family,                       
and the former Saudi intelligence chief and the brother­in­law of King Faisal, Kamal                         
Adham, had a close relationship with Sadat. Adham is reported to have entered into joint                             
business ventures with Sadat’s wife Jehan and other members of his family (Cooley, 2002:                           
92). 
  
In addition to personal and business relationships, Gulf capital’s presence in Egypt also                         
had a institutional form. One of the policies of infitah was the creation of an alliance                               
between Egyptian labour and resources, Gulf capital, and Western technology. This                     
formed the basis of joint ventures such as the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI)                           
(also known as the Arab Military Industrialisation Organisation), a weapons manufacturing                     
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 project that was founded with investment from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar in                             
1975. Gulf capital partnered with the Egyptian state on a number of other projects. These                             
included the Arab African Bank, the Arab International Bank, a oil pipeline from Suez to                             
Alexandria, and an investment company called the Arab Gulf Investment Company (AGIC)                       
(Feiler, 2003: 55­56).    35
 
In addition to aid and investment there were other ways in which Egypt’s economy became                             
more dependent on its neighbours on the other side of the Red Sea. One example was the                                 
Gulf state’s demand for migrant labour as a result of the oil boom, and thousands of                               
trained Egyptian workers sought work in the Gulf states. By 1978 the Egyptian Foreign                           
Ministry estimated that 500,000 Egyptians were employed in Saudi Arabia, 150,000 in                       
Kuwait and the UAE, and 15,000 in Qatar (Feiler, 2003: 101). While Sadat’s infitah policies                             
did not necessarily create an improvement in the standard of living for many Egyptians, the                             
flow of remittances did. Between 1974­1984 remittance to Egypt were $22 billion, of which                           
the majority came from the Gulf countries (ibid: 116).  
 
Emigration to the Gulf quelled political dissatisfaction amongst the Egyptian middle classes                       
as they found new opportunities in the Gulf states. As a result the Egyptian government                             
encouraged migration despite its impact on the local labour market. In the same vein, the                             36
35 Zaalouk describes this class as follows: “The access of this group to state power is an important element to                                       
the enhancement of foreign Western capitalist interests, both as exporters of commodities and future                           
investors. To enable Egypt to play its role as a strategic asset and a potential economic one Americans have                                     
aligned themselves with and supported the rising classes of the Sadat regime,” (Zaalouk, 1989: 11). 
36 Feiler states that: “The government considered migration “a safety valve,” enabling millions of Egyptian of                               
114 
 government also believed that migration had the potential to lower the birth rate and                           
lessen the food import bill (Feiler, 2003: 107). The presence of Egyptian workers created                           
leverage for the Gulf states. During the economic stagnation of the 1980s, Egyptians were                           
the last workers to be fired in the Gulf, due to the sensitivity of relations with their mother                                   
country (ibid: 265).  
 
Sadat’s 1978 Camp David agreement with Israel marked the completion of a campaign by                           
the US to fortify Egypt’s alliance with the West, in which the Gulf played a key role. The                                   
signing of this agreement with Israel resulted in an Arab boycott on Egypt, and Cairo’s                             
Arab League membership was suspended. However most private Gulf investments                   
continued despite the action (Podeh and Winckler, 2002). In fact, the peace deal with                           
Israel led many investors to believe that Cairo’s peace with Israel made the country a more                               
secure destination for capital. Regional crises such as the 1975­1990 Lebanese Civil War,                         
the Iran­Iraq War, and Kuwait’s Souq Al Manakh stock market crash in 1982 also caused                             
the relocation of capital to Egypt (Feiler, 2003: 96).  
 
The Egyptian military became an important ally for the Gulf states as its status as the                               
largest Arab army offered a safeguard of regional stability and security. The alliance dates                           
back to the early 1970s, when the Gulf states transferred large amounts of aid to the                               
Egyptian military prior to the 1973 war with Israel. By supporting the Egyptian military and                             
assisting its victory against Israel in 1973, the Gulf states succeeded in making a powerful                             
all classes ­ frustrated academics who could not find suitable employment, skilled and unskilled workers ­ to                                 
go abroad and to improve their standard of living; through this policy the government was able to avoid                                   
tension and remove political dangers from the Egyptian political scene,” (2003: 107).   
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 regional ally out of a potentially dangerous foe. The importance of this relationship was                           
exemplified when Egypt joined the US campaign to recapture Kuwait in 1991, giving                         
credibility to an intervention that neutralised a serious threat to the Gulf monarchs                         
(Kamrava, 2011: 115). 
 
Under Mubarak, the close relationship between the Gulf states and the Egyptian                       
government continued but Saudi Arabia gradually became more dominant (David and                     
Henderson, 2009). As the Egyptian economy was liberalised in the 1990s the Gulf                         37
became one of the main sources of foreign capital. In addition to agriculture and food,                             
which will be discussed in the coming chapters, Gulf companies invested in real estate                           
projects, industry and tourism. According to Hanieh: “the process of liberalization in Egypt                         
was to a great extent predicated upon the westward internationalisation of Gulf capital, and                           
its incorporation into the anatomy of Egyptian class structure,” (Hanieh, 2013: 43). 
 
The post­2011 era in Egypt is one in which the Gulf has played a pivotal role in Egyptian                                   
politics. Following the revolution in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed                     
Morsi was elected as Egyptian president. Qatar was Morsi’s main supporter in the region                           
and the Gulf state granted more than US $8 billion in aid to his government (Abi­Habib and                                 
Abdellatif, 2013). Qatar also backed Morsi through its Al Jazeera network, the channels of                           
which took a sympathetic position towards the president. Following the coup of 2013, the                           
government of Abdelfattah El­Sisi was also supported by the Gulf, yet in this case it was                               
37 According to David and Henderson: “Since then, the balance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the                                 
leadership of the Arab world has shifted in the kingdom’s favour. This is partly a reflection of the growing                                     
lethargy of President Mubarak, but also the surge of Saudi Arabia’s financial prowess, a consequence of the                                 
high oil prices, little­dented by the 2008/09 global economic downturn,” (David, Henderson, 2009: 8). 
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 Saudi Arabia and the UAE who transferred billions in aid to the country. For these states                               
one of the factors behind their support for Sisi’s government was their discomfort with an                             
Egypt that was led by the Muslim Brotherhood. This is an indicator that the dynamic in the                                 
relations between the Gulf and Egypt that started during Nasser’s rule has continued until                           





This chapter has served as a historical account of the three food regimes in Egypt and the                                 
relationship between Egypt and the Gulf states. The first food regime in Egypt was                           
characterised by the export of cotton to Europe, and the second food regime was defined                             
by the import of grains from Europe and the US. The third food regime in Egypt was                                 
predicated on a shift in the state’s management of the agriculture and food sector. The                             
state withdrew from its management of the sector as a result of policies such as the                               
removal of rent controls, privatisation of state­owned food companies, and the cutting of                         
food subsidies. This was concomitant with the increasing levels of foreign capital, both                         
from the West and the Gulf. As Egypt sought to increase agricultural exports and facilitate                             
investment, foreign capital became increasingly embedded into the national food system.                     
Foreign investors formed an agribusiness “tier” that dominated the production and                     




 Each of the three food regimes was accompanied by a distinct political order and this is                               
evident in Egypt. The first regime in Egypt was defined by British colonial power under                             
which cotton production reached its peak, and the production of the crop took priority over                             
the country’s development. The second food regime was predicted by US power and its                           
competition with the USSR, which pivoted on Global South states such as Egypt. In the                             
third food regime the nature of the political system is more complex. The US remains the                               
dominant power, but this is exercised in a multipolar system that features cores of                           
accumulation and forms of extra­economic power such as military force. While the state’s                         
social responsibility has been subject to austerity, those parts of the state that facilitate                           
capital have been elevated and granted more centralised decision making. Another aspect                       
of this political system is an alliance between capital and the state, which comes in                             
different forms. As will be illustrated in Egypt this alliance has a distinct feature that relies                               
on the executive power of the Egyptian military and the presidency. 
 
This chapter served to frame the lacuna that dissertation will respond to. The remainder of                             
this thesis will aim to provide a contribution to the understanding of the corporate food                             
system in Egypt by examining the role of Gulf investment. It will examine this in chapters                               
that follow the supply chain through horticulture, industrial agribusiness and processing,                     













The Gulf­Egypt region is constituted by circuits of accumulation that have transcended                       
spatial­temporal boundaries, and have territorialised within the social formations of the                     
state. One way this has been established is through Gulf capital’s investment in stock                           
markets and private equity, and these financial structures bind the Gulf­Egypt region. This                         
chapter will illustrate how these markets have provided access to Egyptian agribusiness                       
for Gulf capital, with significant corollaries on the management of the sector.  
 
Gulf capital’s ownership of Egyptian food and agribusiness through financial markets and                       
institutions has been undertaken in various ways. Stock markets have enabled Gulf                       
investors to acquire companies that were previously state­owned. Private equity                   
companies allow GCC firms to invest in funds that acquire agribusiness companies. In a                           
related development, this chapter will also show how Egypt constitutes an important                       
market for Gulf food conglomerates that are listed on GCC stock exchanges, and as a                             
result Egyptian agriculture is a significant space of accumulation for Gulf financial markets.                         
As will be illustrated, these investments provide structure for the relations within the                         
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 state­capital nexus, and they ensure the mediation of the Egyptian state. Financial markets                         
have resulted in joint shareholdings in companies between Gulf investors and the Egyptian                         
state, and they have also created a relation between Gulf capital and Egyptian capitalists,                           
who often have a close link to the bureaucracy.  
 
Structures such as private equity companies and stock markets have allowed Gulf capital                         
to acquire concentrated portfolios of assets, giving greater control across the supply chain                         
and allowing the establishment of large market shares. This concentration of assets has                         
been concomitant with an accelerated rate of acquisition and sale of agribusiness                       
companies, and the last 20 years has possibly seen the fastest rate of exchange of                             
ownership of companies in the history of Egypt’s food industry. Often this vertical                         
integration involves the spatial reorganisation of production, illustrating a link between                     
financial markets and the scalar manner of space in the Gulf­Egypt region. At the national                             
scale in Egypt this accumulation is playing a role in the reconfiguration of the spatial                             
organisation of Egyptian agribusiness.   
 
This chapter will argue that as a result of this process, Gulf capital has played a central                                 
role in strengthening the financial circuit's control over the production of food and                         
agribusiness in Egypt. One corollary of this is management of food and agribusiness with                           
the principle of exchange value rather than use value. Although this is not exclusive to                             
financial institutions, the strategies and investment structures of these markets facilitate                     
the extraction of value across spatial and temporal boundaries. This has resulted in the                           






Today Gulf capital is one of the largest foreign capitals in the Egyptian stock market and                               
private equity industry. This position has been been facilitated by the rapid growth in                           
financial markets and institutions over the last 20 years. While the growth of financial                           
markets in the 2000s was a result of increasing liquidity in the region, in the early 1990s                                 
their development was a result of the policies of the Egyptian state. In free market reforms                               
implemented as part of structural adjustment policies, the financial sector was considered                       
as the best driver of private sector growth and the state sought to encourage its growth.                               
One example of this policy was the liberalisation of interests rates, which resulted in an                             
increase of the rate to almost 20% in the early 1990s. This drew in capital from around the                                   
region and led to strong growth in the banking sector (ESCWA, 2004: 11).  
 
Another significant policy was the strategy of privatising companies through initial public                       
offerings (IPOs) on the Egyptian stock market. This strategy pushed companies into the                         
financial circuit and led to their acquisition by big investors and foreign capital. The                           38
government initially sought to retain control of a majority share of the companies that it                             
privatised through IPOs, but this was criticised by the IMF who pushed the government to                             
relinquish control, in part as minority shareholders did not have the power to implement                           
38 In 1991­1992 the government passed two laws that permitted the sale of state­owned entities to foreign                                 
companies and gave foreign investors on the Egyptian stock exchange the same rights as Egyptian                             
investors, thus granting foreign capital access to all privatisations (IBP, 2007: 48). 
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 restructuring (Amcham, 1997). In response to this, from 1996 onwards the Egyptian                       
government embarked on a more radical phase of privatisation. By November of 1996, 22                           
companies were sold through the stock market at a total value of EGP 1.6 billion (ibid: 4).                                 
These IPOs contributed the biggest part of the total receipt of privatisations during this                           
period, which amounted to a total of EGP 24 billion (ibid).   39
 
This policy led to Egyptian food and agriculture becoming deeply embedded into financial                         
markets. The IPOs of state­owned food and agribusiness companies raised the largest                       
amount of the total funds raised from all offerings that took place between 1995­1996, and                             
11 of the 22 companies sold to the public as minority and majority stakes were in the food                                   
and agriculture sector (Amcham, 1997: 39­40). These companies ranged from providers of                       
inputs such as pesticides to flour mills and beverage companies.  
 
Privatising companies through the stock market assisted the government’s aims of                     
stimulating economic growth, and IPOs increased the capitalisation of the Egyptian                     
bourse. In 1990 the total stock market capitalisation to GDP was 3.7% and by 2007 it had                                 
risen to 88.7% (Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis, 2016). Another aim of the government                           
was to widen the ownership base of companies amongst smaller investors, in order to                           
create stakeholders in the free market economy. It is estimated that between 1993 and                           
39 This new wave of privatisation resulted in restructuring and job losses. Prior to the start of the privatisation                                     
process in 1991 the number of workers employed in state­owned food and agriculture companies was                             
estimated to be around 135,000, one of the biggest sectors in terms of employment (PCSU, 2002: 46). There                                   
are no figures for the number of redundancies made in these companies after they were privatised, however it                                   
is estimated that generally the privatisation policy reduced the number of workers who worked in state                               
companies by around 300,000. In the state­owned Food Industries Holding Company around 7500 employees                           
were made redundant (Amcham, 1997: 29). 
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 1996 the number of domestic investors increased from 80,000 to 500,000 (Amcham, 1997:                         
4). However this was short­lived and in the 2000s, ownership on the stock market became                             
more concentrated. By 2008 the 10 largest companies on the bourse, which accounted for                           
45% of the market’s total capitalisation, were controlled by less than 20 families (Osman,                           
2013: 127).   
 
In the 2000s the flow of Gulf capital into Egyptian financial markets intensified, marking the                             
state of the contemporary phase, in which Gulf companies own large shares of Egyptian                           
agribusiness through financial structures. Capital from the growth in oil revenues was                       
absorbed by the financial circuit in the Gulf and this capitalised banks, equity and debt                             
markets and private equity funds, as well as investment funds controlled by the Gulf states                             
(Hanieh, 2011). The increasing size of the financial circuit in the Gulf led to an increase in                                 
foreign direct investment across the Arab region. In Egypt, Gulf investors’ share of FDI is                             
estimated to have increased from 4.5% in 2005 to 25% in 2007 (Mohieldin, 2008: 41).                             
Although it is unclear exactly how much of this flowed into Egypt’s financial markets and                             
institutions it is likely to be a substantial percentage. The presence of Gulf capital in                             
Egypt’s financial sector can be illustrated by the shareholder structure of the country’s                         
banks and funds. Today, of the biggest 12 banks in Egypt, nine are owned or partly owned                                 
by Gulf capital. Gulf investment also flowed into the Egyptian stock market. By 2007 the                             40
number of foreign institutions invested on the exchange reached its peak, and their                         
shareholdings accounted for 47% of the market’s capitalisation, a percentage that has                       
since declined, partly due to the political instability following the 2011 revolution (Sourial                         
40 See Hanieh (2011) for a full list of these banks and the nature of their shareholders (155­156).  
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 and Amico, 2015: 14). It is likely that a significant proportion of these institutions came                             
from the Gulf states. 
 
Capital from oil revenues also filtered into the private equity industry in the Gulf and Egypt.                               
Relatively unknown in the 1990s, private equity in the Middle East grew rapidly through the                             
2000s. Prior to 2004 the number of funds focussed exclusively on Egypt were eight and by                               
2008 this had increased to 36 funds managed by 13 different companies, with a total of                               
$6.4 billion in committed capital (Ismail, 2010: 10). There are also now 35 regional funds                             
that target the Arab region, and are estimated to be worth $6.1 billion; investments in                             
Egypt are estimated to account for half of this capital (Ismail, 2010: 10). In Egypt, the                               
private equity industry is dominated by a handful of companies such as Qalaa Holdings,                           
EFG Hermes, Haykala, and Beltone Financial, most of which feature a component of Gulf                           
capital. 
 
The rising popularity of food and agriculture as an “asset class” in the Gulf can be                               
observed in this period. In the 2000s the launch of commodity index funds (CIFs) allowed                             
retail investors to speculate on agriculture commodities. There are now around 24 CIFs                         
offered by Gulf banks that include agriculture as an investment. Gulf institutions have                         41
also sought to access the commodity market and Gulf capital has invested in some of the                               
largest agriculture commodity companies such as Glencore. 






Gulf capital is the largest foreign capital in the food and agriculture index of the Egyptian                               
stock market. At the time of writing in 2016 Gulf investors held majority or minority stakes                               
in 15 of the 29 food and agriculture companies on the bourse, all of which are fully detailed                                   
on Table One in the Annex (The Egyptian Exchange, 2016). By comparison Western                         42
investors have invested in only two of the companies on the exchange and is not a                               
majority investor in any of the companies (ibid). The acquisition of food and agribusiness                           
companies on the exchange has taken place in a variety of forms and this has led to a                                   
mosaic of relationships and partnerships that have allowed Gulf capital to territorialise in                         
Egypt.  
 
The stock market provided a means for Gulf investors to access the privatisations of                           
state­owned companies, representing the role of this market in foreign capital's penetration                       
of functions of social reproduction. Gulf investors have been one of the main beneficiaries                           
of the IPOs of state assets on the stock market, and several of the companies that were                                 
privatised in this manner are owned or partly owned by GCC investors. For example                           
Egyptian Starch and Glucose Company (ESGC) was privatised with a 51% IPO in 1996.                           
The Kuwaiti Kharafi Group, through its Egyptian subsidiaries, is now a majority                       
42 This is based on companies or individuals whose stakes are large enough to be named. This does not take                                       
into account small stakes whose owners are anonymous. 
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 shareholder of the company, after it bought the remainder of the company from the state                             
for EGP 128 million in 2004. The firm continues to be listed on the Egyptian bourse, but                                 
only around 8% of shares are open to be traded by the public (Zawya, 2016). As will be                                   
discussed later in this chapter this buy­out was criticised for its detrimental effect on the                             
company and its workforce.  
 
One feature of this form of privatisation is the creation of joint­shareholdings between Gulf                           
capital and the Egyptian state. Some companies were only partly privatised and the state                           
remains the majority shareholder, while private capital holds minority shareholdings.                   
Examples of companies that were partly acquired by Gulf capital after IPOs include East                           
Delta Flour Mills and Upper Egypt Flour Mills, two holding companies that control a                           
number of smaller mills that produce flour for subsidised bread. This relationship will be                           
discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Another form of Gulf capital's acquisition of listed food and agriculture companies has                         
been through banks and holding companies. This is an indirect form of ownership and                           
indicates how food and agribusiness companies have been transformed into abstracted                     
units that constitute a fraction of an asset sheet. An example of this is Atlas for Land                                 
Reclamation and Agricultural Processing, a company with a variety of activities in the                         
agriculture sector. Gulf capital’s presence in Atlas is indirect and it is represented by                           
minority shareholder Misr Financial Investments Company, owned by Ahli United Bank in                       
Bahrain and a number of other banks (Zawya 2016.). In another example the majority                           




Aside from privatisations, the Egyptian stock market has allowed Gulf capital to                       
territorialise deeper into Egypt through IPOs of companies that are owned or partly owned                           
by GCC investors. This incorporates a broader range of Egyptian capitalists, creating new                         
stakeholders and spreading risk. One example is Juhanya’s listing in 2010 in which it                           
raised EGP 1 billion in an IPO (Saleh, 2010). Juhayna is Egypt’s largest dairy and juice                               
company, and a minority share is owned by Saudi investors. A more recent example of an                               
IPO was Domty, which listed on the Egyptian bourse in 2016. The company offered 49%                             
of its shares in the offering in an attempt to raise EGP 300 million (Ahmed, 2016a). The                                 
company is owned by the Egyptian Damaty family and Yehya Bin Laden, a Saudi                           
businessman (EFG Hermes, 2016).   43
 
IPOs have played a role in raising capital for investment in productive capacity, which has                             
built the monopoly market shares of Gulf­owned companies. Often these investments are                       
based on vertical integration, allowing companies heightened control over the supply chain                       
and power over resources. Following Juhayna’s IPO in 2010, the company expanded and                         
it reportedly invested the majority of the offering's proceeds in new dairy herds, farms on                             
reclaimed land that could supply cattle feed, inputs for its juice operations, and distribution                           
logistics (Oxford Business Group, n.d.). Domty also sought to use the proceeds from its                           






A benefit of a stock market listing is that it allows a company to embed deeper into the                                   
Egyptian milieu. A listing creates new stakeholders in the form of institutional and retail                           
investors and also helps a company project an image of being Egyptian, regardless of its                             
ownership. This can offer a company protection in an environment in which firms have                           
been targeted as a result of the political relationships of their shareholders. One example                           
of this is Juhayna, whose chairman Safwan Thabet had his shares in the company frozen                             
by a court order in 2015 after he was accused of having links to the Muslim Brotherhood                                 
(Farid, 2015a). However, the company continues to trade and there are no reports that any                             
of its other activities have been impeded, or that other shareholders face prosecution. Its                           
status as a large listed company with influential investors in Egypt and the Gulf may have                               
offered it some protection, regardless of the political leanings of its chairman.  45
  
A stock market listing on the Egyptian bourse also has tax benefits. For some time listed                               
companies did not have to pay tax on dividends. In 2014 a levy on dividends was                               
introduced but listed companies can circumvent this regulation by rewarding shareholders                     
44 Following the IPO, one of Domty’s executives said in a media interview: “An EGP 300m capital injection                                   
subsequent to the IPO will be deployed to expand our distribution network, allowing us to widen our national                                   
footprint; to introduce new product categories; and to expand our operations to high­growth African markets,”                             
(Ahmed, 2016a). 
 
45 Juhayna has also received loans from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),                             
and this may be another stakeholder that raised the status of the company. 
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 with bonus shares (Farouk, 2016a). In some cases the free float of shares is less than                               





Private equity has provided another route for Gulf capital into Egypt’s food sector, either                           
through Egyptian private equity companies that feature a component of Gulf capital, or                         
through private equity companies that are located in the GCC and are invested in Egypt.                             46
In 2016 six major private equity companies with Gulf shareholders owned around 11 food                           
and agribusiness companies in Egypt, and a full list of these companies is available in                             
Table Two in the Annex. Only one of these six companies had received investment from                             
Western capital.  
 
The private equity industry is a powerful format that has provided Gulf capital with rapid                             
access to Egyptian food and agriculture. The concentration of capital in funds managed by                           
a politically influential management has enabled the acquisition of vertically integrated                     
portfolios of agribusiness assets. In contrast to companies listed on the stock market, the                           
private equity company has a shorter term outlook in which the aim is to sell the company                                 
after its restructuring. A characteristic of private equity’s agribusiness acquisitions is the                       
46 It should be noted that private equity has a range of different management practices and there is some                                     
dispute over whether firms in Egypt can actually be classified as private equity. This debate notwithstanding,                               
this thesis will use the term private equity to describe these companies. 
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 speed of acquisitions and sale, and in some cases companies that have been                         
family­owned for decades, changed hands several times after they were bought by the                         
private equity industry in the early 2000s.   
 
The private equity industry is attracted to the food industry in Egypt as it offers the chance                                 
to acquire businesses that serve a large and growing market, and the management of                           
these companies are explicit about their view that the country represents a “demographic                         
play”. One manager of a Gulf­based private equity firm that concentrates on health care                           
alluded to this strategy in an interview: “In Egypt we’re working on demographic plays that                             
are feasible, scalable, that don’t rely on the welfare system and that are targeted for                             
middle, upper­middle class and rich people,” (Bouyamourn, 2015).  
 
One example of Gulf capital investing in Egyptian agribusiness through the private equity                         
mechanism is Qalaa Holdings, formerly known as Citadel Capital. Qalaa is the largest                         
private equity company in Egypt and it has made a number of acquisitions through its                             
agribusiness holding company, Gozour. Gulf investors were the main source of capital for                         
Qalaa (Bishop, 2012: 227). Its shareholders include the Olayan Group, a large influential                         
Saudi conglomerate and Sheikh Mohammed bin Suhaim Al­Thani, a member of the ruling                         
family of Qatar (First Equity Partners n.d). Emirates International Investment Company, a                       
company owned by two senior members of the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, Ahmad bin                             




 EFG Hermes, a Egyptian investment bank and private equity company, also includes a                         
significant component of Gulf capital. Investors in EFG have previously included Dubai                       
Financial Group, a company owned by Sheikh Mohammed Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai,                           
and Saudi businessman Abdulmoneim Rashed Abdulrahman El Rashed, who currently                   
owns 7.72% of the company (Zawya, 2016). In 2006, EFG Hermes established a food and                             
agribusiness fund, Horus, with a capital of US $46 million in partnership with Rabo Bank, a                               
Dutch bank that specialises in agriculture (Ismail, 2009: 97). Gulf investors directly account                         
for around US $6.6 million of this capital, and this excludes banks that are owned by Gulf                                 
investors, and offshore funds in which the identity of shareholders is not open to the public                               
(Halime, 2014). As of 2009 the fund invested 57% of its capital in four companies, among                               
them Wadi Foods, El­Misriyyeen and Edita Food Industries (EIPR, 2016). 
 
Other examples include Abraaj Capital, which is based in Dubai and has investments                         
across the region. Its acquisitions in Egyptian agribusiness include Spinney’s Supermarket                     
and Agrocorp, a horticulture exporter. Abraaj’s shareholders feature several members of                     
Gulf ruling families such as Nawaf bin Nasser Al­Thani and Khaled bin Zayed Al­Nahyan                           
(Zawya, 2016). Other shareholders are Saudi businessman and Abdulrahman Ali Al­Turki                     
and Saud Abdulaziz Kanoo, a member of the prominent Bahraini business family (ibid).                         
Other Gulf private equity companies that own assets in Egyptian agribusiness include                       
Amwal Al Khaleej, which is a shareholder in Upper Egypt Flour Mills and Dubai­based                           






In addition to its absorption into Egyptian financial markets, food and agribusiness in Egypt                           
has also become embedded into markets in the GCC. Egypt has become an important                           
space of accumulation for Gulf stock markets, and it is the most important non­Gulf market                             
for agribusiness conglomerates listed on GCC stock markets. This is a further indicator of                           
the role of financial markets in creating circuits of accumulation that bind the Gulf­Egypt                           
region. A handful of large conglomerates control assets across the supply chain in Egypt                           
and their listing on Gulf stock exchanges has allowed the concentration of capital that has                             
built these huge market shares.   
 
Of particular significance in this section are three companies: Savola, Kuwait Food                       
Company and Al Marai and to a lesser extent Majid al­Futtaim. The following table                           




Savola  Saudi stock exchange  In Egypt, Savola owns two sugar           
refineries and claims to control the           
majority of the pasta market. 
 
In 2013 the company issued bonds in             
Saudi Arabia worth US $400 million  
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 Al­Marai  Saudi stock exchange  Al­Marai owns Jannat Agriculture       
Development Company, whose     
Egyptian subsidiary Al Rakha       





Kuwait stock exchange  At the time of writing Kuwait Food             
Company was in the process of being             







Savola and Al Marai, two of the largest food conglomerates in the Arab region, are listed                               
on the Saudi stock market. The Saudi exchange is the largest in the GCC and the value of                                   
the listed companies is estimated to be US $570 billion (Petrof, 2015). In 2015, food and                               47
agribusiness accounted for 6.3% of the total market capitalisation, making it the fifth                         
biggest sector after banking, petrochemicals, real estate and IT (Ahmed, Anwar, 2015).                       
Food and agriculture indexes are an important category of these stock markets and they                           
offer investors the chance to access the commodities market, which is less reliant on oil                             
revenues than other areas of the economy. This was especially important at the time of                             
writing, given that the price of oil had fallen substantially, and the positive announcements                           
of food companies can raise indexes on the markets.  48
 
Savola is an agribusiness conglomerate that has invested heavily in Egypt and a                         
significant proportion of its revenues accrue from its Egyptian operations. Savola is one of                           
the largest food companies in the Middle East. It is listed on the Saudi stock exchange,                               
and it is the 15th largest company on the exchange with a market capitalisation of $10.79                               
billion (Ovaska and Fitch 2015). As will be illustrated in coming chapters, Savola is a Gulf                               
company that has been pivotal in the construction of the corporate food system in the                             
47 Unlike other Gulf exchanges that are closed to non­GCC citizens, Saudi Arabia permits foreign investors. 
48 In April 2016 it was reported that the Saudi stock exchange index increased by 1.4% after Al­Marai, a dairy                                       
producer that will be discussed in this section, reported a rise in profit (Ahram Online, 2016). 
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 Middle East region. It has assets across a vertically integrated value chain and it has                             49
activities in four separate divisions; foods, retail, plastic and investments, which includes                       
several real estate subsidiaries. In an indicator of the company’s influence and links to the                             
Saudi state, the company’s major shareholders have included prominent Saudi investors                     
such as the Al­Muhaidib and the Issa families and also members of the ruling Al­Saud                             
family such as Al­Waleed bin Talal (Zawya, 2016).  
 
Savola’s total revenues in 2014 were $7.6 billion in 2014, and of this the company’s oil and                                 
sugar activities in Egypt accounted for $930 million (Savola, 2014: 39). These revenues                         
are a result of substantial investments in Egypt since 1992, the company’s largest outside                           
the Gulf. Currently the company has around US $500 million of fixed assets in the country                               
(ibid). This investment has enabled the company’s Egyptian subsidiaries to develop large                       
market shares of the pasta and cooking oil markets. In 2009 Savola established                         
Alexandria Sugar Company, which the company describes as being the first fully                       
integrated company in the Savola group. An interesting characteristic of Savola is that it                           
invests in financial services, illustrating that its profit, some of which derives from its                           
operations in Egypt, is channelled into the financial circuit in the Gulf.   50
 
49 The company is active in a number of Arab markets and also has interests in Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkey.                                       
Given the tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the extent of Savola’s activities in the Islamic Republic are                                   
surprising. The company owns large shares in Iranian oil and sugar companies that have large market                               
shares. Its interests in Iran are estimated to account for 13% of its revenues (Lavasani, 2016). 
  
50 In 2005 Savola launched Intaj Capital, a US $ 200 million fund with Swicorp, which was aimed at investing                                       
in consumer goods, retail, communications, financial services, and infrastructure. Savola was also a                         
participant in a fund called Joussour, a energy fund that was launched by Swicorp and the Saudi Arabia                                   
General Investment Authority (SAGIA). In a sign that Savola will become further influenced by the financial                               
industry, in 2016 it was announced that the company had appointed the former head of JP Morgan Saudi                                   
Arabia, Rayan Mohammed Fayez, as its new chief executive (Reuters, 2016). 
135 
 Savola owns other agribusiness companies that rely on revenue streams from Egypt.                       
Savola is a 36% shareholder in Al­Marai, one of the largest dairy companies in the world,                               
which also has product lines in poultry, juice and bread (Zawya, 2016). In 2015 Al­Marai                             
had a market capitalisation of US $14.4 billion, making it the tenth largest company on the                               
exchange (Ovaska and Fitch 2015). Al­Marai entered Egypt in 1998 in a joint venture with                             
Pepsico. The company is called Beyti and it is planning to invest $500 million to develop                               
the largest dairy farm in Egypt. Beyti already has a large presence in Egypt and the firm                                 
has 20% of market share in terms of juices, dairy, and yogurts, and the company aims to                                 
raise this to 35% (Farid, 2015b). Of the company’s US $3.36 billion revenue in 2014, 5%                               
accrued from Egypt, making it the firm’s biggest market outside of the GCC (Al Marai,                             
2014: 53). In 2015, this figure rose to 6.4% (Al Marai, 2015: 3). As a sign of the company’s                                     
relationship with the Saudi state, Al­Marai was founded by a member of the Al­Saud family                             
(Zawya, 2016). Al­Marai’s subsidiaries have also invested in Egypt. One company is                       
Jannat Agriculture Company, which is the majority shareholder in Al Rakha, an Egyptian                         
company that owns 10,000 acres in Sharq El Oweinat (Zawya, 2016). The Al­Rajhi                         
banking family are also shareholders in the company. 
 
Another company listed on the Saudi exchange is Kingdom Holdings and it is the 6th                             
largest company on the bourse. Kingdom Holdings is a holding company owned by                         
Al­Waleed bin Talal Al­Saud and it is a multi­sector investor. Kingdom Holdings owns                         
Kingdom Holdings Agricultural Development Company (KADCO), a anchor investor in                   




Another large GCC food and agribusiness company that derives significant revenue from                       
Egypt is Kuwait Food Company, which is listed on the Kuwait stock exchange, and it has a                                 
market capitalisation of US $2.95 billion (Zawya, 2016). Kuwait Food Company is the                         
holding company of Americana and several companies in Egypt, including Farm Frites and                         
Cairo Poultry Company. Perhaps more than any other company in the region, Americana                         
is responsible for the import of Western fast food brands to the Middle East. The company                               
owns the franchise of Kentucky Fried Chicken and a number of other fast food brands in                               
the region such as Pizza Hut and Krispy Kreme. Egypt is an important market for                             
Americana and in 2014 Egypt and Africa accounted for $1 billion of its total revenues of                               
$3.2 billion (Americana, 2014: 87). The company’s annual report does not distinguish                       
between Egypt and the rest of Africa but it is reasonable to assume Egypt accounts for                               
much of that revenue. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, Americana’s operations in                           
Egypt are extensive and in 2014 the company had 396 restaurant outlets in Egypt                           
(American, 2014: 22). In a characteristic that is similar to Savola, Kuwait Food Company is                             
part of a conglomerate with a range of activities in the Gulf. The company is owned by the                                   
Kharafi family, the owners of one of the largest conglomerates in the region with assets in                               
banking, engineering, tourism, and industry. The family own around 16% of the National                         
Bank of Kuwait, the largest bank in Kuwait and also a number of other financial institutions.                               
In 2015 it was announced that a 69% stake in Americana would be acquired by Adeptio, a                                 
UAE consortium led by Mohammed Al Abbar, a Emirati who is the chairman of the                             




Egyptian agribusiness has also been linked to Gulf financial markets through the bond                         
market. The issuing of securities has become more common in the Middle East region                           
through conventional bonds but also sukuks, a instrument compliant with Islamic law.                       
Majid Al­Futtaim Holdings (MAF) is an Emirati conglomerate that owns the Middle East                         
franchise of Carrefour, and has 17 supermarkets across Egypt. MAF raised capital through                         
the issuance of sukuks and in 2013 it listed a $400 million bond on the Nasdaq Dubai                                 
exchange (Gulf News, 2013). In another case, Savola raised $400 million in 2013 through                           





The financial markets and institutions discussed here are a material manifestation of the                         
social relations that form the Gulf­Egypt region. Through these markets, Gulf investors                       
have entered into partnerships with the Egyptian state, and Egyptian capitalists with close                         
connections to the state. These partnerships have territorialised Gulf capital and                     
embedded it into the Egyptian space, obfuscating its status as foreign; institutions such as                           
Qalaa appear to be Egyptian, even when they are partly a creation of Gulf capital. This has                                 
ensured the mediation of their investments by the Egyptian government, and as will be                           
51 This is a major deal that may stimulate the Gulf’s mergers and acquisition (M&A) market. According to a                                     
lawyer quoted in a media article: “I think a transaction of this size and complexity provides a timely shot in                                       
the arm for the high­end M&A market in the region,” (Kerr, 2016).  
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 discussed in the coming chapters, these companies have benefited from the allocation of                         
state resources. In this context these markets have played a key role in forming the                             
state­capital nexus.  
 
The Egyptian stock market has allowed Gulf investors into the heart of the                         
government­controlled food system. The IPOs of public assets in the 1990s created joint                         
shareholdings between Gulf capital and the state. Upper Egypt Flour Mills and East Delta                           
Flour Mills, two state­owned companies that were partly privatised are now partly owned                         
by Gulf investors. A minority stake of Upper Egypt Flour Mills is owned by the Egyptian                               
subsidiary of Saudi private equity company Amwal Al Khaleej, which is owned by several                           
prominent Saudi investors. Ten percent of East Delta Flour Mills is owned by Mohammed                           
Al­Rajhi a member of the family that owns Al­Rajhi Bank, the largest bank in Saudi Arabia                               
(Zawya, 2016). This holding makes Al­Rajhi one of the largest minority investors in a                           
company where the majority shareholder remains the state. The Egyptian government is                       
represented through the Food Industries Holding Company that is controlled by the                       
Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (Zawya, 2016). These flour mills are central to food                             
subsidies as they are two of the five mills that produce more than 70% of the flour for                                   
subsidised bread in Egypt (Kamal, 2015: 41). Other examples where the privatisation of                         
state companies through IPOs have created joint shareholdings between Gulf capital and                       
the Egyptian state include Sharkia for Food Security, 20% of which is owned by Saudi                             
investor Nawaf Abdullah bin Dayel making him the largest shareholder. The company was                         




The relationship embodied in these companies pushes the logic of private capital's                       
accumulation into the state food system and sets a precedent for further privatisations of                           
food companies. In 2015 the supply minister announced that it was considering privatising                         
the Food Industries Holding Company in a IPO (Reuters, 2015). The minister said that the                             
offering for a company that has 43 subsidiaries could raise between EGP 3­4 billion. If this                               
does take place, such a IPO would represent a huge withdrawal from the state subsidised                             
food system, and given that Gulf capital has become a beneficiary of many of these                             
privatisations, it would possibly have a role.   
 
In terms of private equity, the management of these institutions are politically influential                         
and this has provided a fulcrum for Gulf capital's penetration of food and agribusiness. The                             
executives of these companies are closely connected to the Egyptian ruling elite, a social                           
relation that has enabled them to benefit from privatisations and government policy. For                         
example, Qalaa was founded by Ahmed Heikal, the son of Mohammed Heikal, a                         
well­known journalist who was an advisor to President Nasser. Mohammed was the host                         
of a popular programme on Al Jazeera in the 2000s and according to one interviewee,                             
Mohammed’s status assisted Ahmed in raising funds in the Gulf . Heikal is married to the                             52
daughter of Nabil El Araby, a former Egyptian foreign minister. In an example of a                             
revolving door between the private sector and the Egyptian state, Hatem Saleh the former                           
CEO of Gozour, a Qalaa subsidiary, was appointed minister of trade and industry in 2012.                             





In a similar manner to Qalaa, EFG Hermes also represents the class relations behind the                             
state­capital nexus. One of the founders of EFG was Hassan Heikal, the brother of Ahmed                             
Heikal. Gamal Mubarak, the son of President Hosni Mubarak, was a major investor in EFG                             
and he was estimated to have owned 35% of EFG Hermes (EIPR, 2016). EFG Hermes                             
ran Horus Food and Agribusiness Fund that included a number of prominent Gulf investors                           
such as Zad Global Investments Fund, the investment vehicle of Prince Mishal Al­Saud, a                           
member of the Saudi ruling family (Halime, 2014). Gamal Mubarak’s shareholdings in EFG                         
and a number of other companies were hidden by a complex structure that involved                           
offshore companies in tax havens. However in the case of Horus Food and Agribusiness                           
Fund he was actually named as a director of the company (Besedova and Lustgarten,                           
2012: 21). EFG’s close relationship to the state is indicated by the role the institution                             
played in advising the government on the privatisation process. This format of Gulf                         53
capital and politically influential Egyptian shareholders appears to have been highly                     
profitable, and one recent study estimated that every dollar Gamal Mubarak invested in                         
EFG turned a profit of $12000 within a decade (Diab, 2016). 
 
These relations with the state are likely to have been a major factor behind the success of                                 
53 EFG’s chairman Mohamed Taymour, was quoted as saying: “I think that we have been instrumental in                                 
helping the government with the privatization activities. Many of the large privatization activities that were                             
undertaken were marketed by EFG­Hermes through our brokers and investment banking activities, like the                           
cement factories, tobacco, real estate, etc. I think that we benefited as a firm from the privatization program                                   
and we like to think that we contributed to the program at the same time,” (Hanieh, 2013: 257).  
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 these companies. Qalaa was a beneficiary of the privatisation process and it made huge                           
profits by purchasing state companies, restructuring them and then reselling them to other                         
investors. In 2005 Qalaa and a consortium including Saudi­food conglomerate Savola,                     
bought Egyptian Fertilizers Company from the Egyptian state for $739 million. Two years                         
later, the company was sold to Abraaj Capital for $1.4 billion (Gara, 2011). The deal was                               
the biggest private equity deal to have taken place in the Arab region at that time. Qalaa                                 
was also accused of benefiting from a similar sale after it bought Helwan Portland Cement                             
from the state and later sold it at double the price.  
 
Since the 2011 revolution Qalaa and EFG Hermes have been subjected to some scrutiny                           
as a result of these political links. Gamal Mubarak’s role in EFG Hermes led to accusations                               
of corruption and a travel ban was imposed on Hassan Heikal. Qalaa’s role in the                             
privatisation of Helwan Portland Cement was subject to investigation, and a travel ban was                           
imposed on Ahmed Heikal and Atef Ebeid, the prime minister between 1999­2004 with                         
whom Heikal was accused of conspiring with in this case (Hussein, 2011). These funds                           
have also had to contend with an economic recession that took place after 2011. This                             
hampered their ability to complete the deal cycle and exit companies. Between 2010­2013,                         
Qalaa recorded losses of $180 million (Ahram Online, 2013). So far Qalaa has only exited                             
from eleven of the 54 acquisitions made since its inception in 1990. In order to return                               
capital, Qalaa has announced that it intends to sell its “non­core assets”, and this was                             
behind its sale of the food companies El­Misriyyeen and Rashidi El Mizan in 2015. In the                               




The relations described here illustrate how financial markets and institutions form                     
structures that allow the accumulation of Gulf capital in Egypt. This accumulation has been                           
mediated by the state, sometimes in direct forms such as joint­partnerships, but also                         
through the connections of the Egyptian management and shareholders. In many of the                         
companies that have been mentioned in this chapter Gulf investors are removed from the                           
politics of these investments and there is considerable distance, both spatially and socially,                         
between shareholders and the place of production, the workers and the environment. As a                           
result of the partnership with Egyptian businessmen and the state, these social realities                         
have been abstracted to figures within company accounts. For Gulf investors, interaction                       
with Egyptian agriculture and farmers does not take place in the fields or in the factory, it                                 





The Gulf­Egypt region embodies scales through which value is extracted. These spaces of                         
production allow enhanced control over the means of production and this will be discussed                           
at length in Chapter Five. One manner that control over these spaces of production is                             
intensified is through vertical integration, a strategy based on the acquisition of companies                         
54 At the time of writing there were rumoured to be a number of interested parties, including corporates from                                     
the Gulf, but so far a sale has not been completed.   
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 and assets across the supply chain, which are intended to complement each other and                           
facilitate the reduction of costs. This strategy takes place throughout the agribusiness                       
sector, but it is particularly noticeable in the activities of private equity and the industry's                             
concentration of capital allows multiple acquisitions that enable vertical integration. 
 
Companies with a vertically integrated supply chain are considered to be more                       
competitive, as they have more control over their raw materials and other inputs. As a sign                               
of the heightened control over the relations of production, vertical integration internalises                       
the supply chain in one company. This places an emphasis on extracting profit through                           
creating synergies, rather than through investment in long­term productive capacity. 
 
The practice is particularly noticeable in the activities of Qalaa, and the firm has developed                             
a reputation for basing its business model on the strategy (Bishop, 2012 :147). Qalaa’s                           
agribusiness subsidiary Gozour was built on a strategy of vertical integration. It was                         
started in 2007 with equity of $257 million, making it the largest holding company in                             
Egyptian agribusiness at that time (Ismail, 2009: 178). The fund was launched with the aim                             
of investing in the agribusiness sector, rather than a specific company.  55
 
Gozour is divided into three separate divisions. These subsidiaries are agribusiness and                       
55 One of the company’s executives explained: “Typically, when we’re raising money, it isn’t just for a specific                                   
acquisition or project, but a theme, so for instance if we are raising money for an investment in food                                     
processing, it won’t just be for one deal but to use as a base for multiple other acquisitions to create a                                         
regional play in that industry,” (Bishop, 2012: 228). 
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 dairy (Gozour Agri), fast­moving consumer goods (Gozour Foods) and sugar and corn                       
processing (Gozour Intermediate) (Dixon, 2013b: 9). These divisions feature a number of                       
subsidiaries in different stages of the supply chain, and the creation of this large portfolio is                               
an indicator of how Gozour extracts value by creating synergies with other companies it                           
owns. Examples of these firms include Dina Farms, a dairy producer with the largest dairy                             
herd in Egypt, Wafraa a company with the rights to 574,000 feddans in Sudan, Rashidi El                               
Mizan, a jam producer, and El­Misriyyeen, a cheese manufacturer. The companies in                       
these divisions were acquired on the basis that they complemented other Gozour                       
subsidiaries. This synergy can be achieved through the acquisition of a company that                         
produces raw materials for another subsidiary, or through the consolidation of facilities                       
such as warehouses, transport and logistics (Ismail, 2009: 180). Qalaa’s management                     
considered this as a response to the “fragmentation” of the food industry. In some cases                             56
companies were acquired with vertical integration being the main priority. For example,                       
Gozour acquired dairy producer El­Misriyyeen in 2007 for EGP 88 million (Abdel Razak,                         
2008). The company had 1% of the cheese market and it was in need of investment in                                 
order to modernise its production. Qalaa believed that the company would be profitable                         
when combined with other Gozour companies. In a media interview, Qalaa executive                       
Hisham El­Khazindar explained: "it is a company with vast potential that is in need of                             
further restructuring and capital injection. As a stand alone investment, it might be                         
questionable, but its integration in Gozour makes perfect sense," (Abdel Razak, 2008). 




Another company that was bought with vertical integration in mind was Rashidi El Mizan                           
(REM) in 2007. Qalaa invested EGP 100 million into the company and also bought a                             
manufacturer in Khartoum in order to open up the Sudanese market (Salah­Ahmed, 2012).                         
A Gozour subsidiary that was intended to complement REM was National Company for                         
Maize Products (NCMP), which was acquired in 2007 and would provide inputs for REM.                           57
The internalisation of the supply chain can make companies more competitive, allowing for                         
increased profits. One of the managers of REM said access to NCMP's products would                         58
give them increased control over the cost of sesame seeds, the price of which had tripled                               
in the three years prior to 2008. In 2012, another executive of REM said this vertical                               59
integration had improved profit margins as it ensured that no raw materials were imported,                           
an important factor given the devaluation of the Egyptian pound that has taken place since                             
2011.  
 
57 In a media interview the chairman of REM Mohamed El­Rashidi said: “Securing our own raw materials                                 
through the output of National Company for Maize Products (NCMP) and Dina Farms, in addition to future                                 
plans to cultivate several crops and acquire more companies, will help us lower our production costs, which                                 
will definitely be reflected in prices,” (Abdel Razak, 2008).  
 




59 The chairman said: “You can only blame me for raising prices when I have control over the cost of raw                                         
materials and that is what we will have in the future,” (Abdel Razak, 2008). 
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 For a company as large as Qalaa, vertical integration can be extended into many different                             
sectors, and it has integrated the logistics required for the circulation of commodities. One                           
of Qalaa’s companies, Nile Logistics, aims to expand logistics networks between Sudan                       
and Egypt using transport boats on the Nile. Qalaa’s energy subsidiary TAQA acquired a                           
chain of petrol stations, a refinery, and a plot of land adjacent to the Suez Canal on which                                   
a logistics and energy hub is planned (Citadel Capital, 2008). Qalaa’s acquisition of a 85%                             
stake in Rift Valley Railways, the national rail operator of Kenya and Uganda opens up the                               
possibility of an expansion into East Africa for other companies in the Qalaa portfolio                           
(Qalaa Holdings, 2016). In addition to logistics, Qalaa has also acquired waste companies.                         
The disposal of household and agricultural waste has been traditionally dealt with by                         
informal collectors known as “zabbaleen”. However in recent years corporations have                     
entered the market and Qalaa owns two companies in this sector.   60
 
Another example of the link between Gulf capital and vertical integration is EFG Hermes’                           
Horus Food and Agribusiness fund. The capital it injected into agribusiness companies                       
was used to pursue strategies of vertical integration and expansion. Horus owned a 5.90%                           
stake in Wadi Foods, an agribusiness conglomerate with a number of different activities,                         
and the acquisition of this stake allowed the company to expand its operations and                           
vertically integrate (Arab Finance, 2011). The company has recently reclaimed 5000 acres                       
of land for its horticultural production and also has an animal feed producer for its poultry                               
productions (Saleh, 2013). In 2016 it was announced that Horus would be divesting from                           
60 The companies are Egyptian Company for Solid Waste Recycling (ECARU) and a solid waste                             
management company, Engineering Tasks Group. ECARU aims to convert agriculture and municipal waste                         
into compost and animal fodder (Qalaa, 2016). 
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 Wadi Foods (Ezzat, 2016). Edita Food Industries was another Horus investment. The                       
company is one of the biggest producers of cakes in Egypt and since Horus’ investment it                               





As a result of the levels of investment illustrated in the previous section, Gulf capital has                               
played a role in intensifying the financial circuit’s control over food and agribusiness in                           
Egypt. This has played a role in privileging the exchange value of food over the use value,                                 
a process that can be found across the agribusiness sector but one that is particularly                             
visible in those companies owned by financial institutions. This can be observed in the                           
manner that a company or piece of land is not valued for its productive ability but rather its                                   
market price (Moore, 2010; McMichael 2009). This transformation has enabled the                     
extraction of profit at a faster rate, meeting the demands of shareholder value, often while                             
working conditions for the company’s labour force have deteriorated. This illustrates the                       
role of financial markets and institutions at the heart of the Gulf­Egypt region’s value                           
relations, in which value is channelled to conglomerates in the GCC amid worsening                         
labour rights, and rising food insecurity in Egypt. In this region, value is longer defined just                               
at the place of production, either the farm or factory, rather it is also abstractly determined                               





This process is particularly clear in private equity, an industry that is based on extracting                             
profit through exchange value. Firms owned by private equity firms have been bought and                           
sold multiple times. This pattern suggests that after these firms have entered the financial                           
circuit, and are subject to restructuring, their fungibility is enhanced and they become                         
assets that can be repeatedly bought and sold. Restructuring facilitates this fungibility as it                           
imposes redundancies and cost cutting, and also installs management practices that are in                         
line with private equity and financial institutions. Of particular importance is the manner in                           
which the history of previous acquisitions gives buyers confidence, as it sets a benchmark                           
that establishes the approximate price of companies within the market. Another feature to                         
private equity’s strategy is temporal and it has the potential to return substantial profit to                             
shareholders in shorter periods.   
 
Rashidi El Mizan (REM) was bought and sold several times by different private equity                           
companies at considerable profit, allowing the extraction of value. REM was a                       
family­owned company until 2000 when the company was bought out by US food                         
conglomerate Best Foods, which later merged with Unilever. In 2002 Unilever sold REM to                           
Commonwealth Development Commission (CDC) for EGP 92 million. CDC is a private                       
equity fund that was previously owned by the UK state and is now a partner of the private                                   
equity company Actis. In 2007 REM was sold to Qalaa Holdings for EGP 410 million and                               
at the end of 2015 the company was sold to the Olayan Group for EGP 518 million (Qalaa                                   
Holdings, 2016). Evident in the example of REM is the substantial increase in the valuation                             
of the company since its initial buyout in 2000. The restructuring that was imposed on the                               
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 firm and its vertical integration enhanced its profit margins substantially. In a 2008 media                           
interview the chairman of REM said the company’s profits since 2000 were equivalent to                           
the company’s entire profits since its founding in 1889 (Abdel Razak, 2008).  
 
Another example is Nile Company for Food Industries, which is known by its trading name                             
Enjoy. It was acquired in 2005 from its family owners by Haykala, a private equity                             
company, for US $16 million (Dubai Beat, 2009). Haykala is a private equity company that                             
is partly owned by Gulf investors, and shareholders include Commercial Investment Bank                       
(an institution partly owned by Gulf capital) as one of its major investors and Al Futtaim                               
Capital, owned by members of the Futtaim family in Dubai (Bayt n.d.). In 2009 Enjoy was                               
acquired by Gozour for an undisclosed sum. According to a manager of Haykala who was                             
quoted in the media at the time of the deal, Enjoy had been subject to restructuring that                                 
increased its profitability and it became “institutionalised”, a likely reference to                     
homogeneous management practices that have enhanced its fungibility in the financial                     
circuit.  62
 
Agriculture land is a commodity often defined by exchange value, particularity when it is                           
managed by financial markets. The low level of fixed investment allows a level of fungibility                             
that is not available in other assets, and it can absorb surplus capital in a means that is                                   
62 The manager said: ​“Haykala has successfully completed its originally planned value creation model in                             
Enjoy. Under our control, the company regained its brand equity and market share. It has turned from a                                   
family­run business into an institutionalized one, and we were able to reposition it as a leading brand. It’s                                   
time for Enjoy to move into the control of another investor that can take it into the next phase of its life cycle,”                                             
(Qalaa Holdings, 2009). 
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 temporally flexible, rather than a more complex investment such as factory. A good                         
example of this is Dina Farms, a subsidiary of Qalaa Holdings, the operations of which are                               
located in the Nile Delta, in an area that is adjacent to the Cairo­Alexandria Desert                             
Highway. According to two interviewees who are familiar with Dina Farms, the company’s                         
10,000 feddans of land in the area is considered to be one of its biggest assets. Yet this                                   63
land is not primarily considered valuable due to its agricultural use, but rather because of                             
its value for luxury real estate projects. As a result, interviewees say the company would                             
like to relocate its farms to a more remote location and sell its farm to developers.                               
However such a scheme would depend on the government reclassifying the land in order                           
to obtain the necessary permits for construction. Possibly as a result, there is a narrative                             
within parts of Egypt’s agribusiness sector that the area is no longer suitable for agriculture                             
due to a fall in the water table. In fact the change in the level of the water table may be                                         
negligible, and this may just be part of an attempt to persuade the government to allow                               
building permits on agricultural land. In this case, the characteristics that valorise                       64
agricultural land (such as water resources and soil) and grant it use value are being                             
devalued, in order to enhance its exchange value.  
 
In Egypt the value of land has an extra dimension as a result of the practice of land                                   
reclamation, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. These projects, even                           
63 One interview in Cairo in September 2013 and another in November 2013. 
64 These complaints drove plans for a World Bank funded project to expand the network of water canals into                                     
the area. The bank initially agreed to the project and the Agence Francaise de Developpement also became                                 
involved but after the revolution of 2011 the project was cancelled (Sims, 2014, 88­92). 
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 when they lie unused or undeveloped, can serve as a secure asset class that absorbs                             
surplus capital and hedges against inflation. This should be considered in analysis of the                           
strategies of businessman who have invested in these projects. For example, Prince                       
Al­Waleed bin Talal, a major stock market investor, and members of the Al­Rajhi family,                           
the owners of the largest bank in Saudi Arabia, have invested in the Toshka project.                             
Another potential dimension is that land that has been allocated to these investors by the                             
Egyptian government can be transformed into an asset that can be securitised against.                         
This is a form of fictitious capital, as land that previously had little value has been brought                                 
into circulation and given a market value.   65
 
A regime that privileges exchange value extracts profit at the expense of workers.                         
Companies that are listed on the Egyptian stock market, which are partly owned by Gulf                             
investors have made dividend payments amid the increased exploitation of the workforce                       
and the deterioration of labour conditions. One example of this is Americana’s                       
management of Egyptian Starch and Glucose Company (ESGC). In 2012 Americana                     
announced that it would close one of its factories in order to undertake a renovation                             
(Gaber, 2011). However the factory’s workers said the management actually demolished                     





 been stopped. While workers at the factories complained that the management of ESGC                         66
neglected their rights, in the years since, the company has generated significant profits                         
and in 2015 the firm recorded profits of EGP 45.08 million, an increase on the EGP 30                                 
million in the previous year (Mubasher, 2016). As a result of this performance the company                             
paid shareholders a dividend of EGP 0.82 a share (ibid).    67
 
Another form of this extraction of value is the prioritisation of shareholders amid crisis. An                             
example is the behaviour of Cairo Poultry Company (CPC) following the outbreak of the                           
Avian Flu in 2006. As will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Five, the Avian Flu                                 
crisis was an opportunity for corporate poultry producers to expand their market share,                         
provided they could invest in capital intensive operations that would isolate their stock from                           
the Egyptian biosphere. As a result, amidst the crisis in 2006, CPC announced that it was                               
investing EGP 100 million in a new slaughterhouse, a facility that would increase                         
production (Rasromani, 2006). In order to finance this expansion, the company retained                       
profit from the previous year, paid a dividend but increased the capital by EGP 10 million in                                 
order to raise finance for its plans (ibid). A manager of CPC was quoted in the media as                                   
66 The workers protest over the fate of their workplace was made shortly after the revolution of 2011.                                   
According to a union leader who was quoted in the media article: “We are now calling for the operation of this                                         
factory. Of course before the revolution, we were not able to speak out and if we did Central Security would                                       
have rounded us up. In light of what has happened – after the Intifada – all we ask is that we begin operating                                             
our factory again; nothing more,” (Gaber, 2011). 
 
67 The profitability of the company under the management of Americana was boosted by a low valuation of                                   
ESGC at the time of the sale of the state’s remaining shares in 2004. The union of the factory’s workers                                       
complained that the amount paid for the company, EGP 128 million, was too low given that the company’s                                   
turnover was EGP 400 million in 2005 (Gaber, 2011). Moreover they claimed that the company’s assets                               
included a substantial reserve of capital that meant that the Kharafi Group would only spend EGP 40 million                                   
on the acquisition, as the remainder would be recouped from the balance sheet after the take over.                                 
Accusations that the state sold the company at a value that was too low are confirmed by the huge increase                                       
in share price following 2004, at the beginning of 2005 the share price was around EGP 3.85 and by June                                       
2008 the price hit a high of EGP 54.40 (Reuters, 2016). 
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 saying that a dividend was paid because shareholders “deserved” the profits made in the                           
previous year. However, while retained profits were channelled back into expansion of the                         
company and dividends paid to shareholders, CPC workers were not given the extra                         
payment they negotiated as a result of the serious health risks of working in poultry farms                               





This chapter has illustrated that financial markets and institutions form the basis of the                           
Gulf­Egypt region, as many of the investments in Egypt's agribusiness sector have taken                         
place through these mechanisms. In another feature of this architecture, Egypt represents                       
one of the most important non­Gulf markets for GCC food conglomerates and                       
considerable value is transferred into Gulf markets as a result. 
 
The previous sections have illustrated the manner that financial markets and institutions                       
have provided a political structure that underpins the Gulf­Egypt region. At the regional                         
scale markets have facilitated the flow of capital from the Gulf into Egypt and the transfer                               
of value back to Gulf shareholders. The partnerships that have been discussed in this                           
chapter have territorialised Gulf capital and ensured that its accumulation has been                       
mediated by the Egyptian state. At the national scale, the financial sector has acted as a                               




A consequence of Gulf capital's investment through financial institutions has been the                       
strengthening of control of the financial circuit over food and agribusiness. This has had a                             
number of corollaries. Through the capitalisation of private equity firms, companies have                       
been combined into vertically integrated portfolios and are often acquired on the basis of                           
the synergies between them. Another consequence of the penetration of financial markets                       
into the sector, is the transformation of companies into assets with enhanced fungibility                         
that are dominated by the logic of exchange value. This fungibility is a result of                             
restructuring imposed on them, which disciplines labour and cut costs. In some cases                         
companies that have been through this process have been exchanged several times since                         
2000, generating considerable profit. 
 
The principle of exchange value worsens the conditions of labour and in some cases                           
destroys the means of production. Company assets have also been sold off in an attempt                             
to expedite accumulation. Factories are closed and subject to asset stripping and                       
agricultural land is valued for uses other than growing food. This process of intensifying                           
the extraction of value was well described by Moore, when he said finance capital is                             
“finding new ways of extracting wealth from the productive economy, removing the surplus                         











In 2002 the international peasant union La Via Campensina announced that it no longer                           
considered land to be the main source of power in agriculture. Rather, it believed that                             
command over the “relations of production” such as technology and capital had become                         
the most important element in the industry (McMichael, 2012: 684). In the Gulf­Egypt                         
region, however, the control of land has anchored an agribusiness supply chain and                         
ensured a productive base for the growth of table crops and inputs for agro­industry. One                             
way this power has been secured is through the reclamation of land from the desert. This                               
is a particular characteristic of agribusiness in Egypt and it produces land, normally a fixed                             
commodity, directly for the agribusiness sector, bypassing the complexities of the                     
smallholder existence that are deeply embedded into the Old Lands.   
 
This chapter will illustrate how Gulf capital is the largest foreign capital invested in the land                               
reclamation schemes that have taken place since 1990. The chapter will illustrate two                         
types of land reclamation project. Firstly those that have been established by Gulf­owned                         
agribusiness companies as part of a strategy of vertical integration. Secondly, larger                       
projects that have been undertaken by Gulf investors in order to directly export                         
commodities back to the Gulf, and the chapter will include a case study of two such                               
projects, Toshka and Sharq El­Oweinat. This process amounts to the opening of a new                           
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 frontier, segregating agribusiness both spatially and socially from the traditional agriculture                     
areas, and Gulf capital has played a main role in this transition.  
 
The state­capital nexus is a central factor in these projects. Connections to the state have                             
ensured that Gulf investors were allocated large areas of land, often in an unaccountable                           
manner that amounted to a process of dispossession. These schemes, especially Toshka,                       
had a political overtone, and Gulf investors used their involvement to strengthen their                         
alliance with the Egyptian elite. As a result these projects illustrate how the social relations                             
behind the state­capital nexus is both produced and reproduced through the flow of Gulf                           
capital.  
 
In terms of semantics, in food regime literature large scale land acquisitions are often to                             
referred to as “land grabs”. This is a homogeneous expression that is used to refer to all                                 
kinds of processes and this chapter generally avoids it. In an acknowledgement of existing                           
literature on this process in Egypt, this chapter will also refer to the land that has been                                 
reclaimed as the New Lands, while Old Lands refer to the traditional agricultural areas of                             
the Nile Valley and Delta. This thesis will also use the term reclamation, which is a                               
common term for these projects in Egypt, both in Arabic and English. 
 
Research on reclamation projects in Egypt is frustrated by the divide between official                         
statements and reality (Sims, 2014; Deputy, 2011; Mitchell, 2002). Government                   
announcements on these projects use the size of the area of land that is earmarked for                               
reclamation as a measure for success as opposed to an evaluation of yields (Sims, 2014).                             
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 Moreover official claims about the social and developmental benefit of these projects, such                         
as the numbers employed on the projects, are often unreliable. The lack of accurate                           
information on these projects is exacerbated by the coy nature of the companies who                           
operate the farms, whose management are reluctant to give reliable information on their                         
operations and where their produce goes. As a result I attempted to corroborate                         





Since the rule of Muhammad Ali reclaiming land from the desert has been a feature of                               
Egypt’s agricultural sector. The practice has contributed to a significant increase in                       
agricultural land in Egypt, from approximately two million feddans in the early 19th century                           
to around 8.4 million feddans today (Sims, 2014: 33; El­Nahrawy, 2011). Much of this                           
development has been a result of relatively small scale irrigation projects that have been                           
expanded over the decades. But since the 1950s, there have been a number of attempts                             
at “mega projects”, which have featured more ambitious attempts to control the Nile.                         
These schemes have benefited from state support and often feature foreign capital in the                           
form of aid and investment. They have relied on increasingly sophisticated engineering                       
projects that have allowed Nile river water, and groundwater to be pumped and channelled                           
into desert areas (Sims, 2014; Barnes, 2014; Mitchell 2001).  
 
The political dimension of these projects has been significant. In the post­1952 era their                           
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 utilisation, funding, and other features have been a reflection of Egypt’s internal politics                         
and foreign relations. The economic rationale behind these projects has also undergone a                         
transformation that has followed the transition from the statist system of the 1950s and                           
60s, to the free market system of today. Although the economics have changed, a                           
consistent feature of these projects has been their use by successive regimes in Egypt to                             
construct legitimacy, either through the direct allocation of land, or more generally to                         
create the appearance of progress and development. 
 
Under Nasser, land reclamation was undertaken with a developmental ethos. The                     
government viewed it as a means to assist industrialisation, as an increase in agrarian                           
land would cheapen the diet of a growing population of urban workers. The concept of                             
creating new agricultural space fitted with the developmental nature of the government of                         
Nasser, and he initiated the policy of allocating reclaimed land to peasants, unemployed                         
graduates and other notable groups such as families of military veterans (Sims, 2014: 81).                           
Under Nasser these projects were sometimes funded by the Soviets and were modelled                         
on collective farms, a reflection of his government’s non­aligned position (Adriansen,                     
2009).  
 
Under Sadat, Western capital became a feature in land reclamation projects. Following the                         
expulsion of Soviet military advisors from Egypt in 1972, and the subsequent influx of US                             
aid to the country, US government institutions and corporations played a growing role in                           
reclamation projects (Lackner, 1978). The case of Osman Ahmad Osman’s partnership                     
with Pepsico is a good example of the cronyistic relationship between foreign capital and                           
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 well­connected Egyptians, which characterised the economic liberalisation of this period                   
(Sadowski, 1991: 113­115). A close ally of Sadat, Osman went into a partnership with the                             
Pepsico company in a huge land reclamation project. The scheme was intended to result                           
in the creation of 3.08 million acres of new farmland that would increase the country’s total                               
agricultural land by 44%, but it fell well short of its initial aims despite its considerable cost,                                 
the majority of which was paid for by the Egyptian state (ibid).  
 
In the 1980s the role of private capital grew further. In 1983, 10,377 feddans was                             
reclaimed by private companies and by 1988 this had increased to 66,000 feddans (World                           
Bank, 1990: 18). One estimate suggests that by the early 1990s 75% of reclamation                           
projects were accounted for by private agribusiness companies (Sims, 2014: 111). This                       
increase in private investment was enabled by the introduction of Law 143 in 1981;                           
legislation that allowed direct foreign investment in reclaimed land. This statute included a                         
clause that exemplifies the political and economic orientation toward private capital that                       
took place during this period. A common practice in Egypt is the informal reclamation of                             
land, whereby farmers cultivate a piece of land adjacent to a canal or other water source                               
(Sims, 2014: 43). This practice, known in Egypt as ​wad al­yad or “hand claim”, was                             
criminalised by Law 143 (Johannsen, et al., 2009: 10). In this context, as private capital                             
was granted increasing control over water and land, the access of small farmers to these                             
resources was reduced. 
 
In the 1980s international finance institutions (IFIs) began to have more influence over                         
Egypt’s agricultural policy. These institutions pushed for the establishment of more                     
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 reclamation projects as they considered them as a driver of growth. As an example, in                             
1980 a World Bank loan financed the reclamation of 24,000 feddans in Nubariya (Sims,                           
2014: 84). This pressure intensified after the debt crisis of 1988, and in its 1992 report the                                 
World Bank lobbied for more private investment in land reclamation: “The 1.9 million fed                           
(sic) of reclaimed lands (including those presently managed by the public sector) are                         
presently producing at levels far below potential; representing nearly 25 percent of total                         
agricultural lands, they present an important potential growth point for the agricultural                       
sector in the coming decade,” (World Bank, 1992: ii). From the 1990s onwards the amount                             
of land earmarked for reclamation has increased significantly. Projects such as Toshka                       
and Sharq El Oweinat consisted of 1000s of acres and Gulf capital was the largest foreign                               
investor.  
 
In the contemporary period, the main beneficiary in reclamation projects is private capital,                         
but these farms continue to be heavily subsidised by the government. The state provides                           
infrastructure such as phone lines, roads, and water pipes (Lang and Zandstra 2001: 185).                           
Farms are often exempt from tax in the first 10 or 20 years. With this considered it is                                   
unsurprising that the main institution responsible for land reclamation, the General                     
Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development (GARPAD), is a loss                     
making institution and in 2011 it announced that its total debt was EGP 23.5 billion (Sims,                               
2014: 81). In contrast to the loss incurred by the state, the private sector has made                               
substantial profits through these projects. During an interview in Cairo in September 2013,                         
one farm manager, who described himself as a “veteran” of reclaimed land projects,                         
described the costs involved with establishing a farm on reclaimed land: “The main                         
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 problem is the cost of infrastructure. The cost of developing 1 feddan of land is EGP                               
17,000. So if you have 1 million feddans then you need to invest 17 billion EGP. But you                                   
will make half of that back in your first year.”    68 69
 
There is an absence of information on the total amount of land that has been allocated for                                 
new reclamation projects. As a result it is difficult to keep a track of these schemes in                                 
Egypt, and in secondary sources figures and information is often incorrect or conflicting.                         
Research into the ownership of the land on these projects is also complicated by the fact                               
that land is often subleased, and therefore it is not clear who the original owner is (Bahar,                                 
2014). Estimates on the total amount of land that has been reclaimed vary, and some state                               
institutions claim that since 1997 a total of 2.6 million feddans has been reclaimed, which                             
would result in a 42% increase in arable land since 1952 (Sims, 2014: 281). The reality is                                 




69 Given the profits involved, it is not surprising that corruption has been a constant theme in land reclamation                                     
projects. In 2009 the chairman of GARPAD admitted that he was under pressure by government officials,                               
National Democratic Party MPs, and their families, to allocate land to them (Sims, 2014). In an interview in                                   
September 2013, an employee of a Gulf­owned agribusiness company, gave an insight into how bribe                             
paying to government officials is crucial to securing allocations of land. The employee of the company said                                 
that a payment of around £90,000 per project was common and often these payments would come in the                                   
form of a car or a flat. He said that in order to be successful investors may have to pay bribes to officials in                                               
the MALR, the Interior Ministry, the Investment Ministry and the Council of Ministers. 
70 The conflicting reports over the success of land reclamation projects is partly a result of their management                                   
by different state institutions. Three government institutions have jurisdiction over these schemes; GARPAD,                         
the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) and the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation                               
(MWRI). In addition to these ministries other government institutions also undertake reclamation projects                         
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 Land reclamation on the scale of the projects that were launched in the 1990s has had                               
implications for the management of the country’s water resources. Projects such as                       
Toshka prioritise the water needs of agribusiness over smallholder agriculture, and there is                         
evidence to suggest that there is insufficient water for both reclamation projects on a huge                             
scale and smallholder agriculture (Sims, 2014: 70). A study carried out by the Ministry of                             
Water Resources concluded that it would be possible to continue with schemes the size of                             
Toshka only if water management were improved in the Old Lands (ibid). The zero sum                             
nature of water distribution relates to increasing pressure within policy documents over the                         
need for water use in Egypt to be rationalised and economically justified. Prioritising                         71
water consumption on the basis of economic value justifies corporate land reclamation, as                         
these projects produce high­value exports for exchange. In this context, large­scale land                       
reclamation projects encapsulate the prioritisation of agribusiness companies over                 
smallholders, a strategy that has been described as “farming without farmers” (Ayeb and                         
including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. (Sims, 2014: 81) Often the relations between                                 
these different institutions are competitive and unfriendly resulting in poor coordination and communication.  
 
71 The 2009 World Bank’s report on food security in the Arab region stated that ”When farmers are                                   
encouraged to pay the full cost of water, they voluntarily switch their use of irrigated land from low­value                                   










Gulf companies are the largest foreign investors in land reclamation projects in Egypt, and                           
a full list of these investments can be found on Table Three in the Annex. Gulf food                                 
conglomerates have vertically integrated farms on reclaimed land and all of the                       
conglomerates that were discussed in Chapter Three produce in this manner. For                       
example, Americana has subsidiaries that have around ​6900 acres of reclaimed land.                       
Savola also has a farm of a similar size and nature. Egyptian companies that have                             
received Gulf investment such as Wadi Farms and Juhayna also produce commodities on                         
these farms. This is reflective of the significance of these projects for agribusiness in                           
Egypt. They have allowed heightened control over the supply of inputs and have enabled                           
companies to bypass the Old Lands. By comparison, Western capital has acquired no land                           
on any of the large land reclamation projects.   
  
In addition to direct investments, the Gulf is also a major destination for Egyptian export                             
crops and this is a driver for land reclamation by Egyptian agribusiness companies. From                           
the 1990s onwards Egypt came under increasing pressure to earn foreign currency                       
through increasing agricultural exports. One way this was achieved was through the                       
expansion of reclaimed land, and an interviewee described the increase in these projects                         
over the last two decades as an “agent of change” for the agribusiness sector. Contrary to                               
the idea that increased agricultural exports can benefit smallholder farmers by allowing                       
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 them to access the value chain, these export markets are restricted to the largest                           
companies that have the capital required to launch land reclaimation schemes. According                       
to another manager of various agribusiness projects in the Middle East since 1980, all                           
farms that provide produce for processors or export use reclaimed land: During an                         
interview he said “there are at least 200 companies that are of the right scale that can                                 
provide the size of these contracts and all of them are doing it on reclaimed land.”   72
 
The Gulf states are the largest market for Egyptian horticultural exports and they account                           
for more than 50% of the country's export in fresh horticultural products (Euromed, 2013).                           73
Aside from table crops, Egypt is also a large producer of livestock feeds such as alfalfa, a                                 
water­intensive livestock feed for dairy herds as well as other livestock such horses and                           
camels. Due to the combination of climate and water sources, the Nile Valley is considered                             
to be one of the best locations in the world for the cultivation of alfalfa and farms can take                                     
as many as 12 cuts a year (Kadco n.d.). As a result, Egypt and Sudan is now a favoured                                     
location for the production of alfalfa for Gulf markets. The crop is often grown on reclaimed                               
land as it is used as a substrate that can fertilise reclaimed land and prepare the soil for                                   
other crops.  
 
Alfalfa is a crop that clearly exemplifies the position of Egypt as a productive platform for                               
72 Interview took place in Cairo, September 2013. 
 
73 In terms of specific products, between 2003­2009 the export of processed vegetables increased from US                               
$92 million to US $145 million and Egypt ranks as the 26th biggest processed vegetable exporter in the                                   
world (Selim, 2009:4). In 2015 Saudi Arabia was estimated to import 14% of its processed vegetable                               
commodities from Egypt, one of the largest importers to the Kingdom after the Netherlands (Mousa, 2015).                               
The domestic market is also estimated to be growing at 20% a year (ibid).  Fruit juices are another area of                                       
growth and between 2003­2009 the sector grew from $713,000 to $13.5 million (ibid). 
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 the Gulf’s agro­industrial inputs. As well as the increase in recreational livestock ownership                         
and meat consumption, the demand for alfalfa is partly driven by the growth of the dairy                               
sector in the Gulf states. Over the last two decades companies in the UAE, Saudi Arabia                               
and Kuwait have established large industrial dairy farms. One firm, Al Marai, has                         
established the largest integrated dairy operation in the world and its seven farms produce                           
a billion litres of milk a year, and feature a total herd of 135,000 cows (O’Keeffe, 2013).                                 
Partly as a result of these huge dairy operations, the market for livestock forage in Saudi                               
Arabia is estimated to be 4 million tonnes a year (Laessing, 2013). Such is the extent of                                 
this demand that the Saudi government now requests that 1 kg of livestock forage is                             
imported for every litre of milk that is exported (Arab News, 2013). This regulation is                             
fuelling a demand for the import of livestock crops from countries such as Egypt.  
 
The logistics behind this export of commodities to the Gulf are substantial and are further                             
proof that the industry is restricted to large corporations. For table crops, integrated cold                           
supply chains have been established and crops are packaged before being dispatched to                         
Cairo airport, from where they are flown to markets in the Gulf and elsewhere (Kadco,                             
n.d.). The exposure to the Egyptian biosphere is kept to a minimum and often containers                             
are sealed at the farm gate and are opened only when they arrive at their destination                               
(ibid). For livestock feeds such as alfafa, produce is bailed in Egypt and then dispatched                             
by trucks to Egyptian ports whereby they are shipped to Gulf markets. Port Khalifa in Abu                               
Dhabi receives a weekly shipment of alfalfa from Egypt and Sudan (Jenaan Investment,                         
2015). These processes are a representation of the efficient and rigid supply chains that                           




4.4 Gulf investment in land reclamation projects. A case study on Toshka and Sharq                           
El Oweinat 
 
Toshka and Sharq El Oweinat are two of the largest projects in which Gulf capital has                               
invested since the early 1990s. These areas were part of the ambitious Southern Egypt                           
Development Plan that was launched by Mubarak in 1996, and the project featured new                           
cities, factories, and thousands of acres of new agricultural land (Sims, 2014; Mitchell,                         
2002). Toshka was allocated substantial water resources; equivalent of up to 10% of                         
Egypt’s total allocation of Nile river water (Milliman and Farnsworth, 2011: 147). The cost                           
of developing these two areas was estimated to be as high as US $86 billion, of which the                                   
state would pay as much as 25%, and the remainder would be provided by private capital                               
(Sims, 2014: 49). The government paid for the initial works after having failed to secure                             
finance from the World Bank, who were unconvinced by the feasibility of the project                           
(Mitchell, 2011: 273). As a result of the funding shortfall, the government turned to Gulf                             
investors, and the GCC states, in order to find funding. Although these projects were part                             
of the same plan and are often confused for one and other, they are differentiated by their                                 
location, hydrological nature, and their management by the state.  
 
What is evident in both of these schemes is the manner that Gulf capital has been                               
allocated considerable control over land and water resources, and this has allowed the                         
production of table crops, cattle feed for export, and agro­industrial inputs. Of particular                         
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 relevance to this thesis is the insight that these schemes provide into the state­capital                           
nexus. Access to these projects was made possible through Gulf capital’s relationship with                         
the presidential office and the military, the most powerful institutions in the Egyptian state.                           
What is also evident is the manner in which the state­capital nexus was reproduced                           
through these projects. Gulf support for Toshka was beneficial to Mubarak, as he sought to                             
use the project in order to accumulate political capital; Gulf investment in Sharq El Oweinat                             
allowed the military to further entrench its position as a gatekeeper to Egyptian resources.                           
Furthermore, while the consumption of resources by these projects represent a process of                         
deterritorialisation, the pivotal role of powerful players in the Egyptian state conflicts with                         
the idea that this is a loss of the host state’s control to predatory foreign investors. The                                 





Toshka is located 150 kilometres west of Lake Nasser. Irrigation for the project is based on                               
Nile river water, which is pumped into the project’s irrigation canals. It was initially intended                             
to involve the reclamation of 661,000 acres of land, although it is unclear how much of this                                 
has actually been developed. The main pump was reportedly the largest pump in the world                             
at the time of the project’s launch; the irrigation canals reached 260 kilometres in length                             
(Sims, 2014: 49). As an indication of the process of dispossession that is inherent in these                               
projects, Toshka is an area of land that belongs to Nubians, a minority group that lost their                                 
lands during the construction of the High Dam and the creation of Lake Nasser. Nubians                             
168 
 say that Toshka was the site of 44 villages, from where they were evicted in the 1960s                                 
(El­Din, 2016).   74
 
Toshka was a showcase project for Mubarak in the 1990s and the scheme was well                             
publicised by the Egyptian state. During the construction work, state media broadcast daily                         
updates on the progress of the project; TV news showed footage of work being undertaken                             
by earth­moving equipment (Mitchell, 2002: 273). The scheme appeared in Egyptian                     
school books, and a brand of cigarettes called Toshka was released following the                         
completion of the first stage of the project in 1997 (Deputy, 2011). The state promoted                             
Toshka as a solution to a range of problems including food security, population growth,                           
unemployment, housing, and pollution. It was vague regarding the completion date, and it                         
was careful to avoid revealing specific details of the plan, in order to avoid creating a                               
benchmark that could be used to prove failure (ibid). 
 
In the view of some scholars, Toshka was primarily a political exercise and its material                             
success was a secondary concern. According to Deputy: “rather than being a symptom of                           
precipitant development or front for embezzlement, many of these projects were designed                       
to fail because the regime received the largest benefit by starting them ­ not by completing                               
them.” (Deputy, 2011: iii). One way of viewing Toshka’s political dimension is that it                           
allowed Mubarak to manufacture legitimacy during a politically sensitive period. As a result                         
of structural adjustment policies the 1990s was a period of upheaval in Egypt’s agrarian                           
74 At the time of writing in 2016, Nubians have attempted to return to this area in order to assert their claim                                           
but they have been stopped by the authorities. According to one activist: “These lands overlook the Nile, like                                   
most Nubian land, and represent a large fortune for investors. That’s why the state does not intend to give us                                       
the right to return and resorts to trumped­up security threats,” (El­Din, 2016).  
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 economy; by 1997 more than a million farmers would be displaced from their land as a                               
result of the removal of rent controls. In interviews, Mubarak revealed that he considered                           75
these huge reclamation schemes as a stabilising force and a response to the country’s                           
socioeconomic problems.  76
 
By the 2000s it became clear that the plan was not going to fulfil its initial objectives.                                 
Numerous problems afflicted the scheme. The rate of evaporation from the irrigation                       
canals was very high and the region's clay soil became waterlogged, immobilising                       
irrigation booms (Lewis, 2011). As a result of its shortcomings, Toshka became subject to                           
greater scrutiny. There were reports in the Egyptian press that large areas of land on                             
Toshka had been left unutilised, and Muslim Brotherhood MPs began to openly criticise                         
the project in parliament (Sims, 2014: 51). According to some reports, only one of the 22                               
75 This view was echoed by the World Bank: “Land scarcity is reflected in the four­fold increase in land rent                                       
since the liberalization of land rent in 1996. To address this issue, the government launched a major program                                   
of land reclamation in the Western Delta through the Nasser Canal, the Eastern Delta, and Sinai (Es Salam                                   
Canal), and more recently in the South of the New Valley (Toshka) and East Al Aweinet on the border with                                       
Sudan” (World Bank, 2001: xi).  
 
76 In response to a question over how his government intended to stop Islamic extremists from recruiting                                 
Egyptians who had been alienated by poverty, Mubarak said in a 1997 interview: “Land reclamation of the                                 
desert must be pursued with the greatest urgency. The Toshka Project which has been begun in southern                                 
Egypt is the first step of a decades­long plan, which in the future will provide new living space for millions of                                         




 pumps that were built to lift water out of Lake Nasser into the irrigation canals were                               
actually being used (ibid: 67). Criticisms of the project continued, and in response in 2010                             
Mubarak ordered a review of Toshka and other reclamation projects only months before                         
his overthrow the following year (ibid: 275).   
 
Although the project is sometimes portrayed as a dysfunctional failure, agribusiness                     
companies continue to operate farms on the project, and Gulf companies constitute the                         
largest foreign capital on the scheme. On a project that has a total size of 661,000 acres,                                 
four Gulf companies have owned or rented up to 327,634 acres of land. As is indicated on                                 
Table Three, the largest share of land was taken by Prince Al­Waleed bin Talal Al­Saud, a                               
member of the Saudi royal family, whose holding at its largest was 247,105, although this                             
has now been reduced. Other investors include a UAE company Al Dahra, which is owned                             
by Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and owns 120,000 acres of land on the project                               
(Maher, et al. 2016). Another firm that owns a large plot of land is Al Rajhi International                                 
Investments, which is owned by Sulaiman Abdul Aziz Al Rajhi, a shareholder of the Al                             
Rajhi Bank, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest banks. Al Rajhi owns 103,784 acres on the                             
project (Zawya, 2016). Another Saudi company with a large holding is the National                         
Agricultural Development Company with a plot of 77,850 acres (Argaam, 2014).  
 
In addition to private Gulf investors, the UAE state also played a central role in Toshka.                               77
77 Gulf states sponsored other reclamation projects. The Sheikh Jaber Canal in the North Sinai Development                               
Plan was built using a US $ 1 billion loan from the Kuwait Fund in 1991, and hence was named after the                                           
Kuwaiti Emir at that time (Kerisel, 2001: 147). Also in the Sinai, the Abu Dhabi government funded an                                   
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 In 2001 the Abu Dhabi Development Fund funded part of the infrastructure, the Sheikh                           
Zayed Canal, at a cost of US $100 million (UAE Interact, 2010). Gulf­owned construction                           
companies won contracts for the construction of the project, and Abu Dhabi company                         
Al­Jaber Transport and General Contracting Establishment worked on the Sheikh Zayed                     
Canal (Sowers, 2014: 189).  
 
The ownership of the Gulf companies that invested in Toshka reflect the class relations                           
behind the scheme. This project allocated significant resources to private capital, and the                         
Egyptian state subsidised the purchases of some of the wealthiest investors in the Gulf.                           
The investment of Prince Al Waleed was a good example of this. The outspoken prince is                               
a man who promotes himself as one of the richest men in the world, and his conglomerate                                 
Kingdom Holdings has a large portfolio of interests that include banks, hotels and real                           
estate. However Al Waleed’s Kingdom Holdings had little experience of operating an                       
agribusiness farm and initially he had sought to partner with a US agribusiness company                           
that would provide the expertise for the farm. However the company went bankrupt in 2003                             
and Al­Waleed was forced to undertake sole management of the farm through his                         
subsidiary Kingdom Agriculture Development Company (KADCO) (Los Angeles Times,                 
2005).  
 
Despite the company’s limited experience in agriculture, the state was keen to secure the                           
extension to the Bitter Lakes and East Suez areas of reclaimed land in the mid 1990s and this was also                                       
known as the Sheikh Zayed Canal (Sekem, 2008).  
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 involvement of a prominent investor such as Al­Waleed. As a reflection of this eagerness,                           
KADCO’s purchase was heavily subsidised, and while Egyptian smallholders paid the                     
market rate for land, Al­Waleed paid around around EGP 50 per feddans for 247,105                           
acres of land on Toshka (Ahram Online, 2011). Another form of subsidy was fuel and                             
according to interviewees companies such as KADCO received subsidised petrol, supplied                     
by both the civilian authorities and the Egyptian military. 
 
However, his high­profile nature made Al­Waleed a lightning rod for criticism of the project.                           
Following the revolution of 2011, there was increased scrutiny of Toshka and in April of                             
that year a court froze KADCO’s holding on Toshka. The court ruled that the sale of land in                                   
1997 contravened the law, as the area of land was twice the legal limit and it had                                 
unlawfully exempted KADCO from taxes and other regulations (Reuters, 2011). Following                     
negotiations, Al­Waleed agreed to return 185,329 acres to the state, 75% of his total                           
holding. However during interviews, it became apparent that since this ruling KADCO has                         
in fact increased its holding on Toshka by 4800 acres.  78
 
Interestingly, Al­Waleed’s experience is used as an example in the agribusiness industry                       
of the importance of maintaining a low profile. One manager of a farm who was                             
interviewed in September 2013 said that one of the problems faced by the prince on                             
Toshka was that he attracted too much attention: “The agricultural ministry doesn’t do                         
anything for us and if you start pushing them too much then they will cause problems for                                 
78 Interview with a KADCO employee, Autumn 2013.  
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 you. They will start taking more of an interest in your contract. That’s what happened to                               
Al­Waleed. The best way is just to be quiet about what you do and try not to draw                                   
attention.”  
 
Investments in Toshka served other aims for Gulf investors aside from the purchase of                           
agricultural land. On a November afternoon in 2013, an employee of one of the Gulf                             
companies that operates a large farm on Toshka, was keen to explain to researchers such                             
as myself that contrary to popular opinion they had in fact not made any money from their                                 
investment. In an interview in his office in a suburb of Cairo “Mohammed” declared that:                             
“It’s not yet profitable. I don’t think we are going to make a profit. In a couple of years                                     
maybe we will make a profit. We are going to have to invest more in the project as much of                                       
the existing equipment is already depreciated.” The manager was defensive; he                     79
lamented that Toshka had been unfairly criticised since 2011, while other projects such as                           
Sharq El Oweinat were largely ignored by the media.  
 
Given that his company's involvement in the project had apparently resulted in a loss,                           
during the interview I questioned the point of the investment. Mohammed was explicit that                           
an incentive for the purchase in the 1990s was its political importance, as it presented the                               




 in an era of privatisations: “Through Mubarak we had access to the ministers. We never                             
used the channel of the government. He (the owner of the company) dealt directly with                             
these issues with the president.” Mohammed pointed out that following his investment in                         
Toshka, the owner of his company went on to buy several hotels in Cairo and other assets                                 
in Egypt. “It was a small investment to enter the Egyptian market. It was not a charity                                 
investment, it was an investment,” he said.  
 
At the end of the interview Mohammed predicted that as a result of the size of Egypt’s                                 
population Gulf companies would remain interested in the Egyptian market: “these Gulf                       
investors continue to believe in this market because they think that whoever rules Egypt                           





Although it is also part of the Southern Egypt Development Plan, Sharq El Oweinat has                             
different characteristics to Toshka. The project consists of a collection of farms that is                           
around 300 km to the West of Toshka, in a remote location in the Western Desert.                               
Oweinat's plan was based on the reclamation of around 259,000 acres, although there are                           
conflicting reports on this (Sims, 2014: 53). The scheme received less publicity than                         




 Oweinat is based on groundwater irrigation. The investment required for the project was                         
less than Toshka, as it did not rely on the construction of huge pumps and a canal that                                   
could transport Nile River water. Rather, irrigation has been undertaken through the drilling                         
of boreholes to access the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, one of the largest aquifers                           
in the world. This hydrological feature expands across Chad, Libya, Egypt and Sudan and                           
is estimated to contain 150,000 km3 of water (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003: 47).  
 
Since its establishment in 1998 it is estimated that a total of 24 companies have acquired                               
land on the project, most of which are Egyptian (Bahar, 2014). Gulf firms are the only                               
foreign investors on Sharq El Oweinat, and they have received some of the largest                           
allocations of land. As detailed in Table Three in the Annex, four Gulf­owned companies                           
rent or own 85,000 acres of land on Oweinat, more than half of the project's total size.                                 
Jenaan is a company with one of the biggest plots on Oweinat and it has a holding of                                   
around 35,000 acres; it is owned by the UAE state and has a contract to supply the Abu                                   
Dhabi government directly (Dahan, 2013). It has a capital of more than US $1 billion and                               
has operations in Sudan, Ethiopia, Spain, and elsewhere (Business Network Radio, 2014).  
 
Al Dahra is also a UAE company with operations on Sharq El Oweinat and it has a holding                                   
of 23,500 acres that was acquired after it purchased a Egyptian company, Navigator                         
Investments, in 2007 (Maher et al. 2016). As was mentioned earlier it is owned by a                               
member of the Abu Dhabi royal family, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Another                           
agribusiness firm with land on Oweinat is Al Rakha, which is the Egyptian subsidiary of                             
Jannat Agriculture Development Company. The chairman of Jannat is Mohammed                   
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 Al­Rajhi, a member of the family who own Al­Rajhi Bank. Al Rakha owns 10,000 acres on                               
the project (Jazadco, n.d.). Another Gulf company on Oweinat is East Oweinat for                         
Investment, which is the Egyptian subsidiary of the Aqeel Group, and the company owns                           
around 20,000 acres on the project (East Owainat n.d.). 
 
Almost 1000 miles from Cairo, the project’s location is very remote. Apart from a car                             
journey of many hours on desert roads, the only other means of transport is by air to Sharq                                   
El Oweinat airport, and Jenaan operates a weekly charter flight in order to transport                           
workers and technicians to the project (MEED, 2009). A government permit is required to                           
visit the area, supposedly due to the proximity of the Sudanese border, and this also                             
makes the scheme hard to access.  
 
The most striking aspect of Sharq El Oweinat is the role of the Egyptian military in the                                 
project. Although there is little official confirmation of this, the most obvious indicator of this                             
presence is the military's ownership of a farm that is almost half the total size of Sharq El                                   
Oweinat’s total amount of reclaimed land, an area of 110,000 acres (Bahar, 2014). The                           
military's involvement was confirmed by a political analyst in an international organisation                       
who I interviewed in Cairo in April 2014. The analyst thought that the army had seen the                                 
commercial opportunity of Toshka, but had dropped any pretence of social development in                         
their plans. “The army wanted to rationalise Toshka,” he said. According to him the                           
location of Oweinat in the Western Desert was an area in which the military held a                               




Interestingly, managers in the agribusiness sector said Sharq El Oweinat has the                       
reputation of being a well­managed project because of the military’s control over the                         
scheme. According to one manager: ”I have never been to Sharq El Oweinat because you                             
need a permit to get there but I heard that in terms of management it is way better than                                     
Toshka. I think the military are better organised. They subcontract a lot of the work out to                                 
professional companies. It is so isolated that you don’t have any interference. This is a                             
benefit.” However this was contradicted by a report in 2015 that Jenaan was seeking to                             80
abandon their investment on Sharq El Oweinat as a result of the remote location and the                               
permit system. The chairman of the company said they were intending to move to a new                               
area of desert reclamation in the Minya Governorate, where his company will focus on                           
olives and palm trees on 100,000 acres of reclaimed land (Agweek, 2015).   81
 
Regardless, Sharq El Oweinat is a good example of the Egyptian military’s position in the                             
synthesis of the state­capital nexus. Its apparent disinterest in any pretence of                       
developmentalism is indicative of the relative unaccountability of the army's power within                       
the Egyptian state, and its concern with commercial opportunities rather than the social                         
needs of civilian affairs. In this case, the Egyptian military has essentially enclosed access                           
80 Telephone interview October 2015. 
 
81 In a media article in 2015, the chairman said in reference to Oweinat: ​"The infrastructure is poor and it is                                         
very far away from Cairo, it is 1,300 kilometres, so management wise it is difficult ... ​It is on the border with                                           
Sudan, so even if you want to visit our project, there is a security pass we have to apply for and this might                                             
take months to be issued” (Agweek, 2015). 
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 to a vast aquifer, a resource that could be of great importance to Egypt’s food security.                               
Instead the military is facilitating the production of livestock feed and export crops in                           
partnership with Gulf investors.  
 
4.5 Gulf investments in land reclamation. Food security or agro­commodity supply                     
chains? 
 
Under the corporate regime, food security is increasingly entrusted to the market                       
(Lawrence and McMichael, 2012). As the state has withdrawn from the management of                         
agriculture and the circulation of commodities, the market has taken over. But it cannot                           
guarantee universal food security. Indeed it can “only feed people who possess the                         
necessary purchasing power, and they are a minority of the world’s population” (ibid: 136).                           
Yet the power of the market partly rests on its ability to maintain hegemony and assure its                                 
participants that it functions, even when a cursory glance at the levels of malnutrition in                             
Egypt suggests that it does not. One area where the divide between the principle of food                               
security and the reality is patent, is the discourse that surrounds land reclamation projects.   
 
Gulf investment in land reclamation projects in Egypt has often been accompanied by a                           
food security rhetoric that claims they are mutually beneficial, allowing a “win­win” situation                         
for the investor and the host state. According to one manager of a Gulf­owned company:                             
"we consider ourselves to be strategic partners for the Egyptian government in terms of                           
food security," (Dahan and Fick, 2014). This discourse even goes as far as to mobilise                             
religion in order to create the appearance of benevolence. A online advert that described                           
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 the process of land reclamation on Savola’s project in Minya Governorate was proceeded                         
with a verse from the Quran, which described the importance of the greening of the desert:                               
“And a sign to them is the dead earth: We give life to it and bring forth from it grain so they                                           
eat of it,” (Savola, AUCR 2015).  
 
This rhetoric is supported by the Gulf states who use their considerable financial resources                           
to fund conferences, governance institutions, and research that addresses their food                     
security needs. This has created a discourse that highlights the vulnerability of the Gulf                           
states, and generally advocates the offshoring of food production in the form of large land                             
purchases. GCC states have also directed funding towards studies on Gulf food security in                           
universities and think tanks .   82
 
However, in contrast to the claims of these companies and the food security rhetoric, there                             
is scant evidence that any of the projects described in this chapter serve the domestic food                               
security in the non­market sense. Research suggests that these farms are mostly used to                           
produce high­value horticultural table crops or livestock feed for industrial farming, in the                         
82 In 2013 Chatham House, a think tank on international affairs in London, UK published a report entitled                                   
“Edible Oil: Food Security in the Gulf” that was funded by the court of the crown prince of Abu Dhabi,                                       
Mohamed bin Zayed Al­Nahyan. In another example, in 2010 the Economist Intelligence Unit published a                             
report called “The GCC in 2020: Resources for the future” that included a chapter on food security (EIU,                                   
2010). The report was sponsored by the Qatar Financial Centre Authority, a government institution. Qatar                             
founded the the National Food Security Programme in 2008 and the Global Dry Land Alliance (GDLA) in                                 
2010. In 2010, the UAE established the Food Security Centre with the aim of improving the country’s food                                   
security. In another example, Saudi Arabia established the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural                           
Investment Abroad with a capital of US $800 million in 2010. The institution is tasked with providing interest                                   
free loans to Saudi companies that are considering agricultural investments outside of Saudi Arabia                           
(Lippman, 2010). 
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 manner that was described earlier in this chapter. In an interview, one manager of an                             
company listed in Table Three in the Annex said that 40% of his company’s produce is                               
exported. Another informant from a Gulf­owned company said his firm exports 90% of its                           
livestock feed crops back to the UAE.  
 
This is confirmed by the websites and corporate publications of the Gulf companies that                           
farm these projects. According to the website of UAE­owned Al Dahra: “Al Dahra Egypt                           
channels its production through various export markets in Africa, the Middle East and                         
Europe,” (Al Dahra, 2016). The website of KADCO states that: “Currently, horticultural                       
crops are being exported to the UK, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Germany, Holland, and                         
Italy. Exports of Table Grapes are also starting to central Europe, Scandinavia and to the                             
GCC countries. Alfalfa production is mainly exported to the GCC countries with huge                         
potential for expansion in that crop,” (Kadco n.d.). 
 
Many of the crops grown on reclaimed land projects owned by Gulf investors are used as                               
inputs for agro­processors that serve the region. A major producer of frozen chips in Egypt                             
is Farm Frites, a subsidiary of Americana, and 50% of its potato supplies are vertically                             
integrated on reclaimed land, owned through three other subsidiaries in the Americana                       
group (Americana, 2012). Much of this crop is destined for Gulf markets, where Americana                           
hold large shares of the fast food sector. ​Farm Frites has ​35% of the Kuwaiti and Emirati                                   
market, 14% of the Saudi market, 45% of the Bahraini market and 42% of the Qatari                               
market (Americana, 2012). As well as individual consumers, Farm Frites products are also                         




Another example of how Gulf investment in reclaimed land provides a productive base for                           
agro­processors is the production of sugar. Savola’s United Sugar Company has up to                         
70% of the market for sugar in Saudi Arabia, some of which it serves from its factory in                                   
Egypt (Savola, 2015). In order to meet demand for its factory, in 2014 another Savola                             
company, the Alexandria United Company for Land Reclamation, launched a land                     
reclamation project near Abu Qurqas in the Minya Governate that will cultivate sugar beet.                           
Other Egyptian companies that export to the Gulf and have vertically integrated reclaimed                         
land include Juhayna, which owns two reclamation companies for cattle feed such as                         
alfalfa.  83
 
The notion that these cross­border land acquisitions offer a universal solution to food                         
security is also contradicted by the character of the Gulf companies behind these                         
investments. Several of the companies that are listed in Table Three can be described as                             
a form of state capital, based on the identity of their owners and their reliance on forms of                                   
state support and subsidies. Companies such as Al Dahra and KADCO are owned by                           
members of Gulf royal families, and Jenaan has a contract to supply the Abu Dhabi                             
government. This link involves opaque forms of state­capital relations such as diplomatic                       
leverage, personal relations and the distribution of aid from the state to private companies.                           
83 Enmaa Livestock Company owns 550 feddans in the Bahariya Oasis and Enmaa Company for Agriculture                               
Cultivation which owns 7450 feddans in the Bahariya Oasis (Juhyana n.d.).  
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 With this in mind, investments by these companies represent a form of “agro­security                         
mercantilism” of the type described by McMichael (2013: 48). 
 
Given that they are of questionable benefit to Egypt’s food security, a perverse aspect of                             
these projects is that they are subsidised by the Egyptian state, both in terms of land and                                 
water resources and fixed capital. They have received land at less than the market rate                             
and the amount of water that they consume is not made public.  
 
Despite its support, the Egyptian state has struggled to regulate these companies. At the                           
time of research in 2013, alfalfa cultivation was a profitable activity in Egypt. The crop sold                               
at $300 a tonne in the Gulf with an approximate cost of $150 tonne. As a result of its                                     84
intense use of water with little benefit to Egyptian food security, in 2013 the state                             
attempted to regulate alfalfa production by introducing a tax of $50 a tonne. The response                             
of Gulf­owned agribusiness companies to this duty is indicative of capital’s ability to switch                           
jurisdictions and strategies. Following the introduction of the duty some agribusiness                     




 one with poor infrastructure and bad security. As a result Sudan has become a new                             85
frontier for alfalfa and Gulf companies have established huge farms there.   86
 
Aside from relocating to Sudan, the other response of Gulf companies to the tax was to                               
take advantage of the price that the Egyptian government offered for wheat that is grown                             
domestically, which is higher than the international price. Between 2013­2014 the                     
international price for a tonne of wheat was US $300, while the Egyptian government price                             
for domestically grown wheat was US $400 (Reuters, 2013). In 2013 UAE­owned Jenaan                         
announced that it was ending its strategy of growing livestock feed on its farms in Egypt in                                 
favour of growing wheat (Dahan, 2013). Executives of the company said that the export                           
tax on alfalfa was hitting their profit margins, but they also said that the Abu Dhabi                               
government had asked it to assist with Egypt’s food security and that was the main                             
impetus behind the decision to grow wheat.  87
 
85 According to a manager of an agribusiness farm with operations in Egypt and Sudan: “The cost of                                   
production in Sudan is much cheaper. But there are two problems. Roads and security. If you put something                                   




86 One interviewee pointed to a case where a farm in Sudan was being offered to a Saudi investor with water                                         
rights of around 5% of Sudan’s total annual allocation of Nile river water. In 2013 a Lebanese company                                   
announced that it was investing $800 million in a farm in Sudan that by 2019 would export around 750,000                                     
tonnes a year of livestock feed to Saudi Arabia (Laessing, 2013).  
 





“The Delta is like a petri dish, in which the bacteria is dying from within because it is                                   
running out of food to eat, and polluting its own environment,” said a manager of a poultry                                 
company in an interview in September 2013. This reference to the Nile Delta as an                             
environment in terminal decline is a perception that is driving land reclamation. In the                           
discourse of the agribusiness industry, Egypt’s Old Lands have become polluted,                     
exhausted, and over­populated; in response it has sought the spatial fix of producing new                           
land as a commodity.  
 
There is no doubt that urbanisation, soil degradation, and disease threaten agricultural                       
productivity in Egypt’s Old Lands. A drive through the Nile Delta is an insight into such                               
problems; the road system is congested, villages have become urban centres and                       
commuter towns for Cairo, rubbish lies everywhere. Conclusions drawn during anecdotal                     
observation are confirmed by studies. Agricultural land in the Nile Valley is decreasing as a                             
result of illegal and unplanned building. Egyptian government officials estimate that since                       
2011, 31,140 acres of agricultural land a year have been lost due to illegal building,                             
especially in the area around Cairo and the Nile Delta (Fick and Mourad, 2014). The                             
development of infrastructure in areas such as the Delta has not matched the growth of                             
population. An inadequate sewage system means that human waste is dumped in                       
irrigation canals, which are also used for refuse, and there are reports of industrial and                             
hospital waste being deposited in these channels (Al Jazeera English, 2012). As a result                           
canals often become blocked with rubbish, decreasing the flow of water, compromising                       
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 their ability to irrigate farmland. The transport infrastructure in the Nile Valley is also                           
inadequate for the size of the population, making it difficult for farmers to take their                             
produce to market. Several interviewees who are familiar with Egyptian agriculture said                       
that farmers often lose a large percentage of their produce in the course of transportation.                             
Compounding these problems is the prospect of soil exhaustion and Egypt agriculture is                         
one of the most intensive users of fertiliser in the world. The Old Lands have also been the                                   
site of outbreaks of disease, and the epidemic of Avian Flu will be discussed at greater                               
length in the next chapter.  
 
For Gulf capital these projects also provide a fix to the environmental exhaustion within                           
GCC states. Projects such as Toshka constitute a frontier that provides a fix to the                             
exhaustion of water resources in the Gulf states, particularly for Saudi Arabia. In light of                             88
the Gulf’s reliance on imported food, and the requirements of agribusiness conglomerates                       
for sources of raw inputs, Egypt’s reclamation projects provide Gulf capitalism with a free                           
gift, albeit one with a limited lifespan. This is also a feature of the scalar nature of the                                   
Gulf­Egypt region. The territories of the GCC states may be bound by a political boundary,                             
but accumulation and social reproduction is reliant on these platforms of production in                         
Egypt. Although these investments have taken place across the world, Egypt is of                         
considerable importance due to its proximity to the Gulf. As a result of these platforms, the                               
88 Riyadh ended its policy of subsidising domestic wheat production in 2016 as a result of the damage that                                     
was inflicted on its aquifer, which was caused by the pumping of an estimated 5 cubic miles of water every                                       
year for around 40 years (National Geographic, 2016). To put that in context, the entire size of the country’s                                     
aquifer is estimated to be 120 cubic miles (ibid).  
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 Gulf states can internalise the surplus value of these projects while externalising the                         
detrimental corollaries to the environment and society in Egypt. At the national scale in                           
Egypt, land reclamation has created a new space of production, and this has social                           
implications. The distance between the place of production, and the place of consumption,                         
lessens the potential for public scrutiny (both in Egypt and the Gulf), and a particular                             
example of this distance is the inaccessibility of projects such as Sharq El­Oweinat, which                           
is both geographically remote and securitised by the military.  
 
These schemes produce land as an industrial commodity, a feature that contrasts to the                           
Old Lands, where land is a means of production controlled by smallholder farmers. This                           
desocialisation of land is a particular characteristic to the Gulf­Egypt region; and it is one                             
that challenges the argument that the land­based nature of agriculture throws aspects of                         
food regime theory into doubt (Goodman and Watts 1994). Such a view posits the role of                               
land as a reason why restructuring of agriculture at the global scale is a heterogeneous                             
process that is partly defined by “micro­social” features (ibid: 3). However in the case of                             
Egypt, land reclamation allows the industrial production of land through alchemy that                       
imports homogenous agribusiness practices. The agency of the micro­social is limited in a                         
“landscape devoid of people” where capital determines production through water irrigation,                     
earth moving equipment, and fertiliser (Sims, 2014: 89). 
 
The micro­social in this case features a workforce who live on site for entire seasons or                               
longer, alienated from their families and communities. Although many of the workers are                         
local, interviewees report that companies on these projects also seek out foreign migrant                         
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 workers on the basis that they stay for longer periods of time, as opposed to Egyptians                               
who seek seasonal work. There are reports of labour organisation, but the remote location                           
of these projects makes workers vulnerable and leads to greater dependence on their                         
employer (Almasry Alyoum, 2011). The residential work camps also illustrate the                     89
increasing social and spatial distance between the places of production and consumption;                       
in the Gulf­Egypt region, the farm has become a segregated zone where alienated workers                           





This chapter has illustrated how Gulf capital has been the primary foreign capital invested                           
in the process of land reclamation in Egypt. In projects such as Toshka and Sharq El                               
Oweinat, two of the largest schemes in the country, farms owned or rented by GCC                             
investors account for almost half of the total area. Elsewhere other companies owned or                           
partly owned by Gulf capital have also launched their own farms on reclaimed land. In both                               
modes, commodities are either exported or sold as inputs for agro­industrial operations                       
and this is a illustration of how these farms form the basis of a “closed circuit” of                                 






The process of land reclamation has led to new spaces of production that form the scalar                               
nature of the Gulf­Egypt region. The industrial production of land has intensified production                         
and intensified the extraction of value through these spatial scales. The uncommodified                       
space of the desert has been opened in this frontier and appropriated by Gulf capital in                               




One aspect to these projects has been the use of a food security rhetoric that is used to                                   
justify these schemes. This chapter has shown that the ability of these projects to                           
contribute to Egyptian food security remains questionable as they are primarily concerned                       
with supplying the regional market with commodities. In many cases, the produce from                         
Gulf­owned reclamation projects is directly exported to the GCC states and does not enter                           
the Egyptian market, therefore making little contribution to the food security of Egypt. In                           
other cases the products from farms owned by Gulf investors are sold to agro­processors                           
and livestock producers who supply the Egyptian market. As a result, this should be taken                             
as a reminder that the market’s ability to ensure food security is flawed, and claims that it                                 
can are somewhat disingenuous.   
 
This chapter has illustrated the role of the state­capital nexus in these projects. In the case                               
of Toshka and Sharq El Oweinat investors interacted with the most powerful parts of the                             
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 Egyptian state, the presidency and the military, in a form of “state­managed” enclosure                         
(McMichael, 2012: 693). These investments were enabled by this relation, but they also                         
played a role in reproducing the power of this nexus. Although Gulf capital may have been                               
a major beneficiary of these schemes, the Egyptian state has not been a passive actor, it                               
remains in control of these projects and continues to be their facilitator. In the case of                               
Toshka, the state was able to seize land back from a investor. In the case of Sharq El                                   
Oweinat, the extent of the military’s control over the project suggests the securitisation of                           
an enclosed area that is rented out to foreign capital. Land reclamation is an undemocratic                             
process that results in the enclosure and segregation of resources. The practice also                         
entails dispossession, both from the indigenous residents of the land but also society at                           
large. As will be seen in the next chapter the expansion into the New Lands is also taking                                   
place in the agro­industrial sector, and this segregation of agribusiness has implications for                         
labour conditions and public accountability. The reliance by these investors on state                       
resources is indicative of how the state did not retreated from the economy during the                             
1990s, but rather orientated towards the mediation of capital. In its attempts to implement                           
a project that had some developmental aspects (on paper at least) the state was                           
dependent on the involvement of high­profile investors in order to gain credibility. In the                           
case of Toshka, its establishment was also dependent on foreign investors' ability to                         
generate positive publicity.  
  
The next chapter will illustrate the role of Gulf capital in the restructuring of Egypt's                             
agro­industrial sector. The development of farms on reclaimed land is important context for                         
this process as these projects were vital to the development of agro­industry through the                           
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 provision of inputs. In this sense, this chapter has provided an insight into Gulf capital’s                             
role in the creation of a productive land base at the bottom of the supply chain. The next                                   



























“There are things that make no sense. The private sector is getting everything and giving                             
nothing, the small farmer is giving everything and getting nothing,” said an employee of an                             
international NGO in Cairo, during an interview in September 2013. His despair was a                           
reference to the privileged position of agro­industrial companies and the differential                     
between their profits and the poverty of Egyptian smallholders. This chapter will show how                           
a corollary of the flow of Gulf capital into Egypt agribusiness has been the development of                               
a capital intensive agro­industrial complex. As will be illustrated, this sector occupies a                         
powerful position as a result of its support from the state. Its efforts to control resources,                               
the environment and labour, have enabled a heightened level of accumulation.   
 
Gulf companies have provided the capital that facilitated the technology and scale that                         
established companies with monopoly control of the market. This complex is a measure of                           
the formation of the Gulf­Egypt region. It exemplifies the manner in which the region is                             
bound by the flow of capital from the Gulf into Egypt, and the return of commodities from                                 
Egypt into the Gulf. In some cases GCC companies have established operations whose                         
main purpose is to serve markets in the Gulf states, but they have also invested in                               
operations that exclusively serve the Egyptian market; poultry farming being one example.                       
It would be erroneous to claim that Gulf capital has been the only agent in the                               
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 development of agro­industry, as Egyptian companies have also invested heavily in this                       
sector. However Gulf conglomerates own, or partly own, the companies with the most                         
expansive operations and the largest market shares, and the capitalisation that                     
accompanied the investment of GCC firms facilitated the restructuring of the sector.  
 
The restructuring of agro­industry by private capital in Southern countries is a feature of                           
the corporate food regime. This process led to the rise of New Agricultural Countries                           
(NACs). Egypt is also considered as a NAC due to its industrial development within the                             
corporate food system (Dixon, 2013a). This chapter seeks to enrich the understanding of                         
Egypt as a NAC by arguing that Gulf capital has contributed to this process by investing in                                 
agro­industry, but also by acting as a partner for multinational corporations that have                         
entered the Egyptian market. As a result, there has been a shift from nationally defined                             
food and agriculture, to a international corporate food system, transmitted in part through                         
the Gulf­Egypt region.  
 
The chapter will illustrate how capitalisation by Gulf companies has facilitated the vertical                         
integration of inputs. This represents heightened control over water and land resources,                       
and the state has acted as a partner in this process through its allocation of land, and its                                   
policies that have privileged the largest agribusiness companies. Agro­industry has                   
benefitted from the modernist and productivist outlook of the Egyptian state, which views it                           
as the most effective means of providing safe food to the population. Following the                           
outbreak of Avian Flu, government policy openly favoured agro­industrial operations, and                     
blamed the outbreak of the disease on informal subsistence poultry farming. However                       
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 while the government supports agro­industry, the cost of the produce of these companies                         
is higher than that of the smaller and informal producers, and is thus limited to more                               
affluent consumers.  
 
This chapter will detail the manner that Gulf capital’s accumulation in agro­industry is                         
partly based on a differential with smaller farmers. As well as vertical integration, the                           
companies examined in this chapter also rely on disintegrated supply chains and they                         
source their inputs through contract farming with smaller producers. This control over                       
supplies is vital to the success of these companies as it allows them to manage the risk of                                   
price fluctuation. This is further evidence of the closed circuit system in which commodities                           





The flow of private capital into agro­industry in Egypt began during the 1970s. The infitah                             
reforms allowed investors into the sector, especially cronies who had the political                       
connections to lobby for allocations of land and subsidies. As a result, the private                           
companies that emerged during this period benefited from state resources and the                       
expertise of the public sector. One company, the Ismailia Misr Poultry Company, which is                           
now owned by Saudi businessman Kamel Saleh, was founded by the director of the                           
state­owned General Poultry Company (GPC) in 1977 (Sadowski 1991: 185). GPC was a                         




During the 1990s structural adjustment policies resulted in the state’s retreat from the food                           
and agriculture sector, in the form of privatisations and free market reforms. The                         
consequence of this can be seen in the growth of private capital in the agro­industrial                             
sector through the 1990s and the 2000s. In 1995 the value of publicly­owned agro­industry                           
was EGP 1.8 billion, and privately­owned agro industry was EGP 2.6 billion (Ibrahim and                           
Ibrahim, 2003: 163). By 2000, the value of publicly­owned agro­industry had declined to                         
EGP 1.3 billion, and that of privately­owned agro industry had increased to EGP 8 billion                             
(ibid). During the late 2000s the sector continued to grow, and in 2008 annual issued                             
capital in the sector hit a high of EGP 3.5 billion, before contracting following the global                               
economic crisis and the post­2011 revolution period (Maher et al., 2016: 5). Currently,                         
agro­industry is estimated to account for around 20% of the total value of Egypt’s                           
manufacturing sector (ibid).  
 
This flow of private capital into agro­industry has targeted Egypt’s social, geographic, and                         
agro­ecological characteristics, all of which make it an attractive location to locate                       
agro­industrial plants. Egypt’s large population makes for a sizeable domestic market and                       
there is a strong demand for cheap and durable processed food. The country also has                             
proximity to other markets, in the Gulf, North Africa, and in East Africa, which it can access                                 
90 In reference to the directors who founded GPC, Sadowsky stated that: “These men knew the most                                 
effective ways to lobby their former colleagues in governments. They typically had established their farms on                               
cheap desert plots and had petitioned the government to install roads, water and electricity under the terms                                 
of the land reclamation program. When the government cut corn subsidies, they knew where to apply for                                 
their restoration,” (Sadowsky, 1991: 185). 
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 through a relatively good infrastructure network of roads and ports. The shipping lanes                         
through the Suez Canal also allow access to other markets, both for the export of products                               
and the import of raw materials. As was discussed in the previous chapter the allocation of                               
land and water to agribusiness in land reclamation schemes is an essential part of the                             





Gulf capital became one of the largest foreign capitals in the agro­industrial sector from the                             
early 1990s onwards. The following section will examine three sub­sectors of agro­industry                       
in order to illustrate this flow: processing, dairy and poultry. In these three segments of                             
production Gulf capital has invested in the largest, most capital intensive companies that                         
control monopoly market shares. In several cases the conglomerates with farms on                       
reclaimed land that were mentioned in the previous chapter, also own agro­industrial                       
operations. The flow of Gulf investment into Egypt’s agro­industry is the measure of the                           
formation of the Gulf­Egypt region and the cross border ownership that is illustrated in this                             
chapter gives further insight into how this region is structured.  
 
This chapter illustrates the market share that these companies claim to hold, based on                           
figures released by the firms themselves. These figures should be treated with some                         
caution as the claims of market share increases the value of companies, against which                           
they can securitise for further loans, in turn financing further expansion. Market share in                           
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 Egypt is also difficult to measure, especially given the extent of smallholder production. As                           
a result the figures on market shares are likely a reference to the agribusiness sectors and                               
do not include smallholder production.  
 
The entry of GCC investors into Egyptian agro­industry resulted in the capitalisation of the                           
sector. Some of the Gulf conglomerates listed in the previous section such as Americana                           
and Savola were large enough to enter the Egyptian market directly with significant                         
investment. In other cases, Gulf capital has had a more passive role in the form of minority                                 
investment. As was discussed in Chapter Three, investment of this nature often takes                         
place through the stock market or private equity firms, but these acquisitions also take                           
place through direct deals between investors and companies. According to agribusiness                     
professionals in Egypt, investment of this nature first began in the 1970s, and typically                           
involved an Egyptian returning to his country to start a food business with savings                           
accumulated during a stint working in the Gulf states. After a period the Egyptian required                             
more capital and would often return to his employer in the Gulf and offer shares in return                                 
for investment. Today, the GCC states remain a primary source of capital for Egyptian                           
agribusiness.  91
 
As a result Gulf capital played a significant role in creating a technologically advanced                           
agro­industrial sector with a vertically integrated supply chain. By way of example of the                           
ten companies with the largest market share in the packaged food sector in Egypt, five of                               
91 In a recent example Al Jawhara Group, a Egyptian­owned producer of tea and snacks announced that it                                   
was seeking capital and was planning a roadshow in Saudi Arabia and UAE in order to attract investors                                   
(Enterprise, 2016). The group had previously turned down an offer from a Saudi investor who said that he                                   
would invest EGP 500 million following his acquisition (Omar, 2016). 
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 them are Gulf­owned companies (Euromonitor, 2016a: 11). Four of them are European:                       
Nestle, Lactalis, Danone and Kellogg, and one is Egyptian: the Egyptian Food Company.                         
The Gulf­owned companies are Savola, Americana, Halwani Brothers, Arma Food                   
Industries and Al Marai. As will be revealed in this chapter Gulf companies have been able                               





Companies owned by Gulf capital dominate the sugar, cooking oil, frozen food and pasta                           
markets in Egypt and a full list of these firms and their market shares can be found in                                   
Table Four in the Annex. In the cooking oil sector, Savola subsidiary Afia International is                             
estimated to have a 29% of the market (Euromonitor, 2015a). Afia is a regional company,                             
and its Egyptian branch was established in 1996, and it has several brands at different                             
prices, in order to attract consumers from different classes. Egypt is Savola’s fourth largest                           
cooking oil market after the GCC, Iran and Turkey; Afia has a factory in Egypt and it                                 
imports most of its raw materials. Another cooking oil producer company is Ajwa. The                           
company entered the Egyptian market when it acquired Misr Gulf Processing Company in                         
2001 and it owns three marine terminals (Ajwa Group, 2016). Ajwa is owned by Saudi                             
businessman Mohammed bin Issa Al­Jaber and the Islamic Development Bank (Zawya,                     
2016). Prince Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al­Saud, the youngest son of the former King Fahd is                             
also a shareholder in Ajwa. Although it is not based in a GCC state, another company with                                 
a large market share is Arma, a subsidiary of Hayel Saeed Anam Group, a Yemeni                             
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 conglomerate. Arma has a 65% market share of the corn oil market and 72% market share                               
of the sunflower oil market, and investments in these segments are aimed at producing oil                             
for both the Egyptian and Gulf markets (Arma, 2010). 
 
In the frozen and processed vegetable market, Gulf companies are also dominant. Farm                         
Frites, a processor of potato chips, has the largest share of the Egyptian market, which the                               
company estimates at around 90% (Americana, 2012). Farm Frites is a joint venture                         
between Americana and the Dutch company of the same name. As discussed in the                           
previous chapter it has a farm on reclaimed land and it exports to markets across the Gulf                                 
and Middle East. Ajwa also owns a Egyptian frozen vegetable subsidiary, Ajwa El Orouba,                           
which produces 18,000 tonnes of frozen vegetables a year. 
 
Savola also has a strong presence in the Egyptian sugar market and it owns two of the                                 
three private refineries. Savola’s sugar subsidiary United Sugar Company (USC) has a                       
refinery in Ain Sukhna that it acquired from Tate and Lyle in 2010 (Reuters, 2009). Another                               
subsidiary, the Alexandria Sugar Company has a plant in Nubariya City that can process                           
9000 tonnes of beets a day (Savola, 2015). As was stated in the previous section Savola                               
has established a farm on reclaimed land from where it sources sugar beet for its                             
processor. USC exports much of its sugar to the Gulf, and its Saudi parent company                             
claims to have 70% of the Saudi sugar market (ibid). 
 
Savola also holds sway in the pasta market. In 2011 it acquired two pasta companies El                               
Maleka and El Farasha, which together have 60% of the Egyptian market (Savola, 2013).                           
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 Elsewhere in the wheat and flour segment, Gulf investors own shares in two of the flour                               
mills that were privatised in the 1990s. Upper Egypt Flour Mills is 10% owned by Arab                               
Cotton Ginning, which is partly owned by Amwal Al Khaleej, a Saudi private equity                           
company (Zawya, 2015). Saudi businessman Mohammed Al­Rajhi owns 10% of East                     
Delta Flour Mills. The majority shareholder of these mills is the Food Industries Holding                           
Company, which is fully owned by the Egyptian government.  
 
As well as GCC agribusiness conglomerates, Egyptian private equity firms in which Gulf                         
investors are shareholders are also active in the processing sector. In 2008 Gozour, the                           
agribusiness subsidiary of Qalaa Holdings, purchased a 31.5% stake in National Company                       
for Maize Products (NCMP), a company listed on the Egyptian stock exchange (Dixon                         
2013b:7). Another company previously owned by Gozour is Rashidi El­Mizan (REM) in                       
2007. REM is a manufacturer of halawa and tahina with Egyptian market shares of 59%                             
and 68% respectively, as well as a 15% share of the national jams market (Qalaa                             





Gulf capital owns some of the largest companies in Egypt’s poultry sector, and the                           
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Gulf­owned companies have a large share of the poultry market in Egypt. Of five                           
companies that are estimated to have 60­70% of the market four are owned or partly                             
owned by Gulf companies (Agroberichten, 2014). These include Al Wataniya Poultry                     
Company, owned by the Al Rajhi Group and Ismailia Misr Poultry Company, owned by                           
Saudi businessman Kamel Abdullah Saleh and his family. Another company in this list with                           
a large share of the market is Cairo Poultry Company (CPC), a subsidiary of Americana                             
that controls 30% of poultry production, and 45% of the frozen chicken market (Hanieh,                           
2013: 94). Other firms include Saudi­owned Nesma Ommat and Wadi Foods, which until                         
recently was partly owned by EFG Hermes.  
 
Although these claimed market shares should be treated with caution, it is clear that these                             
companies are very large. It is estimated that the total Egyptian poultry population is                           
around 1.2 billion. Of this population, the companies in the previous paragraph account for                           
around 10­20% of this number. Ismaila­Arab produces 8.5 million chickens a year, Nesma                         
Ommat produces 50 million chicks a year, Al Watania aims to produce 100 million broilers                             
a year and CPC produces 45 million chickens a year (Hosny, 2006: 11). All of the                               
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 production in the poultry sector is for the Egyptian market, as exports of poultry have been                               
suspended since the outbreak of Avian Flu in 2006.  
 
Another indicator of these companies’ size is their control over the grandparents of broiler                           
chickens. Grandparents is an industry term for the birds that represent the breeding stock                           
for broilers, the birds that are slaughtered for meat. In 2006, of the five companies that                               
were considered to be market leaders in terms of the size of their grandparent stock, three                               
of them were invested in by Gulf capital. At that time CPC is estimated to have had a                                   
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Gulf capital has played a main role in the restructuring of the dairy sector through                             
capitalising a corporate tier that is vertically integrated. In addition to the direct control of                             
inputs these companies have also integrated smaller suppliers that provide inputs. An                       
interesting feature of the dairy sector is the role of Gulf companies as a partner for                               
Western multinationals in their entrance into the Egyptian market.  
 
The structure of the dairy segment is similar to the poultry industry. At the lower end there                                 
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 are smaller farmers who own herds of cattle, and supply raw unpasteurised milk and dairy                             
produce. This segment of the market is considered to supply 80% of the dairy market in                               
Egypt (El­Kharbotly, 2014). Of the companies in the top end, several of the largest are                             
owned or partly owned by Gulf capital. Most of the produce of these companies account                             
for the Egyptian market but some products are exported to other Arab states. 
 
One of the biggest companies in the sector is Juhayna. Juhayna is 25% owned by Saudi                               
investors and a Saudi national sits on the company’s board of directors. The company                           
claims to have as much as 65% of the packaged dairy market in Egypt and has a herd of                                     
3200 cows (Juhayna, 2015). The company has around 8000 feddans of farmland on                         
reclaimed land and it also produces a range of fruit juices. Another firm is Dina Farms,                               
which became a subsidiary of Gozour, Qalaa Capital’s agribusiness vehicle, after it was                         
acquired by Qalaa Capital for US $85 million from Hussein Osman (the brother of Osman                             
Ahmed Osman) in 2007. Dina Farms is estimated to control around 54% of the fresh milk                               
market and the company has 15000 cows, the largest dairy herd in Egypt (Qalaa Holdings,                             
2014). As well as dairy, Dina Farms also owns 10,000 acres of farmland where it produces                               
table crops. Another Gozour subsidiary is Nile Company for Food Industries, known as                         
Enjoy, a producer of UHT milk and packaged juice. In 2009 it was estimated to be the                                 
second­largest producer of packaged milk and juices, and the fourth largest producer of                         
packaged yogurt (Qalaa Holdings, 2009).   
 
Gulf­owned companies have acted as partners for Western multinationals in Egypt,                     
demonstrating their central position in the corporate food system in the country. Arab Dairy                           
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 Company is also a Gulf­owned company with substantial operations in Egypt. A former                         
shareholder of the company was the family of Kamal Adham, the head of Saudi                           
intelligence under King Faisal. In 2015 the firm was sold to Pioneer, a Egyptian private                             
equity fund with Saudi investors. In 2009 Arab Dairy Company entered into a partnership                           
with the New Zealand company Fonterra in order to launch a range of products. According                             
to Fonterra, Arab Dairy’s infrastructure and existing market share would allow it to quickly                           
penetrate the Egyptian market. Moreover as part of the partnership agreement, Arab Dairy                         
had agreed to invest EGP 126 million into its operations, allowing Fonterra to share some                             
of the financial risk of its expansion (Swann, 2009). In an indication of the homogeneity of                               
standards and regulations within the corporate food regime, Arab Diary was also able to                           
provide Fonterra with assurances that its production would be of sufficient quality. The                         92
capacity to ensure standards is an important element of negotiations for partnerships and                         
acquisitions, and Sweden’s Arla withdrew an offer for Arab Dairy Company in 2015 after it                             
undertook a technical inspection (ibid). Arla subsequently went into a partnership with                       
Juhayna. This venture, named Agro For Food Industries, will have a capital of EGP 200                             
million, which will be increased to EGP 500 million in the future (Ayyad, 2015).  
 
Another company with a presence in the Egyptian dairy sector is Al­Marai, which is active                             
through its subsidiary Beyti. Al­Marai is the majority shareholder with a 52% share, while                           
Pepsico owns the remaining 48%. In 2015, Al­Marai announced that it is planning to invest                             
92 This was important for Fonterra given that its partner in China had been responsible for manufacturing                                 
tainted powdered milk, leading to a ban on the company’s imports into China. 
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 $500 million in Beyti and is seeking to develop the biggest dairy farm in Egypt, with one                                 
farm of 5000 cows and another of 20000 cows. The investment would be used to expand                               
its operations and also acquire a new fleet of vehicles that could expand its sales network.                               
The scale of investment in Beyti is evidence of the ongoing flow of Gulf capital into Egypt                                 
dairy’s sector. Juhayna has also expanded its operations and according to the company it                           
invested a total of EGP 3.2 billion between 2011­2015 (Ayyad, 2016). 
 
Many of the companies here have direct contracts with other corporations in Egypt.                         
Juhayna supplies milk and juices to Egypt Air and Arab Dairy Company has a number of                               
clients such as Hilton, Intercontinental, Radisson and AppleBees. Several of the                     
Gulf­owned dairy firms export their products across the region. One particularly important                       
market for dairy producers is Libya and the ongoing instability in the country has hit their                               





Gulf capital’s accumulation in agro­industry is dependent on the mediation of the state.                         
This is manifest in the state's allocation of resources such as land, water, and other inputs.                               
The state, or at least the parts of it that are most relevant to foreign investment, appears to                                   
support industrial agriculture as a result of a modernist and productivist ethos. The                         93
93 This was illustrated during the outbreak of Avian Flu in 2006 when then prime minister Ahmed Nazif said:                                     
“The world is moving towards big farms because they can be controlled under veterinarian supervision… The                               
time has come to get rid of the idea of breeding chickens on the roofs of houses” (Grain, 2006).   
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 government also plays a role in sustaining cheap labour, both through coercion and                         
through its refusal to introduce a minimum wage.  
 
This mediation of Gulf capital’s accumulation is an illustration of the state­capital nexus,                         
which is amalgamated by powerful shareholders in both the Gulf and Egypt. The social                           
relations that define the nexus are illustrated by the status of the GCC shareholders of the                               
companies mentioned in the previous section. Many of the owners of these companies are                           
members of the ruling families of the Gulf, or are prominent businessmen who have close                             
ties to the Gulf monarchs. The power and influence of these owners is enhanced in Egypt                               
through domestic partners and shareholders who have close ties to the Egyptian state. 
 
A good example of this association can be seen in Americana. The Kharafi family, the                             
owners of Americana, are very influential in Kuwait and one of the members of the family                               
acted as the Speaker of the Kuwaiti Parliament. The CEO of Americana in Egypt is Moataz                               
Al­Alfi a businessman who had a close relationship with Mubarak. His brother is reported                           
to have held a senior position in the National Democratic Party to which Americana’s                           
parent company the Kharafi Group apparently made donations (Roll, 2013: 10). The                       
parent company of Americana, the Kharafi Group, also has a close relationship with the                           
Egyptian military with whom it has joint ventures (Marshall and Stacher 2012). Such a                           
union gives an insight into the corollary of Gulf capital on class formation in Egypt, and this                                 
investment produces and reproduces the power of its Egyptian clients. This is a                         




This class power is often wielded opaquely through backroom deals and private                       
arrangements, but it is also articulated in institutionalised forms. The companies                     
mentioned in the previous section have influence with the Egyptian government, and they                         
have access to policy through a number of different bodies. These include the Food Export                             
Council, the Horticultural Egyptian Association, Chamber of Food Industries, the Union of                       
Horticultural Exporters, and the agricultural subcommittee in the American Chamber of                     
Commerce. These bodies and their influence with the government allow Gulf capital to                         
territorialise in Egypt, securing the continued mediation of the state. 
 
In an interview in his Cairo office in October 2013, “Mustafa”, a manager of a Gulf­owned                               
poultry company, explained how the poultry industry and other agribusiness companies                     
influence government policy: “I must admit that food has a prominent presence in Egypt.                           
The stakeholders are savvy and are able to communicate their demands. We have direct                           
ministerial access and one on one interaction with the government. They have official                         
representation on the health committee, nutrition committee and the standards and                     
specifications committee. There is a platform through which they can lobby. Its an                         
interesting legalised and formal platform.” Mustafa added that in addition to formal                       
lobbying, his company has the capacity to manage its relations with the Egyptian state and                             
deal with bureaucracy. “As a company we have administrative muscle. We have a group of                             
94 These links also come in the form of personal ties. In an example of such a relation Kamel Abdullah Saleh,                                         





“Tariq”, also a manager in an agro­industrial conglomerate that has received Gulf                       
investment, gave an insight into how his company uses these associations to lobby for                           
benefits. According to Tariq: “A good example is the export subsidies. We are trying to                             95
prevent them from coming down. They have come down from 12% to 8% to 6% but we are                                   
trying to make sure that they don’t go down too low, especially for small companies, and                               
companies that have operations all over the country.” In an example of the extensive                           
influence that agribusiness companies have over state resources, Tariq gave the example                       
of how the food industry lobbied against a government plan to increase water rates: “They                             
want to raise the cost of our water from EGP 1.6 per cubic meter to EGP 4.2 per cubic                                     
meter. We compiled a report in order to try and convince them not to do this. There was a                                     
big campaign to stop this from happening.” 
 
Another form of lobbying is the push for new standards and regulations in the Egyptian                             
food industry. According to Tariq, the agribusiness tier has been effective at lobbying for                           
new legislation that is aimed at raising the standards and quality of food production: “They                             
were very active in promoting the food law. If they need it they will push for it. I think these                                       
companies have made the market here. They also use people who have good political                           





The state’s role in mediating access to resources is crucial. As sign of how dependent the                               
agribusiness sector is on state support, it is under continual pressure by investors, who                           
seek further subsidies and benefits, claiming that without such benefits their investments                       
are not viable. In 2015, International Food and Consumable Goods (IFCG), a food                         
company owned by the Bin Laden Group, announced that it was postponing its plan to                             
open a potato processing plant in Egypt due to high operating costs, particularly the high                             
price of electricity. In a telephone interview in November 2015, an employee of the                           
company said: “In Europe the cost of producing one tonne of potatoes is $220 for one                               
tonne. In Egypt it is $280. The government subsidises the production of cotton, why can’t it                               
help with the production of potatoes”?  
 
The charge that Egypt is struggling to maintain its competitive edge was echoed                         
elsewhere in the processing sector. In a second interview in November 2015, Tariq said                           
that they had to stop their olive oil exports as they were unable to compete with European                                 
produce, particularly that of Spain. The employee said:  
 
“Olives and olive oil have been a real struggle. We stopped exporting olive oil                           
because world prices have been extremely competitive. We exported a lot of table                         
olives all over the world but we are in price competition with Spain, which is not only                                 
subsidising production but also the Euro exchange rate is so hard to compete with.                           




Another sector where Egypt is struggling to maintain a competitive specialism is poultry,                         
and in this case its ability to specialise is clearly mediated by the state. Although there is a                                   
continued flow of investment into the sector, it is still recovering from the outbreak of Avian                               
Flu in 2006, and there is some doubt as to whether exports will resume. Egyptian poultry                               96
is unable to compete with cheaper imports, mainly from Brazil whose poultry industry is                           
one of the most competitive in the world. Although it is responsive to lobbying by the                               
private sector, the state also faces political pressure to ensure a supply of cheap food and                               
this is reflected in the government decision to allow increased imports of poultry. In the                             
interview in 2015, Tariq said: 
 
“Today decisions are being made which are not necessarily in the support of the                             
industry. If you are in the poultry business and all of a sudden you see that the                                 
government has made a decision to allow cheap imports in order to feed the                           
masses then you are really hit. You are going to have to reduce your prices or cut                                 
production if you can. We are not able to influence the government. They are                           
refusing subsidies and they are not paying them when they do agree them. We are                             
not as competitive as we were two years ago.” 
 
Although fiscally it may struggle to provide subsidies such as fuel, one way the Egyptian                             
state can continue to offer foreign companies a competitive advantage is through the                         
continued allocation of desert land for reclamation, a resource that it can provide relatively                           
96 The outbreak of Avian Flu had devastating consequences in Egypt, as will be illustrated in the next section.  
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 easily. By example in 2014 the Egyptian cabinet gave approval for the allocation of 60,000                             
hectares of land to the Al­Ghurair Group for the cultivation for a sugar refinery (Everington,                             
2014).  
 
Another form of state support is through a commitment to cheap labour, and the low                             
wages of the workforce is promoted by the Egyptian government. The General Authority                         
for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), the government body charged with encouraging                       
foreign investment, promotes agribusiness as one of its 13 “targeted sectors” and includes                         
the “highly competitive wages” of its workforce as one of the drivers of growth in the                               
sector. This “competitive” pay manifests itself in the absence of a minimum wage for                           
non­public sector workers. According to managers in agro­industrial companies, salaries in                     
the sector are around $100­$130 a month, and sometimes lower. In addition to low wages,                             
one manager who was interviewed revealed that children are employed as labourers on                         
his poultry farm.  
 
In addition to the absence of a minimum wage, the state is also complicit in poor labour                                 
conditions by failing to protect workers in the event of a strike or industrial dispute. In                               
several cases companies have used illegal and violent measures to break up strikes and                           
this has been ignored by the authorities. In 2012, the management of a cooking oil plant                               
owned by International Foodstuffs Company, an Indian company based in the UAE, broke                         
up a strike by shooting at workers and withholding wages. The workers’ union said:                           
“unfortunately, the response from the government and political quarters has been                     






Gulf capital’s accumulation in agro­industry is predicated on heightened control over                     
resources, labour, and its ability to externalise environmental problems. This control                     
enables the extraction of value that is transferred to GCC conglomerates, a flow that                           
defines the Gulf­Egypt region. This dominance is exerted in various forms. Gulf                       
investment's capitalisation of agro­industry has allowed strategies such as vertical                   
integration and disintegration, tightening control over the supply chain, and the import of                         
technologies required for intensive farming. These processes are a characteristic of the                       
corporate food regime and intensify production in a denatured and bio­uniform manner. As                         
was illustrated in the previous chapter, one of the clearest ways that agro­industry has                           
pursued vertical integration is through the acquisition of farms on reclaimed land, and this                           
ensures that their inputs are insulated from the price fluctuations of the market. These                           
strategies are crucial to the successful investments in this sector.  97
 
Aside from direct acquisition of farmland, agro­industry can increase control over its supply                         
chain by taking advantage of its intermedial position in the market, and the ability to                             
97 This was exemplified by the experience of Abu Dhabi­owned Agthia, whose tomato processor was                             
established in Egypt in 2009. In 2012 it was forced to restructure its Egyptian activities due to losses of                                     
almost US $ 6 million (Al Sayegh, 2012)​. The company said that aside from the political instability of 2011,                                     
one of the causes of the losses was the poor tomato crop, which had raised the cost of their products. 
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 access and commodify domains of agrarian life (van der Ploeg, 2008: 88­89). This is                           
manifest in the process of contract farming, in which corporations secure the supply of                           
inputs through arrangements with smaller farmers. Acquiring inputs through contract                   
farming offers agro­industry the chance to maintain control over raw commodities yet at                         
the same time displace risk to smaller producers. In the dairy sector Juhayna sources its                             
milk from 78 different small farms across Egypt (Juhayna, 2015).  
 
As a result of the decreasing support from the state, small farmers are incentivised by the                               
aid that is offered by corporations. For example, contract farming was implemented by                         
Heinz, which entered into the Egypt in partnership with Americana (Estrin and Meyer,                         
2004: 120). As part of the contract, Heinz stipulated the variety of tomato and also                             98
offered farmers a free “extension service” of agronomists employed by Heinz (ibid). This is                           
pertinent given the decline in the number of state extension agents that was mentioned in                             
Chapter Two. Heinz also initiated its own logistics service in order to reduce the amount of                               
crop that was destroyed in transit. Many of the farmers who entered into this contract                             
reported higher yields, but these were achieved through the use of seeds that were                           
provided by Heinz. In this context, such contracts create dependency on homogeneous                       
varieties, to the detriment of biodiverse and self­sufficient farming practices.   
 
98 In another sign of the strength of Gulf­owned companies in the Egyptian market, Heinz chose Americana                                 
as its local partner due to its local knowledge and instant market penetration (Estrin and Meyer, 2004: 120).                                   
The partnership ended but Heinz in Egypt is estimated to control 90% of the ketchup market and 30% of the                                       
tomato paste market (ibid). 
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 Contract farming creates a differential within the supply chain. While corporations are able                         
to optimise the transfer of value through this disintegrated supply chain, smaller farmers                         
are often immiserated by their relationship with powerful corporations. One researcher                     99
found that while contract farming worked for more prosperous farmers, for many the                         
experience was unsatisfactory and they considered it as worse than the open market                         
(Desmulier, 2014). The scale of agro­industry’s need for commodities can have significant                       
consequences on smaller producers, as the market unpredictably switches demand for                     
different inputs. This was echoed by the employee of an international NGO who said the                             
growth of the sugar industry and its demand for sugar beet has been “a soft driver of land                                   
grabs”. The employee said the three private sugar refineries in Egypt, two of which are                             100
owned by Savola, have a great deal of power in the market for sugar cane: “The price                                 
increase for sugar after it leaves the farm gate is between 60­70% in Aswan”.  
  
In an interview in a suburb of Cairo one evening in November 2013, “Adel”, a manager of a                                   
partially Gulf­owned dairy company gave a cogent insight in the manner that                       
agro­industry’s extracts value through its differential relationship with smallholder sector.                   
“You have to distinguish between upstream and downstream,” he said. “Upstream involves                       
some interaction with the subsistence economy. Downstream is where the milk involves                       
technology and is packaged for consumers.” The employee said the contracting of small                         
farmers allows corporate dairy producers to ensure a downward pressure on the price of                           
99 One form of this differential is the delay of invoice payments. This grants corporations significant increases                                 





 milk: “The agribusiness companies take 70% from big producers, and 30% comes from the                           
small farmers. They deal with the small farmers through a middleman. They need to keep                             
a stake in the small farmers in order to diversify their sources and stop the big players                                 
raising prices.”  
 
Adel went on to illustrate how agro­industry extracts profits through its position in the                           
market. According to him, the price for non­corporate milk is around EGP 2.5 per litre while                               
for agribusiness products the cost is around EGP 9 per litre, despite the fact that there is                                 
little difference between them. As a result, the difference between the two prices allowed                           
very high profits for corporate producers: “The tetrapak milk (milk produced by corporate                         
agribusiness) is only for around 10­15 million people in Egypt. Milk is not as important as                               
the main staples. When they have the option they will go for the cheaper “lam” milk. At                                 101
the moment the market is strange. There is no competition and stability. This allows for                             
high margins. It’s a immature market that allows for high margins. The price of                           
agribusiness milk is higher, but they don’t really add that much to the value.”  
 
Aside from control over suppliers in the smallholder sector, these companies also have                         
dominance over consumers. The large market shares that are claimed by these                       
companies constitute a monopoly, in which firms operate a cartel that blocks competition.                         
According to Adel: “It's a cartel. They sit down and agree on prices because they don’t                               
want to hurt each other.” As evidence of this power, in 2011 the Egyptian Milk Producers                               





Another aspect of the control that allows the extraction of value through the Gulf­Egypt                           
region is the position of labour in agro­industry. This is partly expressed through the                           
coercion of the Egyptian state and its commitment to cheap labour, as was illustrated in                             
the previous section. Some of the companies mentioned in the previous section have                         
workforces in the thousands. Cairo Poultry Company (CPC), the majority shareholder of                       
which is Americana, employs 9000 workers. Aside from the economic exigencies of wage                         
labour, the largest poultry farms, such as those operated by CPC, exert heightened control                           
as the workforce is often residential. This is part of a quarantine implemented to mitigate                             
against the spread of Avian Flu, and staff are often required to remain on farms for several                                 
months, especially during the winter season, the period when outbreaks of the disease are                           
most common (Dixon, 2015: 97).   103
 
Agro­industry and its intense farming practices represent an attempt at environmental                     
control. This is undertaken through the introduction of technology and pharmaceuticals,                     
and also the segregation of agro­industry from the Egyptian biosphere, spatially,                     
architecturally, and by a process of denaturing. This is further illustration of how Gulf                           
investment has played a central role in the restructuring of agro­industry; its capital has                           
102 EMPA accused these companies of paying EGP 2.7 per kilogram when the EMPA had requested a price                                   
of EGP 3 per kilo (Reuters, 2011). 
103 As a result of the low pay and poor conditions, over the last 10 years workers in the Cairo Poultry                                       
Company and ​Ismailia Misr Poultry Company have held strikes.  
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 allowed investment in practices that are uniform with the homogeneity of global                       
agribusiness. Many of the companies mentioned in the previous section use animal breeds                         
that are imported from the US and the West, resulting in a reduction in biodiversity, yet                               
augmenting control. In the dairy industry, companies use the Holstein breed of cows,                         
despite the fact that indigenous breeds may be better suited to Egypt’s environment.                         104
The import of corporate breeds also takes place in the poultry industry, and the companies                             
listed in this chapter use breeds such as Hubbard, Arbor Acers and Flex, all of which are                                 
owned by Western corporations. Aside from breeds, these investments have also                     
introduced technology that is line with global agribusiness. In the dairy industry an                         
example of this technology are indoor cooling systems that increase the productivity of the                           
cows, an important consideration given Egypt’s climate. In 2010 Dina Farms announced                       
that it would be spending $2 million on such a system, and a manager of the company said                                   
that the investment would pay for itself within two years as a result of the increased yields                                 
(Trade Arabia, 2010).  105
 
This environmental control has benefits for consumers in the form of improved safety and                           
standards. Corporate producers have invested in technology that obtains international                   
certificates such as ISO 9001 2000 and HACCP, which are awarded on the basis that they                               
104 Although it is estimated to account for 81% of the total production of milk in Egypt, one product that is                                         
absent from the agribusiness product range is buffalo milk and cream (Ibrahim, 2012). There are a number of                                   
advantages to buffalo over agribusiness breeds. Buffalo can consume a greater variety of feedstock and its                               
milk is higher in fat and protein than cow milk.  
105 The manager said: "The investment in the new state­of­the­art equipment will allow us to make better use                                   
of the capacity we already have in place … All these initiatives are in line with Dina Farms’ strategy of not                                         
only getting bigger, but also getting better,” (Trade Arabia, 2010).  
220 
 manage biological risks and maintain standards. Yet these procedures are reflective of the                         
bifurcation of the Egyptian diet and the inequality of a class­based food system. Those                           
who cannot afford the products of self­regulated corporate food, acquire products through                       
more informal supply chains, where they face something of a lottery in terms of the                             
standards of safety and quality, and there are numerous examples of toxicity in such                           
commodities. Although corporate food promotes itself on the basis that it can offer                         106
consumers enhanced quality and safety, their products are also bifurcated and cheaper                       
products for poorer consumers have a lower quality. Most of the producers listed in this                             
chapter have several different lines of the same commodity that vary in price and quality,                             
and the cheaper products usually have a lower nutritional value. This was laid bear in a                               




Gulf capital reproduces the agro­industrial sector, especially in times of crisis. The                       
outbreak of H5N1 Avian Flu in 2006 had a devastating effect on the poultry industry and                               
the millions of Egyptians who rely on aviculture for food and income. The response of                             107
the largest companies that were mentioned in the previous section was to use their                           
resources to heighten their environmental control. Shortly after the outbreak of the                       
106 For example, an investigation conducted by one Egyptian newspaper revealed that 7 out of 13 samples of                                   
informally­produced cheese, which is estimated to be the source of 80% of Egyptian cheese, contained                             
formaldehyde, a chemical that is added in order to lengthen the shelf life of the product (Arij, 2014).                                   






 disease, Cairo Poultry Company (CPC) revealed that it was increasing its capital, and                         
announced plans to spend EGP 100 million on a new slaughterhouse in the Nile Delta                             
(Rasromani, 2006). According to CPC, the new facility would allow the company to                         
increase its output by 350%, from 80,000 chickens a day to 280,000. Since 2006 other                             
Gulf­owned or partially­owned poultry producers have continued to invest heavily in                     
upgrading their operations in order to achieve higher levels of biosecurity and control.  108
 
The viral risks created by Avian Flu and other diseases intensify the competitive pressure                           
for vertical integration. Access to capital allows the control of these risks and safeguards                           
production. CPC incurred losses following the bird flu outbreak but in the long term they                             
have been able to expand their market share as a result of their investments. One of the                                 
causes of the loss was the state ban on the live sale of chickens as many small outlets                                   
bought chickens from its farms. However the company said that it supported the ban on                             
informal slaughter as it was in line with international standards. According to one article on                             
the company: “In the long­run, these measures are anticipated to raise the level of hygiene                             
in the Egyptian poultry industry to international standards, and Zayed (CPC spokesman                       
who was interviewed) believes that his company will eventually benefit from this,”                       
(Rasromani, 2006).   109
108 In 2014 Wadi Foods announced that it would invest US $170 million to build a new farm in the desert in                                           
Wadi Natroun which will feature a air filtration system, preventing the entry of airborne viruses (Daily News                                 
Egypt, 2014b). 
109 Gulf state donors have also been interested in supporting the formalisation of Egyptian poultry production.                               
In 2007 the Kuwait Development Fund announced that it was granting a EGP 500 loan to the Social                                   
Development Fund for the “modernisation” of the Egyptian poultry industry (Namatalla, 2007). One of the                             




The recovery of the market share of corporate poultry producers was aided by the                           
government's policy of ordering a cull of all avian stock following the outbreak of flu. This                               
act of destruction created a market for the largest companies, and is a sign of how the                                 
growth of agro­industry is based on the retreat of other forms of production. The cull had                               110
a disastrous effect and it damaged the biodiversity of Egypt’s aviculture, in some cases                           
wiping out indigenous breeds. It hit smallholder producers the hardest as the government                         
also banned the transport, live sale and informal slaughter of poultry. This is particularly                           
significant given that it is estimated that 90% of rural households and urban households                           
keep hens, ducks and pigeons on an informal level. As a sign of how agro­industry is                               
continuing to advance in the wake of this destruction, the Gulf­owned companies                       
mentioned in the previous section are increasing capacity, entrenching their position at the                         
core of accumulation in the Gulf­Egypt region. Some of the plans to increase capacity are                             
on a very large scale; Al Watania announced in 2014 that it was planning to invest EGP 6                                   
billion in its operations in order to raise their daily production from 80,000 birds to one                               
million by 2018 (Poultry Arab World, 2014).  
 
Capital has enabled a fix to Avian Flu through heightened control over the environment,                           
but this is only likely to be a temporary solution. The poultry sector, and many other                               
features of food and agribusiness production, appears to be in a continual state of                           
managed crisis. Companies are using large quantities of drugs and antibiotics, and there                         
110 It is estimated that 34 million birds were culled and 75% of egg­laying birds and 50% of all fowl were                                         
destroyed (Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008: 14). 
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 are rising cases of resistance against some of these pharmaceuticals. This is akin to                           111
what Jason Moore described as the “superweed effect” (Moore, 2010: 226). The                       
intensification of production has been associated with a rise in disease and environmental                         
exhaustion, to which corporate food has responded with further investment in                     
technological fixes, in the process creating new unforeseen outcomes. 
 
The control that has been illustrated in this section and its importance in the extraction of                               
value is ephemeral. The dominance over the environment, labour, and resources has                       
consolidated the Gulf­Egypt region but it is a moment that has been continually contested.                           
Aside from environmental rebellion, the 2011 revolution challenged the relations within the                       
state­capital nexus that facilitated this control. Companies compete on the basis of the                         
state’s allocation of resources and import bans but this conflicts with the political demand                           
for cheap food. This is an insight into the protean nature of the alliances on which the                                 




111 According to the manager of a farm interviewed in September 2013, the levels of antibiotics that are used                                     
in the poultry industry in Egypt are far higher than other countries. “They throw antibiotics at the problem                                   
here. In Thailand they used 20 mg antibiotics per kilo of meat. Here they use 600 mgs of antibiotics,” he said.                                         
He quipped: “If you have a cold then eat Egyptian chicken!” ​According to the manager there is an interest in                                       
sustaining Avian Flu amongst some state officials as they are receiving payment from pharmaceutical                           
companies who are selling vaccinations. The manager also said that the vaccination is not being managed or                                 
controlled properly and that in some cases they were introducing new strains of the virus in the process. The                                     
manager said: “​They bringing in vaccines from across the border with Israel and from all over the place and                                     




The Gulf­Egypt region has created new spaces of food and agribusiness. The previous                         
chapter illustrated how these spaces have been formed through the process of land                         
reclamation, a spatial fix to environmental exhaustion and social control over the Old                         
Lands. The development of agro­industry has also shaped and reshaped spaces of                       
production that enhance the forms of control that were described in the previous section.                           
Gulf capital’s formation of these new spaces can be observed in the relocation of                           
agro­industrial plants into the desert, and also through the establishment of logistics that                         
link production and consumption space. This is further illustration of the scalar nature of                           
the Gulf­Egypt region and its formation of spaces of production through which value is                           
transferred. Once again, this portrayal should not be interpreted as deterministic. These                       
scales are linked through financial markets, a mosaic of shareholder structures and are                         
formed through the strategies of Egyptian management and shareholders, as well as                       
Egypt's agro­ecological features. Yet the Gulf sits at the core of these amalgamated                         
spaces, in the process forming a region of accumulation within the global food system.  
 
As a result of its intense nature, agro­industry is dependent on the reterritorialisation of                           
production space. A cause of the spread of Avian Flu is the close proximity of poultry                               
farms in Egypt. Although government regulations stipulate that poultry farms should be                       
more than 500 metres apart, this has been routinely ignored and clusters of farms have                             
formed in the Nile Valley (Hosny, 2006: 10). This concentration has been exacerbated by                           
uncontrolled building, frustrating attempts to segregate the avian population. In order to                       




According to Tariq, the manager of an agribusiness conglomerate that Gulf capital has                         
invested in, his company is seeking to move to an area of reclaimed land in the south of                                   
the country. The manager said: “Bird flu is the number one reason that we want to move.                                 
Our existing farms are in the Delta and the city is moving really fast around our farms. In a                                     
very short time we will no longer be away from the city.” The manager said that in                                 
response to this problem, his company is planning to build a new farm in the Aswan area.                                 
“We have chosen the land because it would be away from any other farms and we would                                 
build our own road,” he said. 
 
In a similar manner to the process of land reclamation, the relocation of poultry farms                             
illustrates the status of the desert as a frontier of nature that is seemingly untainted by                               
disease and human population. The association between the Old Lands and disease has                         
become so prevalent that poultry companies promote the fact that their operations are                         
located in the desert in their advertising publicity. According to the website of Katkoot Al                             
Wadi, the poultry subsidiary of Al Wadi Group: “Al Wadi farms are located in Noubaria and                               
Km 49 on Cairo­Alex Road in isolated, bio­secured locations using the latest technologies                         
to provide the most suitable and healthy environments to achieve the optimum                       
performance out of the flocks,” (Katkoot Alwadi, n.d.). 
112 In 2008 the FAO concluded that farms either faced the option of vertical integration or relocation into the                                     
desert. “In order for small and medium­scale producers to survive, they must first solve the biosecurity                               
problems associated with the clusters of farms, either by applying an “all in­all out” policy on a regional and                                     




This spatial fix is also a strategy in the dairy industry. Dairy farms consume substantial                             
amounts of water and produce large amounts of waste. As a result of the intense use of                                 113
water, farms in Egypt are located in areas where there is access to groundwater or                             
Nile­fed irrigation canals. Dina Farms’ dairy herd is located on the Cairo­Alexandria Desert                         
Road and Juhayna’s farm is in the Al­Nubaria area, further north to the west of Alexandria.                               
In an interview, the employee of a dairy producer that Gulf capital has invested in, said that                                 
his company is considering moving its farm to a higher area due to a decrease in the water                                   
table in the company’s existing location. The employee said that the new location was                           
preferable as it had cooler temperatures and therefore would reduce the cost of cooling                           
systems. 
 
Another feature of these companies is their vertical integration of logistics, a strategy that                           
complements the spatial reorganisation of production. For example Americana’s Senyorita                   
Group has a fleet of 950 distribution vehicles and 70 distribution outlets that allow it to                               
maintain a supply across Egypt (Americana, 2014). As will be seen in the next chapter this                               
plays a part in the penetration of rural areas by supermarkets and fast­food brands, many                             
of which are owned by Gulf conglomerates. This is an important feature, as it allows                             
corporate agribusiness to link new spaces of production with new spaces of consumption. 
 
113 It is estimated that in the full cycle of production, including the production of feedstock, hydration, cleaning                                   
and cooling, as much as 1000 litres of water are required in order to produce one litre of milk (Hoekstra,                                       
2008).  
227 
 As these spaces of production are being made at the national scale of Egypt, they are also                                 
being linked with new areas of consumption elsewhere in the Arab region. Many of the                             
companies in this chapter export to other markets in the Arab region, including the Gulf but                               
also markets in North Africa and the Levant. In this sense, Egypt’s cheap labour,                           
agro­ecological characteristics, and relative stability have been developed into a platform                     
that serves a large domestic population but also markets across the region. According to                           
one manager of a large Gulf­owned conglomerate that operates companies across the                       
supply chain: “20­25% of our produce is exported to 40 different countries. Egypt is a                             
strategic location for exports and it is good for African markets. We do a lot of exports to                                   
Africa of juice, dairy and biscuits. Africa is hungry for goods. We can export by ships. We                                 
can export to the Gulf through boat to Aqaba.”   114
 
The investment in an agro­industrial platform that can serve other regional markets is likely                           
to continue in the future. In 2014, the Aujan Coca­Cola Beverages Company announced                         
that it would be investing US $100 million in a juice factory that will start operations in 2017                                   





The three segments that have been examined in this chapter illustrate that Gulf capital                           
was a central agent in the restructuring of agro­industry as the state withdrew from the                             
114 Interview, Cairo November 2013. 
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 sector from the 1970s onwards. In some cases this was a passive process and took place                               
through private equity companies, in other cases Gulf companies launched operations in                       
Egypt, either directly or through acquisitions. It would be inaccurate to say that the                           
restructuring of agro­industry was a solely consequence of Gulf capital’s                   
internationalisation, and Egyptian and multinational companies also played a role. But                     
what should be emphasised is the relation between Gulf investment and the construction                         
of a capital intensive corporate tier that is almost indistinguishable from the global                         
agribusiness industry. The same technology, practices, and breeds have been imported                     
with this capital. Moreover Gulf firms have also acted as partners for Western                         
multinationals, suggesting that in addition to offering the capital, they also possess the                         
political currency that is required to enter the Egyptian market. In terms of the development                             
of a region, the export of products of the processing and dairy industry to the Gulf is a                                   
cross­border supply chain that is based on an international division of labour. At the same                             
time the flow of capital from the Gulf into Egypt into agro­industry is another contour that                               
demonstrates the emergence of this region.  
 
The management of the Avian Flu crises is a good example of what Jason Moore                             
described as the “superweed effect” (2010). Capital’s attempt to control poultry production                       
through intensive farming has created unforeseen consequences such as the outbreak of                       
avian flu and antibiotic resistance. While problems such as Avian Flu are overcome by                           
these technological fixes, the further attempt to tame nature often results in new rebellions,                           
such as antibiotic resistance. Egypt’s poultry industry is becoming more reliant on the use                           
of drugs and capital­intensive farms that allow biosecurity. In such an environment, the                         
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 access to capital in order to invest and build larger sophisticated operations becomes                         
essential and the Gulf­owned farms are leaders in the field. Such investment also creates                           
pressure for other companies to make similar investments or face the prospect of declining                           
market share. 
 
Agro­industrial restructuring has resulted in the formation of new spaces of production. In                         
response to diseases such as Avian Flu, companies are moving their operations deeper                         
into the desert. Their advance into the frontier of the desert, away from the urban                             
population, has a corollary that has implications for labour conditions as it removes the                           
workforce from their communities, alienating them and enhancing their employer’s control                     












If the Gulf­Egypt region has formed new scales of production, what has been the corollary                             
on spaces of consumption? With this in mind, the following chapter examines Gulf                         
investment in supermarkets and fast food restaurants, the final stage in the corporate food                           
supply chain. It will illustrate how Gulf capital has been a primary agent in the introduction                               
of Western supermarket and fast food brands into the Egyptian market. In a characteristic                           
similar to other parts of the agribusiness supply chain, Gulf capital owns the largest, most                             
capital intensive supermarkets and fast food restaurants. These operations have had a                       
transformative effect on the food retail market in Egypt, both in terms of changing                           
consumer tastes and forging supply chains. The establishment of these outlets has been                         
vital to the construction of a corporate food regime as they enable the infrastructure and                             
logistics for the distribution of corporate food, and they also impose the implementation of                           
food regulation down the supply chain. In keeping with other segments of the food and                             
agribusiness sector, this chapter will illustrate how investments in this sector, in particular                         
in the supermarket industry, are facilitated by the Egyptian state through its allocation of                           
land. This chapter will also reveal that supermarkets maintain a commercial relationship                       
with the Egyptian military.  
 
The chapter seeks to enrich the account of the “supermarket revolution”, the concept of                           
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 the spread of supermarkets across the Global South from the 1990s onwards, by                         
illustrating the role that Gulf conglomerates have played in this process in Egypt (Burch                           
and Lawrence, 2009; McMichael, 2009; Humphrey, 2007; Reardon et al, 2003). Rather                       
than a linear flow of investment from the Global North to the South, in this case the role of                                     
the Gulf has been central; as a result of the franchises of multinational supermarket brands                             
that it introduced to Egypt. In terms of fast food chains, the investment by Gulf                             
conglomerates has played a role in introducing a homogeneous globalised fast food                       
culture, at least amongst certain socio­economic classes.  
 
This chapter will also examine other topics that relate more generally to consumption,                         
while the previous chapters that have focused on production. In particular it will examine                           
the effect that Gulf companies have had on consumer culture in Egypt; it will explore                             





In the late 1990s large privately owned supermarkets began to appear in increasing                         
number in Egypt. Egyptian owned chains such as Ragab Sons and Metro Market were                           
successful and established a large number of outlets. In the 2000s Gulf­owned brands                         






Today, GCC companies are the primary foreign investors in the supermarket sector in                         
Egypt, and Gulf capital has introduced brands such as Carrefour and Spinneys to the                           
Egyptian market. As an illustration of this, of the ten companies with the largest market                             
share in the supermarket sector, Gulf­owned firms Carrefour and Spinneys are the only                         








Carrefour – The     
Middle East franchise     
is owned by Majid Al         
Futtaim 
UAE  Six hypermarkets and 10       
neighbourhood supermarkets 
Spinneys – Partly     
owned by UAE private       
equity firm Abraaj 
UAE  Four supermarkets 
Dina Farms – Gozour,       
subsidiary of Qalaa     
Holdings 
GCC and Egyptian  12 supermarkets 







In terms of market share, Carrefour is estimated to have the third largest supermarket                           
share of the grocery market with 1.6% in 2015, a figure that has increased since 0.9% in                                 
2011 (Euromonitor, 2016b: 10) By comparison, the largest supermarket chain in Egypt,                       
Metro Market is estimated to have 3.8% of the market (ibid). Spinneys, another                         
Gulf­owned hypermarket is estimated to have 0.6% of the grocery market a figure that has                             
increased from 0.3% in 2011 (ibid). In addition to groceries these hypermarket chains also                           
have significant shares of the retail market in clothes and electronics. Carrefour owns six                           
hypermarkets and 10 smaller neighbourhood supermarkets. Its first store was opened in                       
the upper class Cairo neighbourhood of Maadi in 2002 and at the time it was the first                                 
hypermarket in Egypt.  
 
Spinneys is another Western brand that was established in Egypt by Gulf capital. It has                             
four supermarkets in Cairo and it first entered the market in 2005, when it opened as a                                 
anchor outlet for the City Stars mall in northern Cairo. In a similar manner to Carrefour,                               
Spinneys maintains a Western image but it is owned by Gulf investors. The chain is partly                               
owned by Abraaj Capital, the Dubai­based private equity firm who acquired the majority                         




 Another supermarket chain that features a component of Gulf capital is Dina Farms, which                           
launched its own chain of supermarkets that sell products direct from the company’s farms                           
and dairy herd. In 2014 Dina Farms owned 12 stores, most of which are in Cairo. Dina                                 
Farms is owned by Gozour, the agribusiness holding company of Qalaa Holdings, which                         
features a number of Gulf investors (see Chapter Three).   
  
Of the supermarket chains that have been established by Gulf investors, Carrefour is the                           
most significant. Although its market share is smaller than the largest Egyptian brands                         
such as Ragab Sons and Metro Market, Carrefour is a market leader in terms of                             
management practices and it plays a lead role in the sector. Carrefour is the fourth largest                               
retail group in the world and now has a presence in Europe, Asia, South America and                               
Africa. It has played a central role in the supermarket revolution as a result of its                               
introduction of corporate retail to the Global South. In addition to food, it also has a wide                                 
range of other items such as clothes and electrical products, and it has a reputation among                               
consumers for low prices.   
 
In the Middle East, Carrefour partnered with Majid Al­Futtaim (MAF), one of the region’s                           
biggest retail conglomerates, whose owners the Futtaims are a prominent business family                       
in Dubai. Carrefour entered into the joint venture on the basis of MAF's knowledge of the                               
region’s markets and the partnership also intended to take advantage of MAF’s ownership                         
of shopping malls, facilities that were already popular among consumers in the region (SIS                           
International, n.d). The partnership was profitable and after establishing the first Carrefour                       
outlet in Dubai in 1995 the joint venture expanded to other GCC countries, and then to the                                 
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wider Middle East and Central Asia. As a sign of how the largest Gulf businesses have                               
developed beyond the position of holding agencies of Western brands, in 2013 MAF                         
bought out Carrefour’s remaining 25% share making it the sole owner of the Middle East                             
franchise (Rahman, 2013). As will be discussed later, Carrefour in Egypt continues to be                           
identified as a Western brand, when in fact it is fully owned by a Gulf company. 
 
Although the market share of supermarkets such as Carrefour and Spinneys has been                         
steadily increasing since the 1990s, it still remains small when compared to markets in the                             
West. In 2015 the grocery market was estimated to be worth EGP 242.7 billion, and of that                                 
hypermarkets accounted for EGP 8.8 billion (Euromonitor, 2016b: 1). This represents a                       
market share that is much smaller than that of hypermarkets in the Global North, where                             
one company can often control as much as 30­40% of the grocery market. One reason this                               
market share is smaller is because of the strength of other forms of food retail in Egypt.                                 
Small neighbourhood stores in Egypt are believed to number 85,000 in total and this                           
number excludes other forms of small retailers such as street kiosks that are present on                             
almost every street in Egypt (Euromonitor, 2016b: 9). Government­owned supermarkets                   
are another important form of retail that accounts for more than EGP 1 billion of the EGP                                 
242.7 billion market (Euromonitor, 2016b: 1). These outlets were established during the                       
1960s and 70s and there are currently 100s across Egypt with more than 300 in Cairo                               
(Youssef, 2011).   115
115 The supermarkets are under the management of the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade and currently                                 





Ostensibly, the government appears to support the establishment of supermarket chains,                     
to which it has the same modernist attitude as it does to other sectors of food and                                 
agribusiness. It considers the establishment of supermarkets as a sign of economic                       
development, regardless of the effect that it has on smaller forms of retail. This attitude                             
was exemplified in the statement of a former minister of trade and supply who described                             
the opening of the first Carrefour outlet in Egypt as an indicator of “a new and civilised                                 
marketing approach,” (Sami, 2001). 
 
In practice, however, the country has proven to be a difficult environment for foreign                           
supermarkets and acquiring the necessary permits from ministries has been known to take                         
years. As a result, a number of European and Western companies have failed in their                             
attempts to penetrate the Egyptian market. The British company Sainsbury’s entered                     
Egypt in 1999 but withdrew two years later after the store was shunned by consumers                             
following allegations that it was Israeli­owned. Makro was another foreign multinational                     
that failed to penetrate the Egypt market. The German company launched a outlet in 2008                             
in Cairo but withdrew in 2016, citing concerns over the safety of the country. According to                               
reports the company faced difficulties in acquiring the necessary government licenses                     
Market has 198 outlets (Euromonitor, 2016a: 1). In addition to government supermarkets, the Egyptian                           
military also operates around 20 supermarkets (Swanberg, Assem n.d.: 4). 
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 (Euromonitor, 2016b: 1). In another example a South African chain Shoprite, established                       
seven stores in 2001, but in 2006 it withdrew complaining of “restrictions on free trade”                             
(Oxford Business Group, 2014).   
 
With this considered, how did Gulf­owned supermarket brands such as Carrefour and                       
Spinneys overcome what appears to be a minefield of bureaucratic and operational                       
problems? In an interview in his office in a suburb of Cairo in November 2013, “Mahmoud”                               
a manager of a Gulf­owned supermarket brand, was surprisingly candid about who the                         
company relies upon to ensure that their operations ran smoothly: “We can not develop                           
anything in the country without the army. The army is the key and it always will be,” he                                   
said.  The manager continued:  
 
“Most of the governors (of the provinces) are former military people and they hold                           
the decision making. There is a lot of bureaucracy and there is a high rotation of                               
managers in the ministries. As a result the army and the governors hold most of the                               
power. I will give you an example, I went to see the government with several issues                               
that were blocked on a file and nothing was done. I went to see the military and                                 
everything was fixed after the first meeting. The army can do in one day what would                               
normally take three months if you went through the standard channels.”   
 
Mahmoud went on to give a specific account of the commercial relationship between his                           
supermarket and the military. His company retails electrical products (such as TVs) that                         
are produced by the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI), a industrial complex that                         
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 is owned by the Egyptian military. As a result, his supermarket creates around EGP 11                             
million in annual revenue for the military due to the sale of its products. The manager said                                 
that in addition to assistance with obtaining permits, one of the benefits of this commercial                             
relationship includes his company receipt of subsidised fuel from the military. “We rely on                           
the army for fuel. When fuel is a little short then the army can supply. Either through their                                   
own pocket or from elsewhere,” he said. 
 
The employee, who works for a Gulf­owned franchise of a brand of hypermarkets from a                             
European state, also said companies who originated from the same state had generally                         
benefited from the relationship between an arms manufacturer, of the same nationality,                       
and the Egyptian military. “This is one part of a much bigger picture,” he said. “Another                               
part of what we offer is that the arms company buys some of their parts from the AOI and                                     
that also helps our position here.” The manager went on to say that his company was                               
introduced to an influential general through an employee of the arms company. This                         
disclosure provides an insight into how much importance arms contracts of a weapons’                         
manufacturer can have for other companies of the same nationality.  
 
In light of the importance of the relationship with the military, it is perhaps unsurprising that                               
the employee said his company was happy about the removal of Mohammed Morsi in July                             
2013. “The arrival of the Sisi government was the best thing for the economy. The                             
economy was going to explode and we are very happy about the removal of Morsi. The                               
new government is running the country with a vision.” The employee said that the new                             




Another factor that assists Gulf­owned supermarket brands in Egypt is the historically                       
close relationship between the Gulf states and Egypt, of which the latest manifestation has                           
been the alliance between Sisi, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Mahmoud said the Gulf states                             
were able to provide some assistance to their investors, but this was limited: “Officially we                             
get no support. Unofficially we get support. In terms of the day­to­day management of the                             
shop we get no support. Luckily the GCC states have made a partnership with Egypt and                               
they have a big charitable programme in Egypt including the construction of hospitals. The                           
GCC countries show their nice face here. The ambassador helps us but he is limited in                               
what he can do,” he said. 
 
The employee also echoed other professionals in Egypt’s agribusiness sector in saying                       
that his company tried to avoid interaction with some government ministries, especially the                         
civilian institutions, out of fear that they would meddle in their operations. “We have to                             
speak to the government every so often in order to see if they are happy. But it’s better to                                     
avoid them as then they start asking for more from us,” he said. 
 
Investments in the supermarket sector are dependent on the state, not just for permits and                             
bureaucratic support but also for the allocation of state land. The government has granted                           
vacant land to supermarket chains that seek to build new outlets. In 2014 it was reported                               
that Carrefour would receive public land for 10 new supermarkets in Cairo and Alexandria                           
(Ahram Online, 2014b). Aziza Panda, the supermarket chain that is owned by Savola, has                           
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 also received public land for its 16 supermarkets that will be opened across Egypt,                           
including in smaller towns such as Assiyut, Fayoum, and Zagazig (Euromonitor, 2016b: 4).                         
The chain is reported to have received plots of land that are between 25 and 125 acres in                                   
size. It is unclear, whether this land will be sold, or leased at market price, but in many                                   
cases the state's allocation of land has been below the market rate.    116
 
The supermarket sector's reliance on the state for the allocation of land is in keeping with                               
other parts of the agribusiness sector, but also the private sector generally. Historically,                         
well­connected businesspeople have received plots of public land on which to build real                         
estate, tourism projects, and other developments. This is often justified on the basis that                           
these projects can create jobs and economic growth, but what is certain is that the                             
granting of low­cost land allows the private sector to profit with the state’s support.  
 
Although decrees on these allocations of land usually appear to be executed at the                           
ministry level, interviewees said the military and the presidential office had ultimate control                         
over these decisions. According to some reports, the Defense Ministry is the largest                         
landowner in the country, and the military is considered to own some of the most valuable                               
land adjacent to urban areas that would be appropriate for commercial use. One                         117
116 There are several cases where state land has reportedly been allocated to agribusiness companies at a                                 
price that is below the market rate. One example is Al­Waleed bin Talal Al­Saud's acquisition of land on the                                     
Toshka project that was discussed in Chapter Four. In the supermarket sector managers have also reported                               
buying state land at a subsidised price. See the interview with “Omar” on p. 233.   
117 The issue of the military’s ownership of land is clouded by a lack of transparency. But what is clear is that                                           
the military has a veto over land use and has the power to block a construction application due to supposed                                       
security considerations. See Barayez (2016). 
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 manager of a fast food chain that is partly owned by Gulf capital said the military would                                 
have to start releasing some of the land that they control in order to stimulate economic                               
growth: “The military are replacing the Mubarak regime and they own the best real estate.                             
This is the only functioning body in Egypt and they are the only one that has discipline and                                   
planning. However they will have to let go of some of that real estate in order to deal with                                     
population growth,” he said.   118
 
Other professionals in the industry said that the president’s office also controlled these                         
decisions, at least before the revolution of 2011. In an interview in November 2013,                           
“Omar”, a manager of a partly Gulf­owned supermarket chain, recalled the need to make a                             
personal visit to Mubarak in order to lobby for the allocation of land for a supermarket                               
project: “I was going to approach Mubarak and ask for subsidised land. We were not                             
asking for prime land, but Mubarak was the key opener for these kinds of things. Nothing                               
got done without Mubarak. We eventually got land at a subsidised price.” The manager of                             
the company said that although his company had some Gulf shareholders, the fact that it                             
was perceived as an Egyptian company improved the likelihood of receiving land: “If you                           
are Egyptian you will have more sympathy. I think we had a better chance.”  
 
Omar said that regardless of the changes in government over the last five years, the                             
nature of decision making within the bureaucracy remained cronyistic, and this was                       
unlikely to change in the near future: “You have to be the right person to do business here.                                   
118 Interview Cairo November 2016. 
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 There is a lot of bureaucracy and you have to be the right person to deal with that. There is                                       
a circle of people who control everything and you see it in every company. They open the                                 
door because they have common interests with people in government.” 
  
However the manager went on to say that the political upheavals that had taken place                             
since 2011 had created an air of uncertainty, and navigating the government bureaucracy                         
had become harder, and decisions over land allocations were less clear than before. “With                           
the new regime no one knows. No one is able to make decisions because they are                               
scared,” he said. He added that there was an air of insecurity over the allegations of                               
corruption that had surfaced since 2011: “People are scared because everyone is                       
accusing everyone else of receiving something.” Nevertheless he went on to say the                         
people in the Mubarak regime were returning to power, especially after the coup of 2013.                             
“The people that were out with the revolution are coming back because you can’t run the                               
country without them,” he said. 
 
The relationships described in this section illustrate the modality of the state­capital nexus                         
in Egypt, and the heterogeneity of this compound on the world scale. In this case Gulf                               
investors have struck a deal with the Egyptian military, in which their supermarkets sell                           
products made by the army's industries in return for its bureaucratic assistance and                         
support. For the military, an incentive for this arrangement is the creation of revenue for its                               
industries such as the AOI. This is an example of how foreign investment from the Gulf                               
has reproduced the power of the military and further entrenched its place in Egypt's                           
economy. In response to the economic liberalisation that has taken place since the 1990s,                           
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 the military appears to have adapted, and by acting as a gatekeeper for foreign investment                             
and renting out resources it has been rejuvenated by the flow of foreign capital. This                             119
section also gave an insight into the role of the presidential office in mediating foreign                             
investment through its control over land. One informant described the need to make a                           
direct appeal to Mubarak for an allocation of land for a supermarket investment,                         
suggesting that such interventions are not made through institutionalised channels of                     
government but rather on the basis of informal connections to the executive of the                           
Egyptian state. This is an indicator how the political negotiations that accompany these                         





Gulf capital has played a lead role in introducing Western fast food chains to Egypt. These                               
brands first appeared in Egypt in the mid 1970s and their establishment was a result of the                                 
economic reforms of ​infitah​. The first fast food restaurant to appear in Egypt was                           
Wimpey’s, a British brand that had been introduced to Egypt by Kharafi Group's                         
Americana. The outlet was opened in Talaat Harb Square in downtown Cairo and it was                             
popular among wealthy consumers who considered it as a novelty and luxury. As a                           120
result of this entrance, Americana introduced the culture of fast food, which spawned a                           
119 See Marshall (2015). 
 





Fast food grew rapidly through the 1980s, both in terms of the variety of brands and                               
popularity. This continued through the 1990s when other brands such as McDonald's                       
entered the Egyptian market. The growth of these chains is a good indicator of the                             
meatification of the Egyptian diet that took place from the 1970s onwards. Egyptian street                           
food consists of vegetarian dishes such as falafel or tamiyya, but the dishes served in                             
these new chains revolve around beef or chicken. These outlets have now become                         
common across much of Egypt, and they are an adjunct to the real estate developments                             
and shopping mall projects that will be discussed later in this chapter; in areas such as                               
New Cairo, Gulf­owned fast food brands are ubiquitous. 
 








Americana ­ Kharafi     
Group 
Kuwaiti  Americana has one of the biggest           
shares of the fast food market. It             
owns the following franchises:       
121 According to one study: “The arrival of the global QSR (Quick Service Restaurants) chains, particularly                               
KFC and Wimpy, prompted the establishment of local QSR chains, e.g. Mo'men and Cook Door, from the                                 
late 1980s,” (Abdelgawwad, 2012: 17). 
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 Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC),       
Hardees, Pizza Hut, Costa Coffee         
and Baskin Robbins 
Al Shaya Group  Kuwaiti  Owns the Starbucks franchise 







The largest company in the industry is Kharafi Group's Americana whose Egyptian                       
subsidiary, Egyptian Company for International Touristic Project, owns a number of                     
Western brands such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), Hardees, Pizza Hut, Costa Coffee                         
and Baskin Robbins. In 2014, Americana was considered to be the leading company in the                             
fast food sector, and the group has a 6% share of the fast food market (Euromonitor,                               
2015b: 2). Egypt is one of Americana’s most important markets and of the 1556 outlets                             
that it has across the Arab region and Central Asia, 396 are in Egypt. One of its biggest                                   
brands is KFC, which has around 140 outlets across Egypt and in terms of chicken­based                             
fast food KFC has a 70% market share in 2014 (ibid). Large market shares are replicated                               
in other Americana brands and the company’s Baskin Robbins franchise is estimated to                         
have a 22% share of the ice cream market (ibid).   122
 
Hana International is another Gulf company that has established Western fast food brands                         
in Egypt and it owns the franchises for Burger King. Hana International is owned by the                               
Olayan Group of Saudi Arabia, one of the largest Saudi conglomerates that has a global                             
portfolio of investments. Al­Shaya Group of Kuwait is also present in Egypt and it owns the                               
regional franchise for Starbucks and there are around 20 Starbucks outlets across Egypt                         
(ibid). As a sign of the significant role of Gulf capital in introducing fast food brands to                                 
122 These market shares are approximate and they should be treated with similar caution to other estimate                                 
that are made about the agribusiness and food sector.  
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 Egypt of the ten companies with the largest share in the fast food sector, two are owned by                                   





The creation of large market shares of Gulf companies has depended on a campaign of                             
advertising and marketing. This section will examine the process of marketing and                       
advertising of fast food by Gulf companies, and it will draw heavily from an interview that                               
was made with a marketing executive of a Gulf­owned food company.   
 
The penetration of Egyptian culture by fast food brands has created a culture that was                             
observed during a trip to a Cairo shopping mall on a Friday afternoon in Autumn 2013. The                                 
food hall was packed with families for whom a meal from one of the fast food outlets forms                                   
the basis of a weekend trip or special treat. While the parents socialised, the children used                               
the adjacent play area or entertained themselves with the toys that are included in the                             
meals. In a crowded city such as Cairo, where public space is limited and children have                               
few recreational spaces, air­conditioned malls can provide space where families can relax;                       
provided they can afford the products on sale in the food halls. For corporations such as                               
Americana, this social role of their outlets offers the opportunity to penetrate the minds of                             




 The popularity of fast food is a consequence of the resources of these regional food                             
conglomerates. Due to their financial power they are able to spend large amounts on                           
advertising and marketing, and as an example the Americana Group spent US $265                         
million on advertising in 2014, a figure that had risen from US$185 million in 2011                             
(Americana, 2012; 2014). This huge budget manifests itself in television advertising and                       
billboards across Egypt, a presence and influence that has created a demand for the                           
products of corporate fast food. Often this advertising clearly targets youth and it features                           
celebrities such as pop stars and footballers, with whom the younger generations might                         
identify with.  
 
Unsurprisingly one corollary of the spread of fast food outlets and the advertising that                           
accompanies them is the rising levels of obesity in Egypt. According to one study: “Some                             
of these habits (the consumption of fast food) are a function of ... the aggressive mass                               
media advertisements by private fast food businesses,” (UNICEF, 2012). Egypt is                     
estimated to have one of the highest rates of obesity in the African continent, and the rate                                 
has increased rapidly over the last 30 years (Charbel, 2010). In addition to obesity, rising                             
rates of colon cancer and diabetes are also linked to poor diet. The problem of obesity                               
among poor Egyptians is considered to be a consequence of the state’s subsidies on                           
carbohydrates and sugar, cheapening their consumption. But among middle class                   
Egyptians a cause of the condition is also considered to be increased consumption of                           
highly calorific fast food. The popularity of fast food in Egypt correlates with the Gulf states,                               
where the penetration of fast food brands has also been a cause of high rates of obesity                                 




During an interview in his office in November 2013, “Karim” the advertising manager of a                             
Gulf­owned fast food company in Egypt explained how his company had to create an                           
awareness of its brands:  
 
“When my company first opened in Egypt (in the 1970s) people thought it was a pharmacy                               
because of the style of the logo. We had to make people understand that it was a food                                   
company,” he said. The employee said that his company also sought to change consumer                           
practices for other commodities that it produces. “When we started a brand of potato chips                             
we had to change consumer habits and it took 10­15 years,” he said “We had to persuade                                 
housewives that it is more time consuming to use the old style of potatoes (a reference to                                 
unprocessed potatoes). All the restaurants and hotels now use it as well,” he said. 
 
Although marketing and advertising is the main factor behind the creation of the fast food                             
market, this process has depended on a shift in regional politics and Egypt’s orientation                           
towards the West and the Gulf states. The manager gave a long account of this process,                               
and his perception adds weight to the argument that Gulf conglomerates played a central                           
role in developing corporate food in Egypt:   
 
“It started back in 1967 after the Six Day War. A number of people from the Gulf                                 
went to the UK and they noticed the trend of fast food. Before that the region wasn’t                                 
so friendly towards Western investment. Then Sadat did a peace deal and the US                           
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 companies started to come in. I remember you used to see American frozen                         
chickens with the US flags on them and that was the first time you would see them.                                 
This aid was used to build markets, and they were very keen to develop markets for                               
American companies. The Middle East was ready for American products. The                     
petrodollars also created a lot of capital that could be invested in Egypt. Gulf                           
companies played a big role in creating the market here. There weren’t many                         
multinationals before Arab countries invested and they were the first. What                     
happened is that Egyptians went to the Gulf and made money and then returned to                             
open their businesses and partner with multinationals. They then went back to the                         
Gulf and brought in investors following the relationships that they made in the Gulf.                           
This marriage with wealth created the market in Egypt.” 
 
Karim also argued that the Egyptian market offers influence over the whole Arab region,                           
due to its geographical position, and its political and cultural influence. “Egypt is the pivot                             
country in the whole region, and it has influence from the Atlantic to the Gulf,” he said. “All                                   
the Gulf businesses started to flourish here after the 1970s. We started in Egypt because                             
there was a relationship between our owners and they started to build business in Egypt.”                           
 123
 
The interviewee went on to say that his company's establishment was also aided by the                             
close relationship between Egypt and Kuwait. “I think 1990 was a big event in the                             
123 See Chapter Five for more detail on these individuals. 
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 relationship between Egypt and Kuwait,” he said. He added: “The Egyptian army defended                         
the rights of Kuwaitis. Americana was the first company after the liberation of Kuwait to                             
reopen and it continued to pay the salaries of all its employees throughout the occupation.                             
The Kharafi family was committed to paying its employees.” 
 
The opinion of the executive offers an insight into how Gulf companies may have changed                             
consumer tastes in Egypt. However consumer tastes and fashions are capricious and one                         
interesting development that may challenge the popularity of fast food franchises owned                       
by Gulf corporations is the recent emergence of Egyptian brands that promote Egyptian                         
food and culture. Brands such as Zooba and Cairo Kitchen celebrate Egyptian cuisine and                           
although they are relatively expensive, and are very small relative to Western franchises,                         
they have the potential to grow in the future (Euromonitor, 2015b: 3). Some Egyptian                           
brands have even made inroads into Gulf markets, where consumers have also shown an                           
interest in Arab and “authentic” cuisine. Mo’men is an Egyptian brand that sells                         
sandwiches and burgers. In 2008 the private equity group Actis invested $48.5 million in                           
the company in order to enable it to expand into other Arab countries, including the UAE,                               
Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. However, although the emergence of new trends                       124
may challenge Gulf firms’ existing brands, the capitalisation of Gulf conglomerates will                       
most likely allow them to adapt by launching their own competitors, or more likely by                             
buying them out.   
124 In another example the brand Sale Sucre, which is owned by the Egyptian company United Beverage and                                   






The Gulf­Egypt region is defined by the creation of new spaces of production and                           
consumption. The previous chapters have illustrated how the flow of capital from the Gulf                           
has had a corollary on the spatial reorganisation of agribusiness and food in Egypt,                           
creating new scales of production that intensify the extraction of value. This section will                           
illustrate that investment in corporate food retail is creating new spaces of consumption.                         
As well as the geographic expansion of corporate food retail into new spaces, it will argue                               
that Gulf­owned supermarkets are playing a role in expanding the market relations of food                           
production among classes of Egyptian consumers that are reliant on less commodified                       
systems of food. 
 
From the outset, Gulf investment in Egyptian food retail has been associated with a                           
reconfiguration of consumption space in Egypt. Gulf owned supermarket chains such as                       
Carrefour and Spinneys were first launched in the cities of Cairo and Alexandria, and their                             
arrival coincided with other Gulf investments in residential real estate and shopping malls.                         
One early example was the Yamama Centre in the Zamalek neighbourhood of Cairo,                         
which was financed by Prince Bandar Al­Saud of Saudi Arabia in 1989 (Abaza, 2006:                           
280). These malls gradually expanded in size, and in 2005, the biggest shopping mall in                             125
Cairo, City Stars, was launched by the Sharbatly and Shobshoki families of Saudi Arabia.                           
125 The emergence of these new malls took place as the government sought to privatise state­owned retail                                 
and by example the government sold Omar Effendi, a well­known Egyptian department store that was first                               
opened in 1856, to Saudi investors in 2006. The sale was annulled in 2013 and shares in the company were                                       
returned to the state (Gamal, 2013).  
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 The mall was one of the first “mixed use” facilities in Egypt and it includes cinemas,                               
restaurants and shops, a scale on par with such facilities in the GCC states.  
 
These new developments and the supermarkets and fast food outlets that accompanied                       
them, led to changes in the patterns of consumption and urban life in general. Access to a                                 
car, or other forms of transport, enabled access to these huge outlets and they became                             
segregated or at least separate from the older parts of the city. Their appearance was a                               
hallmark of the absorption of Egypt into global consumer culture. In the words of one                             
scholar: “Carrefour then is merely another addition to the expanding landscape of                       
up­market Cairo ... The fast incorporation of malls, coffee shops and up­market                       
restaurants into the daily lives of affluent Cairenes signals the consolidated and                       
normalized nature of such reterritorializations of the First World. This conspicuously                     
cosmopolitan Cairo has become the self­evident backdrop of the lives of affluent                       
Cairenes,” (Koning, 2009: 55).  
 
These investments have succeeded in changing the space of consumption for Egypt's                       
middle and upper classes, but the impetus for expansion is constant. Managers of                         
agribusiness companies consider that Cairo remains underserved by supermarkets when                   
compared to other Middle Eastern cities. One interviewee who is a manager in a                           
Gulf­owned food company pointed out that while Cairo has 10 hypermarkets, Riyadh                       
features 40 and in Istanbul there are more than 100. As a result Gulf companies are                               126
seeking to increase their investments and both Carrefour and Spinneys have said that they                           
126 Interview Cairo October 2013. 
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 would like to increase their outlets in Egypt. In the future other Gulf conglomerates are                             127
also likely to enter Egypt’s food retail sector and in 2015, Aziza Panda, a supermarket                             
chain owned by Savola, announced that it would open 16 outlets in Egypt (Trade Arabia,                             
2015). 
 
As well as expansion within cities, supermarkets are also seeking to expand into the rural                             
space. The penetration of rural areas would fortify supermarkets’ position as the                       
intermediary between producer and consumer, in the process challenging other forms of                       
food retail and deepening the market relations of food. Outlets such as Carrefour have                           
established in Cairo, Alexandria or the tourist resorts of Sharm El Sheikh or Hurghada, but                             
not in smaller rural towns. However, there are signs that supermarkets may enter the rural                             
space, with Gulf capital at the forefront. According to one interviewee who works in the                             
agribusiness sector, Aziza Panda, is planning to open outlets in provincial towns: “Now we                           
are seeing an aggressive drive in the retail sector and one of the biggest drivers is Gulf                                 
money. These investors are scaling up retail and now they are expanding. Aziza Panda’s                           
expansion into the Delta could change things and I think it will be a big success as there                                   
are very few outlets outside of Cairo and Alexandria.”   128
 





The encompassing of new social classes and the penetration of non­corporate modes of                         
food production is inherent to this spatial expansion. Corporate food is a class system and                             
it defines consumers by their spending power. Private retail companies in Egypt are highly                           
conscious of how their pricing and advertising appeals to different social strata. A                         
manifestation of this is the explicit terminology that these companies use to describe the                           
classes they target. I encountered this in interviews and the food retail industry refers to                             
different classes by A­E, A being the most wealthy and E being the poorest. Other                             
scholars have also noticed the use of the terminology. In her study of shopping malls in                               
Cairo, Mona Abaza interviewed a manager of a mall who tried to stop working class                             
people, or “class D,” consumers from entering his outlet by instructing the security guards                           
to filter people based on their appearance, and barring those who wear traditional clothes                           
such as galabiyaa (Abaza, 2006 :278) 
   
For obvious reasons, managers of Gulf­owned corporate food retail have targeted wealthy                       
and middle class consumers, the “A” and “B” segments of Egyptian society. However the                           
industry has recently sought to expand into the food market that serves poorer consumers.                           
In the early days of its operations in Egypt, KFC was restricted to the cities of Cairo and                                   
Alexandria, and its consumers were mostly urban middle class. Since the late 1990s the                           
number of KFCs outside of the main cities increased and they are now located in smaller                               
provincial towns. In order to achieve this expansion KFC sought to create demand among                           
poorer consumers. One way this was done was through the introduction of cheaper                         
products, and the chain began offering a special sandwich for around EGP 5, which was                             
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 part of a special “economy meal” (Abdelgawwad, 2012: C­45). As a result, KFC has                           
continued to expand, and between 2012­2014, in a period when foreign investment slowed                         
down due to concerns over political instability, Americana opened 72 restaurant branches                       
in Egypt, and throughout this period the sales of its branches grew (Americana, 2012;                           
2013; 2014). 
 
Supermarkets are also accessing poorer consumers by making their products more                     
affordable. One way this can be accomplished is through the downsizing of packaging.                         
This is a strategy that has already been noted in other parts of this thesis, and it includes                                   
practices such as adding water to milk, and using cheaper ingredients. According to the                           
manager of a Gulf­owned fast food company, consumer goods multinationals have used                       
this strategy in order to penetrate markets in Egypt, and elsewhere in Africa. “There is a                               
big business here to produce smaller packs for the poor. Unilever started this. This is how                               
Procter and Gamble built a several billion dollar market in Egypt,” he said.  129
 
However the intensification of the market relations of food is limited by the resistant nature                             
of non­corporate food systems in Egypt. Social formations such as the family system of                           
food production and rural life act as barrier to the spread of corporate food retail. As is the                                   
case in most societies, food production within the family unit in Egypt is gendered. For                             
supermarkets’ position to reach a par with the Global North, the labour time of women                             
must be transferred from the unpaid labour of domestic work to wage labour, thus                           
129 Interview, Cairo November 2013. 
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 compelling a family to become more reliant on prepared and packaged food. The                         130
presence of Egyptian women in employment has sporadically increased since the 1980s,                       
especially in the private sector (Assaad: 4). In the long term this has the potential to lead to                                   
a radical restructuring of the family relations of food provision. Business reports on Egypt                           
suggest that the growing number of women in employment has resulted in an increased                           
dependence on supermarkets and the durable and packaged food that they offer.                       
According to one report: “Sales of prepared foods are growing rapidly. The increasing                         
number of working women has led to an increase in their purchasing power and the                             
demand for ready made meals,” (Maldonado and Mansour, 2010). However while this is a                           
possibility for middle class women, increased entry into the labour market for working class                           
women has often led to casual or poorly paid jobs, and reports of their increased spending                               
power should be treated with some caution. What is more likely is that the bulk of the                                 
Egyptian population will continue to rely on domestic labour for the provision of food, but                             
possibly in more complicated organisational forms, as women are forced to juggle                       
domestic work with casual labour.  
 
Other structures that limit corporate food retail are forms of distribution owned by the state,                             
and informal food sale such as street markets and kiosks. State­owned supermarkets                       
remain popular, primarily as their prices are competitive; they receive a quota of                         
130 The deepening of market relations of food and the increase in employment in 24 hour food retail was                                     
examined by Harriet Friedmann in her article “Remaking Traditions”. she argues: “Thus "traditional value                           
values" ­ symbolized by the family meal are giving ways to individual life trajectories. Family members work                                 
long and odd shifts, especially in food retail and services, and buy meals” (Friedmann, 1999: 53).   
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 commodities directly from the wholesaler and many of the items are subsidised, making                         
their products cheaper. Due to their low prices, these stores are popular, especially during                           
periods such as Ramadan, when discounts on basic commodities can be as high as 40%                             
(Euromonitor, 2016: 2). Such is the demand for these outlets, the Ministry of Supply and                             
Internal Trade is planning to open a large hypermarket that will sell state­controlled                         
discounted products.   131
 
Aside from the state­owned outlets, non­corporate forms of retail remain the main provider                         
of food for most Egyptians and they range from family owned shops to kiosks and street                               
markets. These informal forms of food retail are unlikely to be challenged by corporate                           
food retail in the near future and one aspect behind their popularity is the factor of access.                                 
Given that the majority of Egyptians do not own a car, these local sources of food are                                 
convenient and can be accessed on a daily basis, unlike a hypermarket that is often                             
located outside of a residential neighbourhood and requires vehicular transport. This has                       
been observed by other scholars. According to one study on Egypt: “Convenient here is                           
used not in any luxurious sense, but in the practical sense that many women have small                               
children to take along or to leave with people, and other women have large families, i.e.                               
need large quantities of vegetables” (Gertel and Petra 1994: 281).   
 
131 In the late 1990s the government considered privatising these outlets and in the case of one chain it                                     
rented the premises to a private chain called Edge Market, which would later be acquired by Sainsbury's                                 
(Albawaba, 2000). However their presence seems to have endured, perhaps due to the importance of their                               
role in supplying food to low­income consumers. 
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 More generally, the state subsidy system is a limit to all forms of corporate food. However,                               
as has been illustrated throughout this thesis there is interaction between Gulf­owned                       
companies and this system. For example, Carrefour retails products made by the                       
government’s Food Industries Holding Company (Ahram Online, 2014b). This extension of                     
Carrefour’s supply chain into the government­owned food industries suggests that an                     
asset of supermarkets is their ability to provide spatial access to consumers. As a sign of                               
this, one manager of a Gulf­owned supermarket said that some of Carrefour’s customers                         
buy wholesale for retail elsewhere in the country: “you can see them on a Friday, buying                               
large quantities of products for their shops in the Delta.”  132
 
The sale of government products by Carrefour represents the power of corporate food in                           
Egypt's food system. An area where supermarkets also hold significant influence is over                         
the price of food. According to Mahmoud (the manager of a Gulf­owned supermarket chain                           
who was interviewed in November 2013) government officials are concerned about                     
increases in food prices and as a result they prefer if his company avoid raising prices.                               
“There is a lot of pressure on food prices and if I put up the cost of 100 basic items than                                         
my competitors will do the same,” he said. “Inflation is an important issue. We try to                               
manage this and we consider it as a form of corporate social responsibility.” Supermarkets                           
portray themselves as managing this influence over food prices responsibly and ethically.                       
In 2014, Carrefour announced that it would fix the prices of 30 basic food items (Farid,                               
2014b). The Egyptian manager of the chain was quoted by the media as saying that the                               
policy was implemented due to the chain’s “commitment to assist the Egyptian people”                         
132 Interview, October 2013.  
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 (ibid). In response the Minister of Supply described Carrefour’s decision as reflective of the                           
private sector’s ability to play a “national role” by protecting consumers from rising prices                           
(ibid). 
 
This influence gives hypermarkets and other forms of corporate food, a negotiating chip                         
that can be used in discussions with the government, namely over the removal of the fuel                               
subsidy. The price of fuel, has an effect on the cost of food due to the increase in                                   133
transport costs, but also because of the use of fuel in other parts of food production, such                                 
as water pumps. In interviews, managers of agribusiness and food companies were                       
supportive of the government policy to reform the fuel subsidy, mostly due to their concern                             
that it is fiscally unsustainable. However, in return for not raising food prices in response to                               
an increase in fuel prices, several managers of food and agribusiness companies say that                           
the government should assist them by facilitating the issue of licenses and permits,                         
especially when it comes to building new supermarkets. One manager of a Gulf­owned                         
agribusiness company, was explicit about this in an interview in October 2013: “The cost                           
increases of diesel can be mitigated with comprehensive government measures. The cost                       
of delivering to many small outlets can raise costs by as much as 50%, and this all gets                                   
passed onto the cost of the producer. If they can help provide land and permits for these                                 
new supermarkets then it can help us deal with the cost of diesel.” 
 
Some figures in the agribusiness sector even believe that the food subsidy system should                           




subsidised commodities. This was the opinion of Karim (the advertising manager of a                         
Gulf­owned food company who was interviewed in November 2013) who argued that: “the                         
subsidy cost will not be passed to the consumer because the GDP that is freed up will go                                   
back into the economy. Our market share would increase because it would open up the                             
market to goods that we could produce that would be better than government goods and                             
only be at a slight premium.”  
 
Although this may be wishful thinking, such a discourse is taking place during a period in                               
which subsidised food continues to be the target of government cuts. In 2014 the bread                             134
subsidy was reformed, and bakeries now buy flour on the open market and are                           
compensated by the government. The food subsidy system was also changed in the same                           
year, resulting in an increase in the cost of subsidised items. Moreover, as was mentioned                             
earlier, in 2015 the state announced that it is considering privatising the Food Industries                           
Holding Company, a company with 43 subsidiaries that represents a substantial part of the                           
state food system. 
 
Another way in which Gulf­owned corporations are beginning to creep, albeit in an indirect                           
manner, into the food system of poor Egyptians, are their attempts to become involved                           
with a school meals programme that was established by the World Food Programme                         
(WFP). The scheme was started in 2011 and provides snacks and nutritional education to                           
around 67,000 children in the poorest areas of the country (WFP, 2015). The private                           
sector has already contributed to the programme and in 2015 Vodafone announced that it                           
134 See CESR (2014). 
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 had contributed US $1.2 million (ibid). According to Karim, the manager of a Gulf­owned                           
fast food company, his company had bid for a contract to provide products for the scheme.                               
“Our dairy company is trying to bid for the government school meals programme. They                           
spend 5­6 pounds (for each meal) on it and it is good for us as we get the opportunity to                                       
build the market,” he said.  135
 
Given that Gulf­owned corporate food retail is seeking to expand, many of these                         
companies has vertically integrated logistics that can link these spaces of consumption,                       
with the spaces of production that were described in previous chapters. Carrefour’s supply                         
network is one of the largest in Egypt, and the chain is estimated to have the largest                                 
amount of stock of any supermarket in the country (Gad, et al. 2014: 122). The Maadi                               
branch of the supermarket has 300 suppliers and in Alexandria its outlet has 190 (ibid).                             
The City Centre branch of the brand receives orders from 298 companies on a daily basis.                               
In a sign of the extent of Gulf capital’s accumulation in multiple aspects of the corporate                               
food system in the Middle East, Carrefour has outsourced its logistics to Agility, a Kuwaiti                             
logistics company that operates globally.   
 
The foundation of these supply chains is central to the accumulation in this sector, as it                               
allows a company such as Carrefour to position itself in the centre of the circuit of                               
commodities. The inability to establish a domestic supply chain was one of the reasons                           
why Western multinationals failed in Egypt. According to one study, Sainsbury’s relied on                         
135 The term “build the market” in this sense is a reference to the opportunity to build brand awareness and                                       
change consumer tastes. 
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 products that were imported from its warehouses in the UK, meaning that they were                           
expensive for Egyptian consumers who were also unable to recognise the foreign brands                         
(Assem and Swanberg: 4).   
 
According to Mahmoud, the employee of the European supermarket that is owned by a                           
Gulf company, establishing a supply chain saved his firm from a similar fate to                           
Sainsbury’s: “In 2003 we were close to bankrupt in Egypt. We tried to follow the way of                                 
Sainsbury’s, who made their Egyptian store the same as the one in the UK,” he said. The                                 
employee said that in response to the problems of importing supplies, his company built a                             
domestic supply network that allowed his company to cater to local tastes and manage                           
changes in currency rates. Mahmoud said: “I stopped importation because we couldn’t                       
deal with the currency fluctuation and the rotation was very slow. Now only 12­14% of our                               
goods are imported and this accounts for 20% of our sales. Egypt is a fantastic producer. It                                 
has cheap labour, a wide range of possibilities in terms of productions. We have 1700                             
items that are made in Egypt.” 
 
The establishment of supply chains by supermarkets and other retailers is a disciplinary                         
force in the corporate food system, as it forces regulations and standards in a regime                             
where regulation has become voluntary. This was expressed by Tarek Tawfik, the                       
managing director of Cairo Poultry Company, and a prominent figure within Egypt’s                       
agribusiness sector:  
 
“Food chain restaurants such as McDonalds and KFC depend on local suppliers to supply                           
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 them with food and other products, and since franchisers put specific regulations that local                           
suppliers should follow (as quality regulations), many local suppliers have been given                       
certifications as they abide to international quality standards and this gives them the right                           
and ability to export to other countries,” Tawfik said in a media interview (Samir, 2015). 
 
As a sign of the uneven nature of the reterritorialisation of scales of production, these                             
supply chains bypass smaller, non­corporate producers due to the capital investment that                       
is required to meet the standards set by supermarkets, and the scale that they require.                             
“Accessing the value chain” is a popular subject for NGOs and development agencies who                           
encourage investment in infrastructure that enables small farmers to sell their produce to                         
hypermarkets such as Carrefour. However there is little evidence that small producers                       
have been able to access such buyers. Moreover, one observation made during visits to                           
Carrefour and Spinneys hypermarkets in 2013 is that they appeared to be primarily                         
concerned with the retail of durable and processed commodities, and its sale of fresh                           
products is much less than is found in supermarkets in Europe. This may partly be due to                                 
the lack of cold transport facilities in Egypt, and also due to the self­enclosed nature of the                                 
export supply chains to the Gulf and Egypt, which bypass the Egyptian market. 
 
The establishment of supply chains embedded into domestic Egyptian production                   
represents a form of localisation. Meaning that while maintaining the same brand and                         
appearance, they also respond to local characteristics of production and taste. In turn,                         
hypermarkets’ supply chains develop the market of agribusiness companies. The logistics                     
that accompany a hypermarket supply chain, in the form of cold storage and refrigerated                           
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 transport, increase the market for the fresh products of agribusiness such as dairy and                           
meat. With this considered, the corporate food system in Egypt can only reach maturity if                             
the number of supermarkets increases. As a result all interviewees who work in                         
agribusiness companies viewed the opening of new hypermarkets as positive. 
 
This section has restated the scalar nature of the Gulf­Egypt region. While previous                         
chapters illustrated the formation of new spaces of production at the national scale, this                           
chapter has shown how Gulf investment has invested in corporate food retail that has                           
created new spaces of consumption. It should be emphasised that this process is uneven                           
and the majority of exchange within the circulation of food commodities takes place                         
outside of the corporate food system. However the non­corporate systems of food, and the                           
non­market relations of food represent potential spaces for future expansion. This will be a                           
long­term process but the fiscal crisis of the Egyptian state creates the possibility for                           
commodification of these structures of social reproduction. The suggestion that the state                       
might privatise its food industries, and the possibility of further cuts to the basket of                             





This chapter has served to illustrate Gulf capital's ownership of corporate food retail in                           
Egypt. GCC investors own some of the largest chains of supermarkets, and fast food                           
chains in the country, and this is another indicator of Gulf capital's central role in the                               
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 construction of the third food regime in Egypt. Food retail is an integral part of the                               
corporate food system as it disciplines the market by enforcing standards and practices                         
down the supply chain. In terms of supermarkets, outlets such as Carrefour have                         
embedded themselves into the Egyptian market, by localising their operations through the                       
establishment of a supply chain of Egyptian­produced goods. 
 
These investments have been mediated by the state. Relations between Gulf investors                       
and the Egyptian state have enabled supermarket chains to override the bureaucracy and                         
ensure the allocation of land for its operations. This chapter has revealed the nature of a                               
commercial relationship between one Gulf­owned supermarket chain and the Egyptian                   
military, illustrating the miscellany of relations that form the synthesis of the state­capital                         
nexus. This is a relation that is present in every stage of the supply chain that Gulf capital                                   
has invested in and it illustrates the continued role of the state in the corporate food                               
system.   
 
This chapter has also analysed the manner that Gulf capital has reshaped spaces of                           
consumption in Egypt, a further illustration of the scalar nature of the Gulf­Egypt region.                           
Through its investments in corporate food retail GCC investment has been a central force                           
in the reterritorialisation of consumption space in cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. Gulf                           
supermarket and fast food brands are also expanding into rural areas, a process that may                             
spread the market relations of food. This accumulation is limited by non­corporate food                         
and the state system of food subsidies, but there are signs that these spheres are being                               
penetrated by the corporate system. Gulf capital is also playing a role in linking these                             
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 spaces of consumption with spaces of production that were mentioned in previous                       












This thesis has sought to make an original contribution to knowledge by responding to the                             
lacunae that were indicated in the introduction. It has augmented literature on the                         
neoliberal period of Egyptian agriculture by illustrating the role of Gulf capital in the                           
transformations that have taken place since the early 1990s. It has also contributed to food                             
regime literature by illustrating the geographical formation of a region and the nature of                           
space within this region. It has also grounded food regime theory in a regional case study.                               
The thesis has contributed to literature on the political economy of the Middle East by                             
providing a industry­specific illustration of the manner that Gulf capital is transforming the                         
region's economy.  
 
This chapter will provide a summation of these findings. Firstly it will review the notion of a                                 
Gulf­Egypt region in the corporate food system. It will then provide a recap of the main                               
points that were made in the chapters of this thesis. This will be followed by broader                               







The Gulf­Egypt region is a notion that has been used to show how the relation between                               
the Gulf and Egypt forms a pole in the global corporate food system. The dynamic of this                                 
region is based on the subordinate absorption of Egyptian food and agriculture into Gulf                           
capital circuits. This has been defined on the basis of several criteria. Firstly Gulf                           
investment has capitalised the restructuring of the agribusiness sector in Egypt, and has                         
invested in the companies that form the core of the tier of corporate production. As a                               
result, Gulf capital has played a central role in the construction of the third food regime in                                 
Egypt. This production is primarily for the Egyptian market, but it is also exported to other                               
Arab states such as Libya, and future export markets may be expanded to include other                             
Arab and African countries. Secondly, Gulf capital has established a productive                     
horticultural platform, in the form of land reclamation projects that provide table crops and                           
livestock feeds for export to the GCC states. Other measures of the contours of this region                               
include shared consumption patterns and the consequence of these tastes on public                       
health. 
 
The concept of this region is intended to enrich spatial and geographic understandings of                           
the third food regime. In order to avoid reification, a scalar understanding of this space                             
reveals its multifaceted nature. The Gulf­Egypt region has been formed through new                       
scales of production in Egypt. These new spaces are represented in the spatial                         
reorganisation of agribusiness, and this is manifest in land reclamation and agro­industry.                       
These scales are in a continual state of being territorialised and reterritorialised, and they                           
allow the extraction of value to the Gulf. The Gulf­Egypt scale overlaps with other regions                             
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 and it is a regional scale within a global system. This is illustrated by the imports of large                                   
amounts of grain and other commodities to both the Gulf and Egypt.   
 
The historical roots of this region can be traced to the structural adjustment policies that                             
followed the fiscal crisis of 1988, which resulted in the state's retreat from its social                             
management of agriculture. The privatisations and free market policies that were a part of                           
the IMF’s conditions for its bailout, provided the opening for Gulf capital’s flow into the                             
sector. This was accelerated during the 2000s due to the surplus capital created by the                             
high oil price.  
 
The IMF and other international finance institutions (IFIs) created the conditions for the                         
third food regime in Egypt, and its relationship with foreign capital such as that of the Gulf,                                 
concurs with definitions of the present regime. Institutions such as the WTO provided                         
transnational governance for international capital, and have played a role in securing the                         
conditions for Gulf investment in Egypt. The IMF and WTO are a feature of an international                               
order in which the US is hegemonic. Despite the multipolarity of the third regime in terms                               
of flows of capital and commodities, and the formation of new regions bound by corporate                             
power, the role of such institutions illustrates the ongoing relevance of US power in the                             
global system. 
 
The Gulf­Egypt region has been territorialised through the state­capital relations that have                       
been illustrated throughout this thesis. Gulf capital is an adjunct to class formation in                           
Egypt, and its investment has made and remade a state­capital nexus; its accumulation                         
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 has been mediated by its relations with the state. These links constitute a mosaic and they                               
are manifest in commercial relations with the Egyptian military, shared ownership of listed                         
companies, and membership of lobbying groups. This thesis has included Gulf capital's                       
partners in Egypt within this nexus on the basis of their relations with the state. These                               
partnerships are often bound through financial markets and institutions 
 
A particular feature of the state­capital nexus, and its role in the Gulf­Egypt region, are                             
contracts that constitute state to state investments. Acquisitions of land on Toshka and                         
Sharq El Oweinat have been undertaken by Gulf state­owned companies or firms that are                           
very close to the rulers. This is a form of what McMichael described as “agro­security                             
mercantilism”, and its manifestation suggests that the formation of new regions on the                         
basis of close bilateral relations may challenge the global principles of free trade that are                             
espoused by the WTO (2013: 48). 
 
The relations that form this nexus have been subject to moments of intense contestation,                           
most noticeably in the form of the 2011 revolution. This event provided a insight into the                               
fragility of the alliances within the Gulf­Egypt region. The project of social dispossession                         
that has unfolded from the 1990s onwards was undertaken by the relations embodied in                           
the state­capital nexus and Gulf capital's accumulation shaped state formation under                     
Hosni Mubarak. The 2011 revolution offered a chance to reverse this dispossession, and                         
return management of state resources and the food system to a greater level of social                             
control. Although any such aim fell short, the emphatic role of the Gulf in supporting the                               




One of the features of previous food regimes has been their relative stability. In the                             
Gulf­Egypt region this has been managed by the alliance between the elites of the Gulf                             
and Egypt, and the hegemony of the US’ defence of free trade. Although the 2011                             
revolution may have briefly disrupted this stability, the reconfiguration of the alliance based                         
on President Sisi may sustain the region for sometime in the future. Certainly, large                           
conglomerates such as Savola and Al Marai appear to be committed to the Egyptian                           
market and plan further investment to their operations, as discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
However the fractures that may challenge this alliance are conspicuous in the deterioration                         
of social conditions in Egypt. One sentinel is the rising levels of food insecurity and                             
malnutrition, especially as the 2016 flotation of the Egyptian pound has made food imports                           
more expensive. An indicator of the political importance of this issue is the slogan of the                               
Arab revolution “bread, freedom and justice”. The Gulf­Egypt region is antithetical to food                         
sovereignty in Egypt, and its neoliberal ethos leaves food security to the management of                           
the international market. Attempts at self­sufficiency have not been prioritised, and this is                         
manifest in the government's neglect of the smallholder sector since the 1990s. The                         
Egyptian resources that could be utilised by smallholder farmers in an attempt to develop                           
self­sufficient food security have been grabbed by corporate agribusiness. The tier of                       
corporate production, which has been partly capitalised by the Gulf, has extended its                         
control over resources such as land and water, and its products are affordable for a                             
minority of Egyptian consumers. Politically these agribusiness companies have been given                     
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privileged treatment and the influence of agribusiness companies has advanced as that of                         
smallholders has retreated. The marginalisation of small farmers is best illustrated in the                         
differential social relations behind desert reclamation projects such as Toshka. Gulf                     
investors receive subsidised resources for the production of export crops while                     
smallholders struggle in the chaotic fluctuations of the free market, amid declining levels of                           
state support.  
 
The control of these resources by regional Gulf agribusiness conglomerates has taken                       
place amid a crisis for smallholder farmers in Egypt and this is manifest in the emergence                               
of urban slums in Cairo. The levels of poverty and food insecurity form the material basis                               
for future revolts and although there appears to be a moment of stability as a result of the                                   
oppressive rule of President Sisi, this remains a period of contestation, and as a result                             
there is always the possibility of progressive advance. According to Friedmann: ​“Times of                         
contention offer real choices of direction. More than one compromise is always possible.                         
Social movements play a key role both in unfolding crisis and in emerging relations of                             
wealth and power,” (Friedmann, 2005: 234). 
 
Another limit to the corporate food regime in Egypt is environmental. The corporate food                           
system has opened the frontier of desert reclamation projects and their access to water                           
resources. But the future of this resource is not certain. These projects are an example of                               
the increased pressure on the hydrology of the Nile Basin as a result of population growth                               
and agriculture. The construction of a dam in Ethiopia, which will be completed in 2017,                             
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 also raises the prospect that Egypt’s control over the Nile will be weakened. The use of                               
groundwater for export agribusiness is myopic, partly because it appears that there is a                           
dearth of knowledge on these non­renewable resource. This is pertinent given that these                         
resources could serve as a national reservoir that can safeguard a level of self­sufficiency                           







Financial markets and institutions have granted Gulf capital access to Egypt's food sector.                         
Although not all investments made by Gulf companies have taken place through financial                         
markets in Egypt, a significant proportion have. As a result these markets are the basis of                               
the architecture of the Gulf­Egypt region, and they have facilitated the cross­border                       
ownership structures and partnerships that place the GCC at the core of accumulation in                           
this regional space. 
 
A corollary of this has been organisational. Capitalisation through financial markets                     
provided the funds for vertical integration. The structure of transnational transfer provided                       
by private equity, resulted in the food and agriculture sector becoming highly capitalised                         
during the 2000s, and surplus capital was channelled into this sector. Another major                         
consequence of this process has been temporal. The private equity firms discussed in this                           
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 chapter have sought to rapidly return capital to shareholders, and therefore aim to acquire                           
and restructure companies, and then resell them. Stock markets also offer a similar                         
temporal gain, in that they provide a structure for capitalisation and return of profit that is                               
unavailable elsewhere.  
 
This chapter also illustrated the role of private equity in applying the principle of exchange                             
value to the management of food. This has abstracted food and agribusiness, and has                           
meant that companies are often traded rather than subject to long­term investment; land is                           
valorised by its exchange value, and this was illustrated in this chapter.   
 
Egypt's food sector has been rapidly capitalised through financial structures. However, as                       
a result of the temporal fluidity offered by financial markets, capital can also be quickly                             
divested from the sector. This raises the prospect that the absorption of food and                           
agriculture into financial markets could destabilise productivity, especially in the event of a                         
political or economic shock. This is especially tenable given that finance may be attracted                           
to the agriculture sector due to the lower level of fixed investment relative to other                             
productive sectors. The potential for speculative bubbles that is inherent to financial                       
markets is a risk, and this is particularly pertinent given the concentration of agricultural                           
assets that are held by private equity companies and firms listed on the stock market.   
 
Gulf capital’s financial transfer into Egyptian food and agriculture is a characteristic of the                           
neoliberal period, in which finance capital has played a increased role in social                         
reproduction. The role of financial markets in social reproduction also grants it an influence                           
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 over the nature of state intervention. This is a dynamic that has enhanced capital’s                           
influence over the state. This is particularly the case where the shares of state­owned food                             
companies listed on the Egyptian stock market have been acquired by Gulf investors,                         
creating a material partnership between the Egyptian state and Gulf capital. 
 
The nature of financial markets and their role in Gulf capital’s internationalisation into                         
Egyptian food does not directly constitute a form of financialisation. Gulf capital’s                       
accumulation through the structures of private equity and stock markets are directly tied to                           
production. There is little sign of food conglomerates entering financial services, and                       
derivatives are generally not present in the Egyptian food market, although this may                         
happen in the future. One aspect of financialisation is considered to manifest itself in the                             
style of management, although this research did not make any assessment of this.       
 
The relationship between food and financial markets in the Arab region is one that requires                             
further research. In Europe the increasing absorption of agriculture into financial circuits                       
has been cited as a cause of the decline in the rate of investment in the sector. However in                                     
Egypt it is still hard to discern whether there has been a decline in the rate of investment,                                   
despite the increase in short­term management strategies, and the extraction of profit                       
through restructuring. In my research there is evidence that companies that have been                         
acquired by private equity companies, partially or otherwise, received investment that                     
allowed them to expand their capacity and productivity. This topic would benefit from a                           
quantitative study on the rate of investment in all agribusiness acquired by finance. One                           
inference is the possibility that Global South countries such as Egypt are at an earlier                             
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 stage in the development of a corporate food system, in which there is a higher level of                                 
investment. Whether this is a cyclical process that features a decrease in investment as                           
the sector matures remains to be seen. This question is particularly important given that                           
the food price crisis of 2007­2008 is taken by some to represent a signal crisis of capital                                 





The reclamation projects that were described in Chapter Four are a characteristic of the                           
“land grab” phenomenon that is a feature of the third food regime. Although many Egyptian                             
companies were involved in this process, Gulf capital was a central component in the                           
biggest projects, such as Toshka and Sharq El Oweinat. These New Lands represent a                           
productive land base for a supply chain for industrial processors, and are a source of                             
high­value export table crops. The state’s policy of allocating areas of desert land to                           
agribusiness for reclamation facilitated the development of the corporate food system. In                       
the words of one interviewee this process was an “agent of change” and it allowed                             
agribusiness to bypass the social, environmental, and spatial limitations of the traditional                       
agricultural areas of the Nile Valley. As a result of their role in the supply chain, the                                 
opening of these new lands, and the water resources that they rely on, has been behind                               
the restructuring of a nationally integrated agriculture. This articulated production at the                       
national scale features some particular characteristics; its integration of the supply chain                       




A feature of Gulf investment in these projects is the “food security” rhetoric that                           
accompanies them. As was outlined in Chapter Four, the Gulf companies behind the                         
projects often present their activities as being universally benevolent and underwritten by a                         
social purpose. This manifests itself in their promotional material, and is also assisted by                           
the discourse on food security that has been sponsored by the Gulf states. However there                             
is very little evidence that these projects serve the non­market food security of Egypt;                           
rather these projects are the base for supply chains for agro­industry in the Gulf and                             
Egypt.  
 
The rising investment in these land projects is driven by a policy change in the Gulf states                                 
(particularly in Saudi Arabia) over state support for domestic agriculture. Following the                       
depletion of groundwater supplies, countries such as Saudi Arabia are supporting the                       
offshoring of food supplies. In this context the projects described in Chapter Four are part                             
of a spatial fix that allows the Gulf states to manage the rising cost of food and safeguard                                   
their political stability. The role of offshore platforms in food security are an illustration of                             
the manner that social reproduction in the nation state is permeated, and is increasingly                           
reliant on scales of space that transcend national borders.  
 
These projects illustrate the nature of the relationship between Gulf capital and the                         
Egyptian state. Firstly, the state mediated accumulation by providing resources for these                       
projects; pertinent given the differential that exists between this intervention and the                       
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 decreasing support for small farmers. The examples of Toshka and Sharq El Oweinat                         
represent the diversity of the alliance between Gulf capital and the state, and these                           
projects illustrate how the state capital nexus is made, and remade through the flow of Gulf                               
investment. Gulf capital is mediated by state institutions whose power is reproduced by                         
this role. In the case of Toshka, Gulf investors secured access to Egyptian resources and                             
it ingratiated itself with the presidential executive, positioning themselves for privatisations.                     
Hosni Mubarak was able to use the involvement of high­profile figures such as Al­Waleed                           
bin Talal Al­Saud in order advance a project that was important to the legitimacy of his                               
regime.   
 
These projects are segregated from the traditional areas of agricultural production, and                       
their remote desert location makes them difficult to access. In the case of Sharq El                             
Oweinat, its management by the military has resulted in its securitisation. This                       
foreignisation of space has frustrated public scrutiny and there is a dearth of information or                             
public awareness regarding these projects; significant given the acquisition of water                     
resources on a large scale that is inherent in these plans. These schemes set a precedent                               
for hydrological management and raise the prospect of continued rerouting of water away                         
from smallholder agriculture to agribusiness. This is especially important given the growing                       
pressure on the Nile River that will be created by dams and population growth. With this in                                 
mind, further research and activism should focus on these land reclamation projects in                         
order to raise public awareness and challenge their social segregation.  
 
As was argued by Sassen, the mode of these projects is at odds with the depiction of                                 
280 
 neo­colonialism that can be represented in the land grab discourse (2013). In the case of                             
Egypt, the state, particularly the presidential office and the military, has been a willing                           
agent in these projects regardless of the fact that they represent questionable social                         
benefit to the population. Indeed, Gulf capital was not the primary actor in seizing these                             
resources although it was a beneficiary. With this in mind, a potential characteristic of the                             
multipolarity of the current food regime is that dispossession has become more of an                           





Gulf capital has been central to the restructuring of agro­industry. GCC investment                       
enabled the industrialisation of the sector and its companies feature the largest market                         
shares and most expansive operations. In Chapter Five, this was illustrated in three                         
agribusiness sub­sectors: processing, poultry and dairy. Gulf investment in agro­industry                   
and processing has contributed to a sector that shares many characteristics that were                         
outlined in food regime literature. Capital intensive processors and industrial farms                     
produce commodities. The power relations of their stakeholders grants them control over                       
resources through vertical integration and influence over government policy. In many                     
cases, this integration is a dialectic between formalisation and deformalisation, as the                       
corporate food system relies on vertical integration and vertical disintegration, whereby                     
companies acquire commodities from smaller farms. Another feature of this nexus is the                         
superweed effect of the unforeseen biological consequences of the intensive nature of this                         
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 farming. In the case of poultry farms, Avian Flu has played a role in creating a market for                                   
capital intensive farms as their ability to offer biosecurity has allowed them to survive and                             
grow following the attempt at a cull in 2006.    
 
This industrial development qualifies Egypt as a New Agricultural Country (NAC) (Dixon,                       
2013a). However, given Gulf capital’s role in the industrial restructuring that secured its                         
status as a NAC, this thesis would locate the emergence of the NAC as predicated on the                                 
Gulf­Egypt region. As a result, the restructuring of agro­industry and accumulation occurs                       
at the regional scale and the determination of industrial development as a national process                           
can obfuscate the regional nature of a NAC.   
 
The state has been a central actor in the restructuring of agro­industry. In addition to the                               
class relations evident in the Gulf and Egyptian shareholders of these companies, the                         
state­capital nexus has been institutionalised in the form of lobbying groups that secure                         
the mediation of the Egyptian state. This influence and access to government policy is not                             
mirrored in the smallholder sector, and smaller farmers have to struggle within the free                           
market amid declining state support. The state also has a modernist and productivist bias                           
toward agribusiness, which it considers as a safe and modern source of food.  
 
Another consequence of the capitalisation from the Gulf has been the deepening of the                           
spatial and social segregation between industrial farming and smallholder agriculture. The                     
outbreak of diseases such as Avian Flu and the failure of the government to prevent the                               
overcrowding of poultry farms has meant that the largest companies are seeking to push                           
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 deeper into the desert, further away from population centres of the Nile Valley. In a similar                               
manner to the process of reclaiming land, this is a spatial shift that is a response of                                 
capitalist farming to the environmental crisis of the traditional rural areas. This is                         
represented by a perception that the Nile Valley is polluted, chaotic, and exhausted.  
 
The social corollary of this is similar to that of land reclamation projects and may result in                                 
the increased alienation of the labour force. On large poultry farms such as Cairo Poultry                             
Company, workers live on site in dormitories and are separated from their families and                           
communities. Labour on these farms have previously been exposed to Avian Flu and in                           
some cases the ongoing risk of further outbreaks mean that workers are confined to farms                             
for long periods. Given the likelihood that employees on poultry farms face intense and                           
harsh conditions, this subject would benefit from further research, especially in light of the                           
history of strikes and also the reports that children are employed on these farms. Chapter                             
Five also argued that this spatial reorganisation has formed new spaces that have                         
enhanced control over production and allowed heightened accumulation in the Gulf­Egypt                     
region.   
 
A central component in Gulf capital’s accumulation in the agro­industrial sector are the low                           
wages of Egyptian labour. Although all stages of the supply chain base accumulation on                           
the low cost of Egyptian labour, agro­industry features the largest workforces. The                       
government is intent on maintaining this low cost of labour, and successive governments                         
since 2011 have resisted pressure from unions and activists to introduce a minimum wage.                           
This is an insight into the absence of a social agenda within the government’s                           
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 development plan, which appears to be focussed on industrialisation and foreign                     
investment at the expense of social development.   
 
In the same context, although there are many examples of capitalisation resulting in the                           
introduction of technology and modernisation to agro­industry, in the long­term the low                       
cost of labour may limit such investment, as it removes an economic incentive to automise                             
the factory line and reduce the cost of wage labour. This contradicts the claim of some                               
government officials that foreign investment results in technology transfer, and companies                     
have little incentive to improve the skills of their workers or invest in their long­term                             
fulfilment.  
 
The condition of workers and their exploitation is pertinent given the high levels of poverty                             
that exist in Egypt. This deprivation is a cause of food insecurity, and the sustained                             
reliance of many Egyptians on government food subsidies is an indicator of the way in                             
which the state compensates for the conditions that allow the accumulation of private                         
capital. This represents a contradictory and unsustainable system where corporate food’s                     
inability to produce cheap food, and the social corollaries of cheap labour and                         
dispossession, creates a fiscal burden in the form of food subsidies. This system does not                             
serve universal food security; workers and their nutritional needs have been marginalised. 
 
The low­income of a large number of Egyptians creates a market for agro­industry’s                         
relatively low­cost durable and denatured products. This is a process of bifurcation. While                         
wealthier consumers can afford the fresh and higher­quality products of agro­industry such                       
284 
 as milk, cheese, and poultry, poorer consumers access low­quality products of the same                         
companies. In this context consumers in the Gulf­Egypt region are defined by class as                           





Gulf capital owns some of the biggest supermarket and fast food operations in Egypt and it                               
has been responsible for the introduction of Western brands such as Carrefour and KFC.                           
The role of Gulf investors in the establishment of these names confirms the regional nature                             
of the corporate food regime in Egypt. These internationalised Western brands entered                       
into partnerships with Gulf companies, who acquired them and capitalised their expansion                       
into markets such as Egypt. 
 
Supermarkets and fast food chains are an indicator of the manner that the corporate food                             
system incorporates the entire supply chain, from farm gate to the consumer.                       
Supermarkets have established their own domestic supply chains and distribution                   
networks, and fast food retail companies such as Americana have vertically integrated                       
supplies. These supply chains were essential for the establishment of corporate retail                       
operations in Egypt, and they have disciplined suppliers by enforcing quality controls in a                           
voluntary regulatory environment, a hallmark of the corporate system. This is significant                       
given that one of the reasons behind the failed attempts of other companies to operate in                               




Supermarkets have not obtained the same pivotal control over the corporate food system                         
that they occupy in the West. In Egypt, corporate retail of food accounts for a minority of                                 
Egyptian consumers and the majority continue to access commodities through other forms                       
of retail such as the state system, or more informal sources such as street markets and                               
neighbourhood shops. However the system of food retail cannot be simply categorised;                       
some consumers are likely to access food from all of these sources, and stores such as                               
Carrefour act as wholesale retailers for smaller shops.       
 
The research on Gulf­investment in supermarkets revealed the role of the Egyptian military                         
in the operations of supermarket chains. This is an example of the tendency of                           
high­ranking officers to capitalise upon their influence and act as gatekeepers to the                         
Egyptian economy. The importance of the military also derives from its control over land,                           
and although this is an opaque subject, this is a characteristic that is important to                             
supermarket investments.     
 
Gulf capital’s introduction of Western brands has played a role in changing consumer                         
tastes and practices in Egypt. Over time, Gulf­owned supermarket chains and fast food                         
brands formed a central part of the landscape of the new suburbs that were constructed                             
around Cairo. As a result, they represented symbols that form a part of the lifestyles                             
afforded by Egypt’s affluent classes, and aspired to by others. The entrance of these                           
brands into the Egyptian market was accompanied by a campaign of marketing and                         
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 advertising, which created a demand for their products. These strategies stratified                     
Egyptian consumers on the basis of class and targeted them with products of differing                           
quality, a demonstration of the bifurcation of diet within the corporate system. 
 
Chapter Six considered the significance of this influence over Egyptian culture and                       
proposed that in light of the rising economic and political power of the Gulf states in Egypt,                                 
this type of influence constitutes a form of hegemony on behalf of the GCC. The modality                               
of this hegemony requires further research, but within the agribusiness and food sector                         
there are indicators of a hegemonic influence. However this is a contradictory process. It is                             
possible that many Egyptian consumers do not associate these brands with the Gulf states                           
but rather with the West, thus undermining their role in projecting the Gulf’s image in                             
Egypt. Moreover consumer tastes are capricious, and there appears to be an emerging                         
demand for “local” products, which conflict with Western brands. In light of this any                           
hegemony that has been accumulated by the Gulf as a result of their investments may be                               
ephemeral. 
 
This research also identified the influence over food prices held by supermarkets such as                           
Carrefour. This grants these companies leverage, and the agribusiness sector is pushing                       
to utilise this influence by securing government commitment in the form of building                         
licenses, and bureaucratic compliance with the opening of new supermarkets. Corporate                     
food retail is essential to other forms of corporate food production as it expands their                             
market in a manner that would be more limited in other forms of provisioning. This                             
leverage over food prices held by supermarkets and corporate food production could                       
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 possibly be expanded in the future, and there is some interest within agribusiness                         
companies in penetrating production of the food subsidy system. This is just one example                           
of the possibility that the corporate system may be expanded, and the manner that other                             
systems of food represent potential markets that could be opened for further accumulation.  
 
While the previous chapters illustrated the creation of new spaces of production, Chapter                         
Six analysed the emergence of scales of consumption. Gulf capital has intensified                       
corporate food retail to Egypt's urban environment, and it is also expanding these forms of                             
consumption into rural areas. Its logistical operations are linking these spaces with the                         







There is a tension between the corporate food regime and other food systems in Egypt.                             
Although corporations control large shares of the food commodities market as well as the                           
resources required for their production, this cohabits with a food system that is controlled                           
by the state. However the state system is being subordinated by the corporate regime. As                             
was illustrated in previous chapters, private capital’s dominance is indicated by the                       
acquisition of shares in state­owned food companies, and this is a process that may be                             
intensified in future years. Given the endurance of the state system and the dependency                           
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 on food subsidies amongst large sections of the population, the corporate regime has not                           
remedied food insecurity. With this in mind, a inference that can be made from the                             
presence of the state­controlled system is that beyond Western Europe and the US, the                           
third food regime is more diverse in terms of its modalities and forms of state intervention. 
 
In addition to the state system, there is also a tension between the corporate system and                               
the informal agricultural economy, a term used here to describe the very large and opaque                             
area of production that falls between that of the state and corporations. The term informal                             
here is problematic considering that this tier of production is responsible for the production                           
of a significant quantity of commodities, which feature their own supply chains and forms                           
of distribution. Moreover, considering that this sub­sector of food and agriculture employs                       
millions of people, the term informal does not encapsulate its value and importance within                           
Egypt. Although as has been briefly discussed within the thesis, the state does not                           
prioritise this tier of production, especially at the smallholder level and therefore the term                           
informal has some accuracy. Regardless, corporate food depends on this sphere, both as                         
a market for its products and as a source for its supply chains. This was illuminated by                                 





One of the areas that was included within the frame of analysis of this thesis was the role                                   
of international NGOs. The decision to include NGOS within this frame was based on the                             
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 expectation that these institutions would be a source of information and insight on the state                             
of agriculture and agribusiness in Egypt. In terms of the specific role of the GCC states in                                 
forming the corporate food system in Egypt the involvement of NGOs is minimal, simply                           
because there are very few NGOs that originate from the Gulf countries. This is excluding                             
the role of Gulf aid and also the financing of research institutions and think tanks that have                                 
highlighted the food insecurity of the Gulf states, as was described in Chapter Four. On a                               
more general level many international NGOs and IFIs that are funded by Western                         
countries have played an important role in advocating policies that have constructed the                         
corporate food system in Egypt and these organisations have benefited Gulf capital by                         
creating the conditions of accumulation in Egypt. One of the most consequential strategies                         
has been to argue that small farmers can improve their standard of living through “access                             
to the market”, facilitating their entry into the agribusiness supply chain. For example, one                           
project which was undertaken by United Nations Development Programme with funding                     
from the Spanish government aimed at creating “viable equitable partnerships between                     
small farmers and private sector investors” in Upper Egypt (UNDP, 2016). These types of                           
programmes have played a role in encouraging the logic that the market can act as an                               
agent of development within rural communities in Egypt. Another strategy that enforces                       
this logic is the provision of microfinance in Egypt, which encourages competitive                       
participation in the market among small farmers (Malak and Salem, 2017).  
 
The role of NGOs in the construction of a corporate food system in which Gulf capital is                                 
heavily invested, is an indicator of the importance of Western institutions in applying                         
policies that are of benefit to accumulation of capital in general. This is a topic that would                                 
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 be a potential area of future research and while there is evidence of NGOs pursuing                             





What comparative remarks can be made about other capitals that have constructed the                         
corporate system? European multinationals such as Danone and Heinz have also invested                       
in Egyptian agribusiness and some of these companies control large market shares.                       
European states also import horticultural products from Egypt, and this has provided a                         
market for large Egyptian companies. With this considered, why does this relationship not                         
also constitute part of a region within the corporate food regime? A primary difference                           
between European and Gulf agribusiness capital is that European companies have a more                         
global presence, and Egypt constitutes a small market for these firms, given that they have                             
invested in multiple countries in the Global South. By comparison, for many Gulf                         
agribusiness conglomerates, Egypt is one of the biggest markets outside of the Gulf                         
Cooperation Council (GCC) states and is a source of significant revenue.  
 
There are also other distinctions between Gulf and European capital. European capital is                         
reliant on institutional relations in the form of state­state agreements such as                       
Euro­Mediterranean Free Trade Area (Euromed). Such free trade agreements open the                     
Egyptian market to European capital and commodities, and have established a framework                       
for the accumulation of European capital across the Mediterranean region. In comparison,                       
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 Gulf capital’s institutional relation is more inconspicuous, and the role of the Gulf states in                             
securing the conditions for accumulation through agreements, and other arrangements, is                     
less clear. The Gulf states have political influence in Egypt as a result of aid transfers, but                                 
the relation of this to the interests of GCC businesses is opaque.  
 
However, although it is less clearly defined in an institutional form, the social relations of                             
the Gulf­Egypt region is formed on a pivotal alliance between Gulf capital and the Egyptian                             
elite, which is not matched by European capital. In addition to close coordination with the                             
Egyptian state, this alliance has been formed as a result of enduring partnerships between                           
capitalists in both countries. As an indicator of the power of this political fulcrum, European                             
corporates such as Heinz and Carrefour have sought to partner with Gulf companies due                           
to their ability to act as a local partner, which can allow them to operate in the Egyptian                                   
market.    
 
Another distinction is that European capital is less embedded into the Egyptian system and                           
multinationals have only invested in the agro­industrial sector. For example, no European                       
companies have acquired land on reclamation projects, although Egyptian companies that                     
export to European markets are present on these projects. This is possibly due to the fact                               
that Gulf capital seeks direct control of land. This may be because of the food security                               
rhetoric that has created a policy atmosphere that legitimise such investments. It may also                           
be because European companies are more comfortable with their reliance on the market                         
as a mechanism for the acquisition of import commodities. European companies are also                         
subject to higher levels of regulation, and are therefore less free to enter relationships with                             
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 parts of the Egyptian state such as the military, especially in cases that involve overt                             
corruption and bribery. Moreover the political overtone of Al­Waleed bin Talal’s investment                       
in Toshka that was discussed in Chapter Four would be of little advantage to European                             
agribusiness corporates. 
 
However, the technology and practices that define the corporate food regime originate in                         
Europe and the US, and GCC investors have relayed these into Egypt. This process is                             
exemplified by Gulf capital's acquisition of animal breeds, technologies, and Western                     
brands such as Carrefour and KFC. This is representative of a multipolar system of global                             
capitals that has internationalised uniform agribusiness and food practices leading to an                       
increasingly homogeneous global diet. It also illustrates that these new regions have                       
entrenched dependency on those multinational companies that operate at the global scale.                       
These Western multinationals retain the technology that lies behind the corporate food                       
regime, such as seeds and chemicals. Multinationals such as Bayer, Dupont and                       





This thesis has submitted that the Gulf­Egypt relationship constitutes a region in the                         
corporate food regime. But how will this include other countries in the Middle East, and                             
what are its prospects for future expansion? Other non­Gulf countries in the Arab region                           
and the Middle East have been absorbed into the capital circuits of Gulf­owned food                           
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 conglomerates. Savola and Americana are active across the region, both in terms of                         
exporting commodities and establishing productive operations. Smaller domestic               
producers in these countries are becoming subsumed by Gulf conglomerates as they                       
cannot produce on the same scale, and have not internationalised to the same extent.                           
Perhaps most importantly, most Arab countries do not have the same agro­ecological                       
diversity, and do not have an integrated national agriculture on the same scale as Egypt.                             
Moreover the political turmoil that erupted following 2011 has limited agro­industrial                     
expansion in many Arab states. The market in Syria and Libya has contracted significantly                           
as a result of civil conflicts. Another limitation is the fact that countries such as Lebanon                               
and Jordan constitute small markets as a result of their demographics. Other larger states                           
such as Iran and Algeria have substantial populations but foreign investment in these                         
countries for Gulf capital is more complex than Egypt. Iran is not politically amenable to                             
Gulf investment and Algeria is an unliberalised economy.  136
 
With these limitations considered, the role of Egypt as a central strategic state in a regional                               
corporate food system that is dominated by the Gulf becomes more apparent. Few                         
countries in the region offer the demographic size, scale of land and water resources,                           
cheap labour, and relative political stability that can allow the intensive accumulation of                         
Gulf capital in the agriculture and food sector. With this in mind there is increasing                             
incentive for heightened internationalisation into the sector, and the development of Egypt                       
into an industrial agribusiness producer for the entire region. Some of this production will                           
also be undertaken in the Gulf, as is the case in the dairy industry that has been                                 
136 Despite this it should be noted that Savola has invested in both of these countries.  
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 established by Al Marai in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf states ability to access new sources of                               
cheap labour in Asia and other Global South states will facilitate further development of                           
this agro­industry. However Egypt will remain an important source of raw inputs for this                           
industry, primarily due to the country's proximity to Gulf markets. 
 
Another potential area of expansion, both in terms of production and consumer markets, is                           
sub­Saharan Africa. The investment strategy of private equity firm Qalaa Capital in East                         
African countries such as Kenya, has given an insight into the role that Egypt could play as                                 
a route for Gulf capital into Africa. This has also been indicated by the activities of Gulf                                 
investors in other Nile basin countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia, who have sought to                             
establish agribusiness farms and processors in these states. However so far there is little                           
sign that Gulf conglomerates can obtain the same position that they have in Egypt, or                             
other states in the Middle East. The first stage of such a plan would be the establishment                                 
of infrastructure through the Nile Valley and this would depend on overcoming the                         
geographies and politics of Sudan and South Sudan. So far any plans for such a scheme                               
have not come to fruition. Although this would be a logical step for Gulf conglomerates, it                               137





137 One project that would facilitate transport infrastructure through Sudan is Agrogate, which involved the                             
construction of a new road between Egypt and Sudan and the development of two million feddans of                                 
agricultural land as well as a free zone and mining operations (Abdelaziz, 2013). However so far the project                                   
has not broken ground. 
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 Given that Gulf capital is heavily invested in Egypt’s food and agriculture as well as other                               
sectors such as real estate and finance, how do these interests manifest themselves in the                             
foreign policy of the Gulf states? During the course of my research in 2013 I spent several                                 
weeks in the UAE and Qatar conducting research on this question, but was frustrated by                             
the lack of transparency and opaque nature of policy making. Many interviewees                       
considered it likely that the commercial interests of the biggest Gulf capitalists were                         
represented in their country’s foreign policy, although others considered formal foreign                     
policy to be slow­paced and unconcerned with commercial interests. Recent aid and                       
investment packages that have been granted to Egypt by the UAE and Saudi Arabia do                             
appear to be attached to commercial conditions, although these are hard to discern. This                           
is an relationship that could change in the future and is a potential topic of future research.  
 
One explanation to this question can be found within a Marxian understanding of the state,                             
one which defines the state as an “institutional relation of class” that holds little autonomy                             
(Hanieh, 2011: 14). This is particularly pertinent given that the Gulf companies invested in                           
Egypt’s food and agriculture sector are often owned by members of the ruling families, or                             
capitalists who have acted as partners and significant constituents of the region’s                       
monarchies. As a result, a methodology based on the assumption of a dichotomous                         
relationship between foreign policy and commercial interests is erroneous. This is enforced                       
by the cases that have been outlined in this thesis. As an example, Al­Waleed bin Talal’s                               
investment in Toshka was a result of a direct relationship between himself and Mubarak,                           
and did not take place through the formal channels of the two countries’ foreign ministries.                             




Another question that arose during this research that extends beyond food and agriculture                         
is the nature of neoliberalism and the state in Egypt. This thesis has been careful to avoid                                 
a simplistic depiction of the state retreating from the economy, and it has emphasised that                             
the state plays a central role through its mediation. What is clear is that the state has                                 
retreated from its social management of the agrarian economy, a process best                       
demonstrated by policies such as the removal of rent controls for tenant farmers that was                             
encapsulated in Law 96. However in terms of private capital the state remains a vital actor,                               
and a striking aspect of Gulf investment in the sector has been its reliance on the state’s                                 
intervention in all stages of the supply chain.  
 
This continued role of the state concurs with understandings of neoliberalism that portray                         
the state as a central actor, and not oppositional to the market (Baylis et al, 2013). State                                 
intervention continues but it has been transformed to prioritise the accumulation of private                         
capital. Moreover its social intervention has also continued in some forms, especially those                         
that ensure the reproduction of conditions required for accumulation. Egypt’s food subsidy                       
system allows the state to manage political stability amid growing levels of poverty and                           
deprivation, which have been a consequence of neoliberal accumulation. The food subsidy                       
system facilitates the reproduction of labour, and allows the state to compensate for the                           




 In a related point, the corporate food system is historically evolved, and it was founded on                               
a state system of food provisioning. The depiction of the state’s food subsidy system as                             
ineffectual should not overshadow the fact that it remains a vital source of food for millions                               
of Egyptians, the considerable inefficiencies that it incorporates notwithstanding. This is a                       
reality that should be reiterated in light of the policy recommendations that apply further                           
privatisations and free market reforms. The increasing budget deficit of the Egyptian state                         
is leading to calls for continued cuts to the food subsidy system and other forms of social                                 





At this point I will return to the issue that was raised at the beginning of this thesis. Given                                     
that Egypt is a country with a rich agricultural sector that employs millions of people, why is                                 
food insecurity and malnutrition a persistent problem? This thesis has responded to this                         
question by drawing attention to the transformation that has taken place in Egypt's food                           
and agriculture sector since the 1990s, one that is manifest in the formation of the                             
Gulf­Egypt region. Through direct investment and financial markets, Gulf capital has                     
internationalised into Egypt, resulting in the absorption of Egypt's agricultural production                     
into Gulf capital's circuits of accumulation. While the companies that dominate these                       
circuits may only account for a minority of Egypt's agricultural production, they have been                           
granted disproportionate access to resources, and have defined the provision of its                       
commodities on the basis of class. The scalar nature of this region has created new                             
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 spaces of production and consumption in Egypt that have heightened accumulation, and                       
intensified the extraction of value.  
 
As a result of these scales of space the use value of food has been obscured. Farmers                                 
and workers produce food they do not eat, and the value of the food that they produce is                                   
not defined by their labour or skill. Rather value is defined elsewhere in the supply chain;                               
through the application of technology that creates the appearance of modernity and safety,                         
through the transport to places of consumption, and through processing into other forms of                           
commodities. At the centre of this process is corporate food's ability to link these spaces of                               
production and consumption, and this is embodied in the Gulf­Egypt region. As was noted                           
by van der Ploeg: “exchange value resides in, and is created through, the combination and                             
reproduction of places of wealth and places of poverty,” (van der Ploeg, 2008: 25). As a                               
result, food insecurity, and poverty, is innate to the Gulf­Egypt region as it is founded on                               
the extraction of value through these scales. As a result, this momentary space in the                             














Name of company  Date listed on Egyptian       
bourse 
Gulf shareholding 
Ajwa for Food     
Industries 
 
Ajwa owns frozen     
vegetable and   
cooking oil factories. 
1995  The majority shareholder is Saudi         
businessman Mohammed bin Issa       
Al­Jaber who owns 61.62% of the           
company. 
Mansourah Poultry  1995  Mansourah’s largest shareholder is       
Sharkia National Company for Food         
Security (see below). 
Sharkia National   





1995  SNCFS is partly owned by a Saudi             





describes itself as     
the largest integrated     
company in Egypt     
and it is estimated to         
control about 20% of       
the market 
1995  The majority shareholder is Dallah Al           
Baraka Group, owned by Jeddah         
businessman Kamel Abdullah Saleh       
and his family. 
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 Upper Egypt Flour     
Mill  
1996  Upper Egypt Flour Mills is partly           
owned by regional private equity         
company Amwal Al Khaleej, through         
its Arab Cotton Ginning subsidiary,         
which owns 9.98%. The majority         
shareholder is the     
government­owned food industries     
company. 




produces 1 million     
tonnes of grain a       
year 





CPC is one of the         
largest poultry   
companies in Egypt 
1996  The majority shareholder is the         
Kharafi family. 
Egyptian Starch and     
Glucose 
1996  Through its subsidiaries, Americana,       
the food conglomerate owned by the           
Kharafi Group, owns more than 90%           
of the company. 
Arab Dairy Company  2001  Arab Dairy Company was owned by           
the family of Kamal Adham, the           
former head of Saudi state security,           
until it was sold in March 2015. The               
company is now owned by Pioneer           
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 Holdings, a a fund that is based in               
Egypt which includes Saudi investors. 
National Company   
for Maize Products     
(NCMP) 
2006  NCMP is partly owned by Abu Dhabi             





2010  The majority shareholder of INFI is           
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt is           
owned by Saudi prince Mohammed         
Faisal Al­Saud 




Produces a range of       
food products 
2011  Univert’s majority shareholder is UAE         
company Al­Samh 




2012  A minority shareholder in Atlas is Misr             
Financial Investments Company,     
which is owned by a number of banks               
including Ahli United Bank in Bahrain.           










































Gozour is the agribusiness holding         
company of Qalaa Holdings,       
formerly known as Citadel Capital.         
Qalaa is based in Cairo 
 
The company features a number of           
Gulf investors including members of         
the Abu Dhabi royal family and the             
Saudi Olayan business family 
Gozour has owned a number of agribusiness             
assets including shares in National Company for             
Maize Products and Rashidi El­Mizan. The           
company also owns Dina Farms, a dairy and               
supermarket company and Enjoy. The company           
has also owned a share in El­Misriyyeen. 
EFG Hermes has owned a number           
of agribusiness companies through       
its fund Horus Food and and           
Agribusiness which featured a       




As of 2009 the fund invested 57% of its capital in                     
four companies, among them Wadi Foods,           
El­Misriyyeen and Edita Food Industries. 
Abraaj Capital is based in the UAE             
and has a number of influential Gulf             
shareholders   
Abraaj owns shares in Spinneys Supermarket and             
Agrocorp 
Amwal Al Khaleej is based in Dubai             
which owns shares in Upper Egypt           
Flour Mills  
Amwal owns shares in Upper Egypt Flour Mill,               
which is listed on the Egyptian stock exchange 

















Name of company  Nationality   Location   Size 
Jenaan  
 
Jenaan has a contract       
with Abu Dhabi Food       
Control Authority and     
supplies the Abu Dhabi       
government directly. It has       
a capital of more than US           
$1 billion and has       
operations in Sudan,     




Part of its contract       
included a deal with Egypt         
Air to operate a weekly         
flight to Sharq El       
Oweinat’s airport in order       
to transport workers and       
employees (MEED, 2009). 
Abu Dhabi ­     
UAE 





 Al Dahra’s Egyptian     
subsidiary Navigator   
Investments, was bought     
by Al Dahra in 2007 “in           
collaboration with the     
governments of the UAE       
and Egypt” (Al Dahra,       
2013).  
 
Al Dahra is owned by         
Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed       
Al Nahyan. 






















KADCO is owned by       
Al­Waleed bin Talal     
Al­Saudi 
Saudi Arabia  Toshka  26,000 acres of a total         
of 661,000 acres 
Al Rajhi International     
Investments is owned by       
Sulaiman Abdul Aziz Al       
Rajhi and his sons. 
Saudi Arabia  Toshka  103,784 acres of a       
total of 661,000 acres 
Jannat Agriculture   
Development Company (     
Egyptian subsidiary Al     
Rakha Company) 
 
The chairman of Jannat is         
Mohammed Al­Rajhi, the     






Jannat is owned by four         
agricultural companies   
that are listed on the         
Saudi stock market; Jazan       
Development Company,   
Al Jouf Agricultural     
Development Company,   
Wafrah for Industry and       
Development and   
Al­Marai (Zawya, 2014).  
Al Lehaa  Saudi Arabia  Toshka (or in vicinity)  Figures on the size of         
the farm are     
unavailable. 
 
According to one     
interviewee Lehaa   
mostly exports   
potatoes and exports     
around 3 million     
tonnes of the crop a         
year. 
Aqeel Group (Egyptian     
subsidiary East Oweinat     
for Investment) 
















Karwin for Land     
Reclamation Company 
 










Company for Land     
Reclamation 





















































The company has 29%       
market share of cooking oil. 
 
Savola owns two of three         
private sugar refineries in       
Egypt. 
 
Savola’s two pasta     
subsidiaries control 60% of       
the Egyptian market.  





Ajwa’s frozen vegetable     
subsidiary produces 18,000     
tonnes of frozen vegetables a         
year.  
Arma ­ Hayel     
Saeed Anam   
Group 
Yemeni  Cooking oil  65% market share of the corn           
oil market and 72% market         















Starch, syrup and     
animal feed 
 
The frozen chip subsidiary       
has 90% of the Egyptian         
market 
 
Its snacks subsidiary     
recorded sales of EGP 1.2         
billion in 2014 
Upper Egypt Flour     
Mills ­ 10% owned       
by Arab Cotton     
Ginning, which is     
partly owned by     
Amwal Al Khaleej     
a Saudi private     
equity company. 
Saudi Arabia  Flour   
East Delta Flour     














Processed food and     
snacks 
Starch and syrup 
Rashidi El­Mizan’s halawa     
and tahina products have       
Egyptian market shares of       
59% and 68%, as well as a             
15% share of the national         
jams market 
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 Univert ­ Around     
50% is owned by       



















  Gamal Mubarak was an       
investor in a fund that         
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